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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This PhD thesis accounts for the legitimacy challenges faced by the state that are 
specifically created by organized industrial workers through their anti-state unrest. It also relates 
such legitimacy challenges to recurring regime breakdown in unconsolidated democracies. I thus 
answer the question: how can we more fully account for labour-led legitimacy challenges to the 
state that at key times contribute to regime breakdown in unconsolidated democracies? I build 
on the dominant elite-driven explanations that are already emphasized in the existing theoretical 
literature by highlighting bottom-up labour mobilization that has not been given sufficient 
consideration. 
Moreover, I have uniquely framed such bottom-up mobilization in terms of “shared norms” 
in a very particular “moral economy” centred around development policy. These norms were in 
part created by the state as part of its informal “legitimation project” with labour. Key to the 
state-labour relationship within this moral economy is workers’ expectation of certain 
subsistence provision from the ruling regime in return for its role in state-led industrial 
production and national development. Such expectation of specific subsistence provision was 
partly built up by the state itself through its own rhetoric and policies; but this also set up the 
state to frequently lose legitimacy when such provision could not be delivered or maintained. 
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CHAPTER 1 
	  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During periods of both military and civilian rule in Pakistan in 1947-1971, ruling elites 
ploughed ahead with a development policy that focused heavily on boosting industrial 
production to achieve growth.1 Part of the rationale behind this particular development policy 
was to give legitimacy to a struggling Pakistani state both abroad and locally2 – the higher the 
level of state-guided industrial production (increasing overall growth), the greater the perceived 
legitimacy of the state.3 
At certain points in its history, outside observers openly praised the results of this 
ambitious industrial development policy, consequently recognising Pakistan as a legitimate state. 
In 1955, for instance, the US government commended Pakistan for the “speed and efficiency 
with which it carried out measures necessary” to give the people “benefits” from its economic 
program.4 In 1964, US President Lyndon B. Johnson admired the state’s “efforts to improve 
[people’s] well-being and pave the way for a better future.”5 The New York Times reported: 
“Pakistan may be on its way toward an [industrial] economic milestone that so far has been 
reached by only one other populous country, the US.”6 Even the Times of India noted its 
supposed enemy’s achievements in a 1965 editorial: “Pakistan has made impressive gains in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This policy, however, failed to consider the distribution of growth to all groups in society. This policy observation 
in many developing countries was first made by theorist John Stuart Mill in 1848 who wrote: “It is only in backward 
countries of the world that increased production is still an important object [when] what is economically needed is 
better distribution” (Book IV, 6.6. Principles of Political Economy, Seventh Edition, Longmans, Green and Co, 
London, United Kingdom, 1909). 
2 Pg 8. The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations Unpacking Complexity, OECD Publication, 2010. Accessed at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/6/44794487.pdf. The OECD identifies four types of legitimacy in weak states like 
Pakistan: process, performance, shared beliefs and international. 
3 Different theorists have defined legitimacy in terms of different criteria. Muthiah Alagappa (1996) for instance 
considers the legitimacy of the state to be linked to the identity of the nation-state, type of regime and government. 
Seymour Lipset (1959) considers the legitimacy of the state in terms of economic development. This thesis focuses 
in on the regime and economic aspect of state legitimacy. This is not to say that legitimacy did not decline with 
respect to the other criteria. 
4 Dawn, February 18, 1955 
5 Pg 2. The Pakistan Example, Documentation of Comments on Pakistan Economic Development, Ferozsons Ltd, 
Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 1966 
6 New York Times, January 18, 1965 
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[industrial] economic field during the last five years. … These are achievements of which 
Pakistan can be justly proud.”7 
Yet viewed through a socio-political lens of a very particular moral economy in Pakistan, it 
is clear that this policy did not always give the state its desired legitimacy locally. While certain 
elite industrialists approved of this development policy, significant numbers of industrial workers 
repeatedly challenged it and in effect the legitimacy of the state-labour relationship during 
periods of low or high growth and military or civilian-led leadership in 1947-1971. Organized 
industrial labour only made up a small minority (300,000-500,000 workers) in a country with a 
growing population of roughly 70-100 million8 in 1947-1971, yet more than ten to twenty 
percent of this group (30,000-100,000)9 managed to pose a notable threat10 to the ruling regime 
through their anti-state unrest. In fact, recurring strikes and protests led by industrial workers 
during this period reveal a “special sort of lens for examining society”11 – they “unmasked many 
of the values of a common people [surrounding development policy] which in other times went 
unvoiced.”12 These values showed labour’s “underlying assumptions about social and economic 
relations”13 in terms of its relationship with the state.14 This significant perspective is largely 
absent from the existing elite-centred literature on Pakistan yet quite apparent in certain local 
archival data. For a more holistic understanding of the challenges to state legitimacy in Pakistan, 
the role of labour must be considered. 
This PhD thesis thus accounts for key aspects of the legitimacy challenges faced by the 
Pakistani state that were specifically created by industrial workers through their anti-state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Times of India, Bombay, June 14, 1965 
8 Pakistan Population Census, Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1972 
9 Pg 10-28. Rashid Amjad and Khalid Mahmood, Industrial Relations and the Political Process in Pakistan 1947-
77, International Labour Organisation, Geneva, Switzerland, 1982 
10 Yes, these organized industrial workers were indeed a small group relative to Pakistan’s population, but this does 
not mean their impact on state legitimacy was negligible. After all, other groups who impacted state legitimacy at 
certain points were also small in number – e.g. a few military-bureaucratic elites in 1957-1958 and more than 20,000 
thousand students in 1969 challenged state legitimacy in distinct ways. 
11 Pg 482. Arjun Appadurai, How Moral Is South Asia’s Economy? – A Review Article?, Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. 43: 3, pg 481-497, 1984 
12 Pg 5. Adrian Randall and Andrew Charlesworth, Moral Economy and Popular Protests: Crowds, Conflict and 
Authority, Macmillan Press, London, United Kingdom, 2000 
13 Randall and Charlesworth 2000: 5 
14 Stanley Hoffman says the existence of the state is derived from “the needs of consent to its people.” This is rooted 
in “the horizontal contract – which is the source of political obligation” – and the right to political and civil liberty –
 the vertical tie which, within the state, binds the government to the people.” The “vertical tie” between the state and 
industrial labour is the focus of this thesis (Pg 67. Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and 
Possibilities of Ethical International Politics, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, United States, 1981). 
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unrest.15 It also relates such labour-led legitimacy challenges to recurring regime breakdown that 
has plagued Pakistan during both civilian and military-led rule since 1947. I thus answer the 
question: how can we more fully account for legitimacy challenges to the Pakistani state that at 
key times contributed to regime breakdown? I look past mere elite-driven explanations that are 
already emphasized in the existing literature and instead highlight bottom-up labour mobilization 
that earlier Pakistan-focused theorists have simply glossed over. I focus in on the state-labour 
relationship specifically to tackle the “problems of measurement” and “vagueness” in such a 
legitimacy-focused study.16 
Moreover, I have uniquely framed such bottom-up mobilization in terms of “shared 
norms”17 in a very particular “moral economy”18 centred around development policy. These 
norms were in part created by the state as part of its informal “legitimation project”19 with 
labour. Key to the state-labour relationship within this moral economy was workers’ expectation 
of certain subsistence provision from the state for its role in state-led industrial production and 
national development. Such expectation of specific subsistence provision was partly built up by 
the state itself through its own rhetoric and policies20; but this also set up the state to frequently 
lose legitimacy when such provision could not be delivered or maintained.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This is not to suggest that industrial labour was the only source of challenge to the state in Pakistan – this thesis’ 
focus is on workers, but Chapter Two does outline in more detail the other sources of challenge to state legitimacy 
already expressed in the existing literature. 
16 According to Andrew MacIntyre: “Problems of measurement are obvious and profound. All too often, scholars 
are reduced to vague and unsubstantiated assertions that this or that government or regime does or does not suffer 
from legitimation problems. In all but a few cases, there are grave problems of empirical validity. The danger of 
tautology is ever present; particular governments and regimes endured or collapsed because they did or did not enjoy 
sufficient legitimation” (Pg 173. Andrew MacIntyre, Book Review: Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The 
Quest for Moral Authority, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7: 3, pg 170-173, 1996). 
17 Pg 59-60. Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
California, United States, 1995 
18 The term “moral economy” was first coined by historian E. P. Thompson in 1971 to explain 18th century English 
crowds protesting food prices and the market; it was then used by political scientist James C. Scott in 1976 to 
explain peasant protests against capitalism in Vietnam; since the 1990s, social scientists like Steffen Mau (The 
Moral Economy of Welfare States: Britain and Germany Compared, Routledge, London, United Kingdom, 2003), 
Stevan Svallfors (Moral Economy of Class, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, United States, 2006) 
and William James Booth (A Note on the Idea of the Moral Economy, American Political Science Review, Vol. 87: 
4, December 1993) have reimagined the moral economy in terms of “the mutual rights and obligations of the 
governing and the governed” (Svallfors 2006: 1). The evolution of the moral economy literature from history to 
political science to political sociology is discussed later in this introductory chapter under the EXISTING 
LITERATURE heading. 
19 Alagappa 1996: 59-60 
20 This was a form of “policy legitimacy.” Richard Smoke (On the Importance of Policy Legitimacy, Political 
Psychology, Vol. 15: 1, pg 97-110, March 1994) refers to theorist Alexander George’s ideas on such legitimacy –
 i.e. the “normative component” in which the policy must be rooted in national values and norms; and also the 
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In fact, these pressures against the state existed throughout a regime’s tenure in Pakistan 
when labour’s specific expectations were not met. Such unrest over unmet expectations22 
threatened the state’s primary goal of industrial production that led to a “legitimacy strain” 
repeatedly during each regime’s tenure that also contributed to the “legitimacy crisis”23 towards 
the end of a regime’s tenure. By crisis, I refer to “a situation in which the basis on which 
authority has been claimed or acknowledged is under such severe stress that there is a strong 
possibility of its destruction and transformation”24; with strain, “the commitment to underlying 
norms may be weak to begin with, or perhaps the commitment has eroded for whatever reason, 
but the erosion has not reached crisis proportions.”25 Of course, the existing literature on 
Pakistan has already stressed the more elite-driven factors that have contributed to recurring 
legitimacy strain, legitimacy crisis and regime breakdown in this purported failed state. 
 
Preceding authors on Pakistani politics have largely framed their analyses in terms of elite, 
civil-military relations and how this has contributed to regime breakdown and the obvious lack 
of formal democracy.26 Since 1947, much like “Hobbes’ state of nature”, Pakistani politics have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“cognitive” aspect in which the state must convince society how it can achieve the policy (Smoke 1994: 100). This 
applies to the Pakistani state’s moral economy of development policy and specific steps it took to convince labour 
that this policy would provide them with expected subsistence conditions. 
21 This is relevant to Alagappa’s ideas. He notes: “Legitimation on the basis of performance is highly contingent –
 and therefore, as pointed out by Weber, it is unreliable as a long-term basis of authority. … Governments must 
continuously do better in order to meet expectations...” (Alagappa 1995: 41). He adds that sometimes a regime 
acquires power through “negative legitimacy” which applies to Pakistan: “the military – or a civilian with the 
support of the military – usurps power with the declared purpose of saving the country or its revered institutions in 
order to clean up the mess, to restore law and order, or to protect the country from a security threat. This 
intervention will be supported by groups that have been (or expect to be) disadvantaged by the policies of the former 
government. Disenchantment with the former government usually, though not always, makes for public 
acquiescence if not approval of the intervention.” Such regimes “by their very nature are prone to legitimacy crisis. 
Their legitimacy is based on rationales (charisma, performance, international support) that are difficult to sustain 
over a long period of time and, moreover, are subject to challenge on the basis of greater reward or greater force. … 
Combined with a capacity for limited self-renewal, these considerations contribute to the erosion of legitimacy and 
eventually to a crisis” (Alagappa 1995: 61-63). 
22 A similar case of “unmet expectations” affecting the legitimacy of the state has been expressed by Rudra Sil and 
Cheng Chen in their article, State Legitimacy and the (In)significance of Democracy in Post-Communist Russia (Pg 
349, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56: 3, pg 347-368, May 2004). 
23 Alagappa coined the term “legitimacy strain or crisis.” In his book, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1990), Rodney Barker defines a legitimate government as an ongoing 
“relationship between state and subjects” (Barker 1990: 2) – if the masses are not contesting the government’s 
decisions and policies, then they are not challenging the legitimacy of the state and so the government is said to be 
politically legitimate. 
24 Alagappa 1996: 59 
25 Alagappa 1996: 59 
26 It should be noted, however, that in recent years, there have been a few notable studies involving bottom up 
mobilization and informal institutions that impact democracy. Matthew J. Nelson’s book, In the Shadow of Shari'ah: 
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been “a ceaseless and ruthless struggle for power”27 among political and military elites. The 
civilian polity historically has been synonymous with corruption and instability, seemingly 
prompting the military’s intervention in politics in a “guardian coup”28 starting in 1958. At this 
point, General Ayub Khan announced the need to stabilize the country before a democratic 
transition could be initiated. But the military was ultimately ousted from power in 1971 by 
frustrated masses who were led by certain political elites.29 Some theorists have also shed light 
on the role of feudals, bureaucrats, Islamist groups and certain ethnic groups in contributing to 
the recurring pattern regime breakdown – whether these regimes have been civilian or military-
led. 
This thesis’ consideration of the role of labour in bottom-up pressures that hinder state 
legitimacy and eventually contribute to regime breakdown thus complements the existing 
literature and contributes to a more holistic understanding of Pakistani politics. It is the 
relationship between the state and organized industrial labour within Pakistan’s informal moral 
economy of development policy that serves as the causal mechanism connecting the independent 
variable (decline in subsistence provision) and the dependent variables (legitimacy strain of the 
state during a regime’s tenure or legitimacy crisis of the state that precedes regime breakdown). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Islam, Islamic Law and Democracy in Pakistan (Columbia University Press, New York, New York, United States, 
2009), explains through a thorough bottom-up analysis how, in western Punjab, the failure of “postcolonial 
democratization is related to the terms of an emerging and increasingly complex disjuncture between the substance 
of postcolonial reforms (“custom” à shari’ah) and the enduring focus of local economic and political demands” 
(Nelson 2009: 3). Arif Hasan’s book, The Unplanned Revolutions: Observations on the Process of Socio-Economic 
Change in Pakistan (Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2009), highlights a “set of dynamic 
informal institutions emerging from below that come to challenge and, ultimately, overwhelm the rigid institutions 
of both the colonial and, in due course, the modern postcolonial state” (Nelson 2009: 1-2). 
27 Pg 389. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan, Middle East Journal, Vol. 13:4, pg 
389-406, 1959 
28 Samuel Huntington defines the “guardian coup” as follows in his book Political Order in Changing Societies 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, United States, 1968): “Military involvement in politics is 
intermittent and for limited purposes, and hence the military view themselves neither as the modernizers of society 
nor as the creators of a new political order but rather as the guardians and perhaps the purifiers of the existing 
orders. … Military intervention, consequently, is prompted by the corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, 
subversion of the established political system. Once these are eliminated, the military claim that they can then return 
the purified polity to the hands of the civilian leaders. Their job is simply to straighten out the mess and then get 
out” (Huntington 1968: 225-226). 
29 This thesis does not emphasize politics events beyond 1971, but the following should be noted: after a brief period 
of civilian rule led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1971-1977, General Zia’s military-led regime emerged; but this ended 
with the death of the general in a suspicious plane crash in 1988. After an unstable era of civilian politics in 1988-
1999 led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, General (Rtd) Pervez Musharraf took over; but in 2007 he left 
politics after months of protests – spearheaded by a politically linked lawyers’ movement – and has finally given 
way to another phase of civilian rule since 2008. The lawyer’s movement arose from the sacking of Chief Justice 
Iftikhar Chaudhry in March 2007 by Musharraf. The current regime, led by President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime 
Minister Yousaf Gilani, reinstated the Chief Justice in March 2009 after recurring lawyer-led protests. 
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Though rooted in political science (legitimacy, regime breakdown), I also include certain 
elements from sociology (moral economy, patron-client relations) to more fully explain 
legitimacy strain and crisis of the state that contributes to the breakdown of both military and 
civilian regimes in Pakistan. I consider examples of both civilian and military-led eras from 1947 
to 1971 to better illustrate this new argument linking labour unrest30 to state legitimacy and 
regime breakdown in Pakistan.31 The specific and elite-driven changes in government – for 
instance, seven changes in government during 1947-1958 and one change during 1958-1971 – 
are not critical to this thesis; rather it is the attacks on the legitimacy of the civilian or military-
led regime itself through anti-state unrest that relate to the core argument.32 
	  
	  
  EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
This PhD thesis thus challenges three important bodies of literature. First, we 
undoubtedly push the literature on Pakistani politics in a new direction. The underlying 
assumption is that politicians, the military (Rizvi), feudals (Malik), bureaucrats (Jalal), Islamist 
groups (Haqqani) and ethnic groups (Talbot) have each played a role in destroying democratic 
prospects, particularly in terms of how they have impacted certain formal political institutions. 
But at times there appears to be more emphasis on describing political events and formal 
procedures, rather than producing one larger argument to explain the mechanism behind 
recurring legitimacy challenges and regime breakdown during civilian and military rule in 
Pakistan. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In the 2007-2009 global economic crisis, many countries experienced a severe local economic crisis that produced 
significant civil unrest (e.g. Russia, Greece, Ukraine, Chile and France) which sometimes led to a change in 
government (e.g. Iceland, Latvia and Hungary). Citizens expected certain forms of provision from the state but, with 
the externally induced-economic crisis, this could not be delivered. The state thus lost legitimacy in this specific 
sense, thus spurring unrest before a change in government occurred; this is much like what has happened repeatedly 
in Pakistan, though the country has always had the added disadvantage of excessive government expenditure on 
defence over development. Relevant articles include: World Bank’s Russian Economic Report (March 2009), New 
York Times’ Latvia’s Government Falls On Economic Toll (February 21, 2009), BBC’s Crisis May “Spark Social 
Unrest” (January 31, 2009). 
31 While this PhD thesis emphasizes the 1947-1971 period, Chapter Five: Conclusion does briefly suggest that this 
proposed link between labour unrest and state legitimacy could also apply to post-1971 military and civilian regimes 
as well, though more research is needed to determine evidence of a similar moral economy. 
32 Talking of democracy or dictatorship, as is often the case in political science, is of limited value for a country like 
Pakistan where anti-state unrest is the same against military and civilian-led regimes; also, it is only six decades 
later, since 2008, that there has finally been discussion about the country’s first legitimate democratic transition and 
election. 
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There is also a tendency by these authors to overemphasize the role played by certain 
elites – politicians, bureaucrats or army men – when describing the end of one regime. The role 
of labour is at times mentioned in terms of civil unrest, but it is not highlighted sufficiently in the 
context of bottom-up mobilization against a ruling regime. There is no sense that labour can 
independently impact state legitimacy since this group is usually described as being a passive 
actor who is simply manipulated into protest by elite groups. 
This PhD, however, challenges such elite and procedural-focused arguments in that it 
considers how Pakistan’s industrial workers have their own agenda (i.e. subsistence needs) and 
demands of the state, outside the reach of elite and politically motivated groups. These 
(organized) workers are a notable contributing factor in regime breakdown; in fact, through their 
informal relationship with the state, they are a chronic source of legitimacy strain through out a 
regime’s tenure, whether the regime is led by the military or political elites. 
Second, by making labour the focus of this PhD analysis, I challenge some of the 
political science literature on regime breakdown. For instance, I move beyond the elite-centred 
focus of earlier literature (Linz and Stepan) and build on the works emphasizing more bottom-up 
transitions (Bellin). While such bottom-up literature is relevant to the Pakistani case, I further 
emphasize labour’s impact on regime breakdown by adopting the patron-client lens of a 
particular moral economy – i.e. an informal social contract between state and labour. 
Third, I build on sociology-based literature on the “moral economy” (and patron-client 
relations) by connecting it to state legitimacy and regime breakdown. While the literature 
explores the idea of a decline in morally embedded patron-client relations and even a loss of 
legitimacy of the patronage relationship (Scott and Kerkvliet), the subsequent connection to state 
or regime breakdown is not fully developed. I also continue to build on the moral economy 
literature that has evolved considerably since Thompson first coined the term. In fact, I build on 
Posusney’s contemporary take on this concept by further solidifying the link between the moral 
economy and state legitimacy as well as regime breakdown. 
These three bodies of literature on Pakistan, regime breakdown and the moral economy 
together are a suitable starting point from which to better conceptualize Pakistan’s unstable 
politics during the period under consideration (1947-1971). At the same time, it sheds light on 
the gaps that can be filled. Let’s now consider each body of literature in turn, considering its 
strengths and weaknesses before fleshing out the main argument of this thesis in more detail. 
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PAKISTAN 
Bureaucrats and the Military 
Ayesha Jalal’s historical and comparative account, Democracy and Authoritarianism in 
South Asia (1995)33, is elite-centric in that it largely focuses on the centralized power of the 
bureaucracy and the military in shaping an undemocratic, post-colonial Pakistan. Jalal also 
briefly identifies similar themes as other authors – such as the role of ethnic groups, Islamist 
groups, politicians, feudals, foreign aid and economic crises – for the lack of democracy in each 
civilian and military-led era. 
But her main concern is with how certain elite partners within the state have controlled 
formal “political processes”34 and so hindered “formal democracy.”35 For instance, she notes 
how certain “dominant social classes” including West Pakistani landowners36 had allied with key 
bureaucrats and military men at certain points in history to prevent democratization.37 In doing 
so, she is not offering the reader a full picture of Pakistani politics – there is limited 
consideration of informal processes that may have hindered governance at different points. The 
reader is not offered a sense of the ebbs and flows in state legitimacy that may relate to regime 
breakdown – one regime simply breaks down and another steps in seemingly only because of 
elite-driven decisions. 
There is inadequate coverage of groups like industrial labour and how they might impact 
the state. Jalal briefly mentions how labour unrest erupted before the breakdown of General 
Ayub’s regime in the mid-late 1960s that led to General Yahya’s takeover.38 But this is not 
fleshed out in sufficient detail or related to challenges to state legitimacy or an underlying 
mechanism for regime breakdown. In this sense, her analysis seems incomplete, failing to offer a 
complete picture of Pakistani politics. 
 
Politicians and the Military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom, 1995 
34 Jalal 1995: 156 
35 Jalal 1995: 48 
36 Jalal 1995: 145 
37 Jalal 1995: 144 
38 Jalal 1995: 221 
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Hasan Askari Rizvi’s Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947 – 1997 (2000)39 essentially 
considers politicians and the military as well as civil-military relations in each regime to explain 
the country’s politics. In this sense, it is largely an elite-driven analysis. Rizvi argues that the 
weak nature of civilian and political institutions only made it more “convenient”40 for the 
powerful military to repeatedly intervene in the political system, though he acknowledges the 
military’s corporate and professional interests as well. He briefly notes how civilian regimes 
faced “serious crises of legitimacy” including at the “popular level”41 before breakdown, but 
does not develop this train of thought further to consider challenges to legitimacy at other points. 
The failure of military regimes is also linked to legitimacy crises but the emphasis is on the 
inability to adopt formal political institutions and loss in conflicts (e.g. 1971 war), rather than 
more informal institutions or legitimacy over time. 
Rizvi considers other factors – including strained border relations, political corruption, 
military aid and internal ethnic tensions – like other authors to explain instability in Pakistani 
politics and effectively the lack of democracy. But the precise mechanism that has produced this 
peculiar political pattern of recurring regime breakdown is not fully explicated. He offers a very 
comprehensive picture of events and the actors involved, rather than an overarching explanation 
for this specific political pattern. 
There is limited consideration of other factors that could pose a threat to the state and 
regime breakdown. While Rizvi does briefly mention frustrated protesters at the end of the 
General Ayub regime, their protest is vaguely framed in terms of a desire for democratic politics, 
rather than subsistence needs. There is no sense that these protesters have challenged the state at 
any other point except at the end of the regime’s tenure, unlike in this thesis where labour in 
particular is recurrently challenging the regime. Rizvi’s analysis of Pakistani politics thus feels 
insufficient. 
 
Islamist Groups and the Military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947- 1997, Sang-E-Meel Publications, Lahore, Pakistan, 
2000 
40 Rizvi 2000: 14 
41 Rizvi 2000: 8 
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Hussain Haqqani’s book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (2005)42, offers a 
different perspective on Pakistani history in that it considers the relationship between Islamist 
groups and the military, partly based on the author’s own experience in politics (especially 
during Benazir Bhutto’s regime in the 1990s). Haqqani argues that previous civilian and military 
regimes in Pakistan have used Islam to both unify the multi-ethnic state and strengthen national 
identity vis-à-vis the predominantly Hindu India. He explains recurring military intervention in 
politics as a result of “provocation” of the military by civilian regimes. Specifically, he explains 
that civil strife against some civilian regimes was purposely “orchestrated” by the military “with 
the help of the reliable street power of Islamist political parties”43 to facilitate regime breakdown. 
He thus alludes to how other groups – in this case, through the spurring of top-down 
mobilization in the streets in Pakistan – have contributed to regime breakdown, but only because 
they have been manipulated by certain elites.  
His analysis is helpful in explaining how civilian leaders have been pushed out of power, 
but the explanation for the downfall of military regimes is less obvious within this Islamist-
focused framework. In this way, Haqqani’s approach is limited in terms of explaining Pakistan’s 
recurring pattern of regime breakdown in its entirety. He also does not place emphasis on labour 
unrest that occurred earlier in a regime’s tenure that may have occurred independent of any elite-
driven influence or how labour may in fact act independent of elite manipulation, as this thesis 
explores. 
 
Feudals and the Politicians 
In Iftikhar H. Malik’s State and Civil Authority in Pakistan (1997) 44 , political 
developments are explained through the lens of the military, bureaucrats, gender, civil society 
and ethnicity, but this thesis focuses in on his chapter devoted to the feudalist system. Malik 
describes the general characteristics of the feudal class in Pakistan since 1947, especially in 
terms of the benefits of being part of the landed aristocracy. While it is made clear how the 
feudals have prevented democratic institutions from flourishing given their extensive political 
influence, it is not obvious how this elite group specifically contributed to recurring regime 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington D.C., Maryland, United States, 2005 
43 Haqqani 2005: 255 
44 Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Authority in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity, Macmillan 
Press, Basingstoke, United Kingdom, 1997 
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breakdown. And although it is clear what forms of state patronage have been given to the 
feudals, other actors are not considered in significant detail. 
From Malik’s analysis, it is apparent how feudals have reduced democratic prospects in 
Pakistan. The fact is that elite feudals have often formed the “bulk of Pakistan’s 
parliamentarians”45 and so have been in a position to prevent policies that would hinder their 
own power and profitability, such as land reforms and agricultural tax. Malik remarks: “a new 
generation of aristocrats with degrees from privileged Western universities have seen to it that 
their near monopoly of national politics and the economy remains unchallenged.”46 This of 
course prevented civilian regimes from successfully implementing more democratic policies, but 
this is not explicitly related to regime breakdown, in civilian or military rule. 
Malik does hint at the production-based forms of provision given by the state to certain 
feudal elites. He explains that, they acquired “grants, soft loans and foreign assistance through 
official channels to build up dairy and fruit farms. Such open biases for an agro-based economy 
are obvious to any observer of Pakistani socio-political structures.”47 But, unlike in this thesis, 
there is no discussion about how such production-based provision from the state may relate to 
other groups. 
He does offer us a basic sense of the role of other groups vis-a-vis elite feudals. He 
explains how the “the monopoly over local services has put the peasants in permanent 
bondage.”48 A mutually beneficial and patronage-based relationship is implied though in that, 
while the peasant worked on the property of the landlord, if he had trouble then the landlord 
assisted him. At the same time, he reveals how some peasants (Haris) were fearful of their 
landlords because, at any point they may be ousted; also, the peasant “might have to leave his 
crops half ripe, his cattle might also be snatched and he might be beaten out of the village.”49 Yet 
the connection between such actors and the state in terms of basic subsistence provision (that 
feed into legitimacy challenges and regime breakdown) is not sufficiently explored, unlike in this 
PhD research (though with respect to non-agricultural labour). 
	  
Ethnic Groups 
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46 Malik 1997: 81 
47 Malik 1997: 84 
48 Malik 1997: 89 
49 Malik 1997: 89 
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Ian Talbot’s book, Pakistan: A Modern History (2005)50, looks beyond what he terms the 
three As – Allah, Army, America – to explain Pakistan’s political developments. While he 
considers the usual gamut of reasons for the country’s unstable politics, Talbot ultimately argues 
that it is the state’s failure to embrace its people’s pluralism – ethnically, linguistically and 
religiously – that has prevented democracy since 1947. This thesis focuses in on his recurring 
theme of the Bengali ethnic minority during both civilian and military in 1947-1971. 
Like other academics, Talbot describes Pakistani politics as an “abject failure” given the 
recurring “political and constitutional crises.”51 In this way, he shapes much of his analysis in 
terms of formal, elite-driven political institutions and the actions of certain elites. But he also 
considers an informal lens when focusing on the frustration of the Bengali ethnic minority in 
East Pakistan. For instance, he notes that Bengalis of this province repeatedly protested against 
the Punjabi-dominated state’s decision to reject Bengali as an official language and for assigning 
large numbers of Punjabi officials to East Pakistan.52 He also notes the discrepancy in state 
patronage in the form of financial aid (e.g. $10 million in US aid in 1957-58, credit facilities in 
the 1960s) to East and West Pakistan, adding to perceived “Bengali alienation from the centre.”53 
Talbot explains that these ethnic-based grievances generated significant unrest among 
Bengalis at different points during both civilian and military-led eras in 1947-1971, which later 
led to the secession of East Pakistan. In this sense, he does allude to the idea that this ethnic 
minority challenged the state’s legitimacy when the ruling regime quite blatantly failed to offer 
resources. However, this line of thinking is not fleshed out sufficiently or explicitly connected to 
regime breakdown, as in this PhD research; rather Talbot’s primary focus is on military and 
political elites54 when describing the process of regime breakdown. 
	  
REGIME TRANSITIONS 
The earlier literature on regime breakdown takes a more elite-centred approach, unlike 
my research that focuses on the key relationship between the state and labour. For instance, Juan 
Linz and Alfred Stepan, in Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (1996), 
consider cases from Southern Europe, South America and post-Communist Europe to determine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, St Martin’s Press, New York, New York, United States, 2005 
51 Talbot 2005: 126 
52 Talbot 2005: 133 
53 Talbot 2005: 169-70 
54 Talbot 2005: 213 
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how a country can achieve democratic transition and consolidation. Underlying this approach are 
certain formal or constitutional modes of legitimation. They emphasize specific criteria that 
would make a state lose legitimacy – for instance, criteria in the realm of the “executive, 
legislative and judicial.”55 Furthermore, they suggest that state legitimacy is lost when political 
elites stop accepting the political system “behaviorally”, “attitudinally” and “constitutionally.”56 
But this elite-driven approach offers an incomplete picture of regime breakdown, as 
shown in this thesis. I highlight the significance of labour’s relationship with the state and the 
impact of this informal state-labour relationship on state legitimacy through out a regime’s 
tenure; it is about an informal social contract echoed by the moral economy literature, rather than 
the formal, constitutional modes of legitimation in the earlier regime transition literature. 
 There is more contemporary literature on regime breakdown that does consider dynamics 
“from below” and broader social forces that impact state legitimacy. In fact, some of this 
literature considers the role of labour in particular. Theorists like Nancy Bermeo attempt to test 
the theory that a more bottom-up view of regime breakdown is more appropriate. Using twenty 
cases of democratic collapse in various parts of the world, she investigates whether “ordinary 
people” play a role in the collapse of governments. While this thesis uses the word “unrest” to 
show labour’s role in regime breakdown, Bermeo refers to private polarization – i.e. changes in 
voting preferences – and public polarization – i.e. mobilizations in public spaces – of “ordinary 
citizens.”57 
Her research, however, shows the role of the ordinary does not have much impact on 
government stability. Taking an opposing view to Giovanni Sartori’s58 work on polarization, 
Bermeo concludes that government breakdown has more to do with the actions of political elites. 
She aptly quotes Valeria Bunce who wrote: “the termination of democracy is very much a matter 
of what elites choose to do – and not to do.”59 Of course, this thesis disagrees with Bermeo and 
Bunce in terms of the significant role of labour in challenging state legitimacy in the Pakistani 
case. 
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56 Linz and Stepan 1996: 5 
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The ideas of Eva Bellin focus on the role of coalitions, both capital and labour, in the 
process of regime breakdown, which is similar to my research. She suggests, “capital and labour 
are contingent democrats for every reason that they are consistent defenders of their material 
interests.”60 She considers that “state dependence, fear and aristocratic position shape capital and 
labour’s disposition towards democratization.”61 Her multi-country analysis of industrialists and 
labour is similar to my focus in that such groups support the existing government depending on 
what they get out of it. 
Bellin first explains the relationship between the state and industrialists that in one sense 
mirrors the provision expectation terms of this thesis. She refers to “the degree to which private 
sector profitability is subject to the discretionary support of the state” in terms of “subsidized 
inputs, protected market position, close collaboration in the definition of economic policy, state 
containment of labour and the capital poor.”62 This is similar to the patronage rhetoric of my 
argument in which elite industrialists expect state support to handle the demands of labour, as 
well as favourable economic policy to boost production. Bellin suggests that industrialists might 
support democracy out for “protecting property rights and securing long-term profitability of its 
investments through the guarantee of order.”63 
Labour, on the other hand, considers dependence on the state in terms of “union 
dependence on state subsidies and union members’ access to state-subsidized benefits as well as 
the politically manipulated setting of wage levels.”64 Organized labour’s aristocratic position 
refers to the “differentials found between the organized and unorganized in matters of wage 
levels, access to stable employment, social security and other nonwage benefits.”65 Again, this 
thinking is similar to the patronage relationship this thesis highlights between industrial labour 
and the state. And, as in this thesis, the support of these groups for the existing regime rests on 
whether their expectations of certain state provisions are met.  
James C. Scott and Benedict J. Kerkvliet offer a comprehensive overview of the types of 
patronage payments between patron and clients that can be applied to the Pakistani context. 
Patron to client flows are described in terms of a basic means of subsistence (e.g. access to land, 
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offering seed equipment), subsistence crisis insurance (e.g. willingness to give loans in time of 
“economic distress” or given support during poor harvest), protection (e.g. physical security) and 
brokerage and influence (e.g. getting rewards to benefit his client).66 
This fits into the informal patron-client relationship proposed in this thesis in terms of the 
state and industrial workers working toward industrial production. For instance, as patron the 
state offers industrial elites resources such as credit – patronage that will help them boost 
production and thus is in line with government policy. At the same time, the government 
promises to provide protection to vulnerable groups of this sector like the industrial labourers 
who often complain of mistreatment by their elite counterparts. In this conception of patronage 
relationships with the state, there are two levels of patronage from the patron, i.e. ruling regime. 
The point to be clarified in this thesis is how the decline of such patronage for industrial labour 
results in a loss of legitimacy of the patronage relationship that effectively reduces the legitimacy 
of the regime and can contribute to its breakdown. 
Scott and Kerkvliet also highlight client to patron flows. These include basic labour 
service (e.g. offering his labour), supplementary labour and goods or simply promoting the 
patron’s interests (e.g. votes, support for government policy). Again, this fits into this thesis’ 
conception of patronage goods given by certain actors to the state. For instance, in the industrial 
sector, in return for state patronage, elite feudals will facilitate government policy to boost 
industrial production; at the same time, workers will continue to offer their labour to help boost 
production. But again, the effect of fluctuations in such patronage on regime stability is 
something considered in this thesis. 
Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Fernando Limongi and Jose Antonio Cheibub in 
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 
(2000) investigate the relevant theme of economic crisis and regime breakdown through a multi-
country analysis spanning 40 years. They aptly explain that when an economy suffers a shock, 
“democracy becomes vulnerable to political forces that put the blame on the “anarchy” of 
democratic competition; such forces promise to establish “order” and to sanitize the economy. ... 
[In dictatorships], the regime can no longer legitimize itself by its economic performance, and 
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forced to liberalize, it unleashes the forces for transition.”67 This logic is similar to my argument 
on economic crisis and regime breakdown, but I view this through the specific lens of a decline 
in subsistence conditions before and during economic decline, and distinguish between military 
and civilian regimes, rather than dictatorships and democracies. 
They note how “under dictatorships, high income inequality may stimulate movements 
attracted by the egalitarian promise of democracy. Under democracy, dominant social groups 
may seek recourse to authoritarianism when the exercise of political rights by the poor – whether 
in the form of suffrage or freedom of association – results in egalitarian pressures.”68 Like in 
Pakistan, labourers do engage in civil unrest when there is a degree of inequality in that expected 
subsistence is not delivered. The distinction of course is that in Pakistan, such anti-state action 
happens under both civilian and military rule. 
Przeworski, Alvarez, Limongi and Cheibub also try to “observe something like pressures 
toward transition” and relate them to “economic dynamics” but they suggest this cannot be 
observed, except for “visible manifestations of political mobilization: strikes, anti-government 
demonstrations, or riots.”69 But these theorists fail to recognize how such unrest is in fact 
reflective of certain aspects of economic dynamics (i.e. price levels) when regime breakdown is 
imminent. This PhD research suggests a closer look at labour “mobilizations” to reveal that 
“economic dynamics” are a factor. 
For this study on Pakistan, I thus consider the role of ruling elites but in relation to 
bottom-up pressures in regime breakdown. Industrial labour definitively challenged state 
legitimacy through out each regime’s tenure, also being a factor that leads to regime breakdown. 
But this is all viewed through a particular moral economy lens centred on development policy. 
	  
MORAL ECONOMY 
My findings in the Pakistani case appear to build on the moral economy theoretical 
framework put forth by the late political scientist Marsha Pripstein Posusney70 in her analysis of 
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pg 76-136, 1971); but she adapts it for the Egyptian case, framing it around the regime’s development policy rather 
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Egypt’s labour protests and its moral economy during capitalist, socialist and mixed regimes of 
the 1950s-1980s: 
 
“In this economy, workers view themselves as being in a patron-client relationship with 
the state. The latter is expected to guarantee workers a decent wage by regulating their paychecks 
and by controlling prices on basic necessities... Workers, for their part, … contribute to the 
postcolonial national development project through their labour.”71  
 
Like Posusney, I construct a moral economy model at the “macro-political level”72 in 
which the state and industrial labourers are in an informal patron-client relationship constructed 
around a national development policy, rather than the market as original conceived by moral 
economy theorists; this patron-client relationship is made obvious by the “nature of [labour] 
protests, their immediate causes, and their frequency in relation to economic conditions”,73 as 
well as state policies and speeches on labour issues. The sway of the state over labour unions that 
influence formal sector workers also shapes the expectation of patronage embedded in the moral 
economy of development policy. 
What I found is that workers expect a certain type of subsistence from the state in return 
for their contribution to the “postcolonial national development project”74, specifically in terms 
of their role in industrial production. This creates what Posusney terms “entitlement 
expectations”75 that can “limit the flexibility of that country’s rulers” – i.e. when workers do not 
receive the goods to which they feel they are entitled for their role in development, their notion 
of “economic justice”76 and subsistence is threatened within this particular moral economy. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
than the market. For a critique of Thompson’s ideas, see John Bohstedt’s The Moral Economy and the Discipline of 
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71 Posusney 1993: 89 
72 By “macro-political level” (Posusney 1993: 120), Posusney is effectively referring to government policies that 
relate to the labour class. For instance, she highlights policies like the official industrial workweek, minimum wage, 
food subsidies (Posusney 1993: 90-91) that are supposed to benefit workers and form part of the expectation 
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micro-level, Marxism and rationality could explain protests more effectively than with the moral economy rationale. 
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pushes them to protest or hold strikes and in effect attack the legitimacy77 of their patron-client 
relationship with the state that can affect the ability of the ruling regime to govern. 
I posit in this thesis that such bouts of labour-led unrest that hinder production challenge 
not only the legitimacy of the informal patron-client/state-labour relationship but also the regime 
itself – in this sense, this can also be a contributing factor to legitimacy strain and crisis of the 
state which can contribute to regime breakdown. Such emphasis on industrial labour78 in relation 
to the state is a fresh way to view state legitimacy and regime breakdown in Pakistan. 
The moral economy lens allows us to connect state and labour; it allows us to examine 
the ebbs and flows in state-labour relations that in fact impact the legitimacy of particular 
regimes. Posusney questions why the moral economy lens is most applicable to labour protests in 
her consideration of Egypt, rather than Marxist or rational frameworks. Her reasoning can also 
apply to the Pakistani case in this thesis. By examining the specific nature of labour protests in 
Pakistan during different regimes, we see that the moral economy rationale is the most relevant 
explanation for such unrest.  
Just as Posusney explains in Egypt, in Pakistan “labour protests occur more frequently 
when the economy is deteriorating, suggesting restorative protest aimed at preventing erosion of 
the workers’ standard of living.” Rather than fight for an increase in pay or “raise new demands”, 
workers typically “sought to regain earnings that had been taken away, again indicating 
restorative protest” in line with the moral economy rationale. Protests also show “strong 
indications that feelings of entitlement have been violated,” particularly when “management or 
the government failed to fulfill its promises.”79 
If these protests were rooted in rationality, Posusney’s logic suggests workers would be 
protesting to maximize their income. In this sense, workers would “strike only if the expected 
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78 Tariq Ali does consider the role of workers, along with students, in bringing down the General Ayub dictatorship 
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benefits, in terms of higher pay and benefits, [exceeded] the expected costs, in terms of forgone 
wages and possible job loss.” 80  So workers would protest more because they see an 
“opportunity” to gain patronage in terms of “higher pay and benefits”, rather than because they 
have experienced an “increase in discontent.”81 Again, this does not fit the Pakistan case where 
labourers typically have protested to regain what was lost and to what they feel they are entitled 
– not more or less. 
If labour protests were rooted in Marxism, then there would be a “fairly steady growth in 
the frequency of strikes and the number of workers involved in them as capitalism progresses.”82 
There would be a visible effort to “raise the class of consciousness of workers” and end “their 
exploitation” which we don’t see explicitly in the Pakistani case. In fact, the singular focus of 
protests by labourers from different factories and industrial sites is simply to receive what they 
were promised by the capitalist state – again an indicator of a moral economy, rather than 
Marxist thinking. 
Posusney identifies specific “evidence of this type of moral economy” to explain labour 
protests in Egypt which also relates to the Pakistani case. First, she points out how “in almost 
every incident the workers’ demands were directed against the state”, reinforcing the patron-
client relationship between the state and labour in this moral economy; this is shown in the 
Pakistani case as well. Second, “workers revealed their view of their own obligations by 
eschewing actual work stoppages … that affirm their continuing loyalty to the cause of 
production, even while they feel aggrieved.”83  
In Pakistan, typically we see that workers first went through official channels to raise 
their concerns about expected patronage they did not receive – it is only then when promises 
were still not kept that we see protests and strikes that disrupt production. This reinforces the 
idea that labour recognized its role in national production in its informal patron-client 
relationship with the state and would avoid civil unrest until it felt state institutions were not 
responding to its subsistence needs. 
There is thus clear evidence of a moral economy in Pakistan in which “collective action” 
by workers follows what Posusney calls a “stability-disruption-protest” pattern, with “demands 
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that are restorative and/or exhibit notions of fairness and a patron-client relationship”84 within 
industrial development policy. In this specific sense, when workers felt there was a disruption in 
their expected subsistence provision from the state, they would go through official channels to 
express their concern (e.g. through labour court); if the state did not ensure that labour’s 
expected patronage was delivered, particularly after a legal ruling, this would lead to protests 
until a specific response from the state (or state-based pressures on employers). Such unrest 
directed at the state represented legitimacy strain as the state’s goal of unhindered production 
was at risk. But once the state responded, protests would end and “stability” would resume, with 
labour going back to work to further the industrialization agenda of the state. This pattern of 
events that impacts state legitimacy is illustrated in chapters three and four, using the 1947-1958 
and 1958-1971 eras. 
Of course, as I will show at the end of each regime, the specific focus of these moral 
economy violations appears to increase to focus on both wages and price levels indicating a shift 
from expectation crisis to subsistence crisis, while protests and strikes rapidly increase; this leads 
to a breakdown of the stability-disruption-protest pattern and a legitimacy crisis of the state as its 
singular development agenda is threatened. Along with other elite-driven factors, unrest by 
labour and other groups at this point represents a direct attack on state legitimacy via its 
development agenda, which creates constraints for the ruling regime to govern; this legitimacy 
crisis of the state contributes to the breakdown of the ruling regime. 
 
Beyond Posusney’s work, this thesis draws on other moral economy literature to more 
fully explain the role of such bottom-up mobilization and labour’s specific relationship with the 
state. Typically, when one thinks of the moral economy, one thinks of protest movements rooted 
in anti-capitalist sentiment that “frequently accompany state making, commercialization of 
agriculture and colonialism.”85 Moral economists have often explained such protest movements 
in terms of “a (presumed) loss of subsistence, security and welfare by the peasantry during these 
changes. They interpret violence as a defensive reaction against capitalism and as an attempt to 
restore the (precapitalist) structures that provided peasant welfare.”86 But in fact the concept has 
evolved since the 1970s. 
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Since Thompson first coined the moral economy in his 1971 study of 18th century 
English crowds protesting food prices, this term has reappeared in political scientist Scott’s 1976 
study of the peasant movements against capitalism in Vietnam. But more recently, political 
sociologists (e.g. Svallfors 2006; May 2003) have re-conceptualised the moral economy more 
generally in terms of the rights and responsibilities of citizens as it relates to public policies and 
institutions. And of course Posusney (1993) used the moral economy to explain labour protests 
in Egypt. This later literature suggests a specific patron-client relationship embedded in this 
moral economy framework involving the ruling government, labour and national development. 
As mentioned before, this thesis builds on Posusney’s model of the moral economy, applying it 
to Pakistan and stressing national development policy in framing the terms of morality. 
But let’s consider the original concept of the moral economy in more detail. Thompson’s 
seminal paper “fundamentally redefined the way in which social historians investigated and 
interpreted popular protest.” He noted that these protests were not just about “rebellions of the 
belly” since they revealed a particular “order and focus which could not be explained by a simple 
desperation for food.” In fact, he suggested such food-focused riots were a “highly complex form 
of direct popular action, disciplined and with clear objectives, the actions of the crowd being 
“informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights or customs.”87 
Thompson explained that these “rights and customs” were in fact rooted in the 
“paternalist model of the marketing and manufacturing process.” Protesters “demanded that 
foodstuffs should be marketed at or near their place of origin, that all transactions should be 
transparent and in the marketplace and that the needs of the poor should always take precedence 
over those of dealers and middlemen.” But at those times when prices were not stable and even 
increased dramatically, the poor felt there was an “artificial scarcity” due to “market 
manipulation” by certain middlemen and government did not respond. This perceived injustice 
was the “legitimising notion” to justify popular intervention and, according to Thompson, 
represented “the moral economy of the poor.”88 The protests were about preventing “market 
manipulation” of commodity prices and “securing a subsistence” at affordable prices. In 
Thompson’s analysis, this “moral economy” was the “value system of an “entire plebian 
society.”89 
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In the same way, this thesis highlights the “moral economy” of Pakistan’s organized 
industrial workers. Just like in Thompson’s 18th century English countryside where workers 
expected the elite to maintain a basic minimum, Pakistan’s 20th century industrial labourers 
expected the state to maintain their subsistence conditions. Eighteenth century protesters wanted 
certain basic food items at fair prices, as did Pakistani labourers. In this case, workers were told 
(and believed) that their role in development would give them basic subsistence promised by the 
state. 
 Scott took this concept and applied it in a similar way to rural, precapitalist Vietnam. He 
suggests that villagers protested because of the way capitalism negatively affected the 
“precapitalist structures that provided peasant welfare.”90  The protests and violence were 
“desperate efforts to maintain subsistence arrangements that [were] under assault.”91 It is the 
village that provided “peasants with security in precapitalist society”92 and offered the individual 
a “minimum income”93 to survive – until capitalism posed a threat to this system.  
At the core, there is a provision-based relationship at work that falters and sense of social 
injustice that is experienced, like Thompson’s 18th century English food riots and this thesis’ 20th 
century Pakistani labour protests. Scott talks about the “subsistence ethic” of the villager being at 
risk94 that propels him to protest. This could also be paralleled to the industrial labourer in 
postcolonial Pakistan. While the peasant in precapitalist Vietnam is in a patron-client 
relationship with his landlord,95 the organized industrial worker in Pakistan is in a comparable 
relationship with the state (not with employers, in keeping with national development policy 
rhetoric). He relies on the state to ensure that within this joint attachment to national 
development policy, his employer treats him fairly. Scott also refers to the loss of legitimacy of 
this patron-client relationship, which is also how we view the state-labour relationship in 
Pakistan.  
 
Of course, this thesis takes this moral economy framework a step further by connecting it 
explicitly to regime legitimacy and breakdown. Political sociologists like Svallfors have re-
conceptualised the moral economy concept in a way more similar to what is used in this thesis. 
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Its focus is no longer the reaction of the poor to unexpected changes in the paternalist model of 
the precapitalist system. Rather, theorist Svallfors views the moral economy in society more in 
terms of the legitimacy of a particular patron-client relationship – i.e. as “the mutual rights and 
obligations of the governing and the governed [which] are collected and condensed.”96 
He notes that at its core, Thompson explained riots “as an idea that the governing powers 
had broken the unspoken contract, the idea of the rights to which all citizens were entitled, that 
was firmly rooted in society”97 – this is precisely what he builds on in his reconceptualization of 
the moral economy. This is also applied to this thesis where we propose that the ruling regime 
offers certain provision to labour to encourage its role in the national development project that is 
emphasized by each military or civilian government. This is also applied to this thesis where we 
propose that the ruling regime also generates certain expectation through its actions for labour. 
Svallfors talks about how the moral economy involves “people’s notions of social 
institutions [that] are guided by normative ideas of reciprocity, obligation and responsibility.”98 
He notes that some researchers have found this moral economy notion “useful for 
complementing a pure self-interest perspective on preferences and attitudes.” In effect, political 
theorists, particularly in sociology, have conceived this moral economy in which “the role of 
public policies and political institutions is paramount,”99 in that they “influence the ways 
individuals understand their rights and responsibilities as members of a political community.”100  
This is precisely why this thesis places such emphasis on government policies and 
labour’s responses to the state when expectations are not met. As Svallfors puts it, “the moral 
economy of present-day societies may therefore, to a large extent, be seen as resulting from 
normative feedback effects of public policies and formal institutions. … A normative feedback 
mechanism is present where public policies and institutions provide citizens with a sense of not 
what their material interests are but the desirable state of affairs.”101 
 But Posusney’s concept of the moral economy is most relevant to this thesis. As 
previously mentioned, she specifically looks at how Egyptian labour had a particular role in the 
government’s development policy and in return certain subsistence-related provision was 
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promised. Of course, this thesis takes her framework and applies it to Pakistan, adding a 
significant economic and psychological angle to explain when the moral economy appears to 
break down, contributing to regime instability and even breakdown. 
My application of Posusney’s conception of the moral economy rooted in political 
sociology makes it prudent to consider certain aspects of the patronage-specific literature from 
political science and sociology as well. Posusney highlights the patron-client relationship 
embedded in the moral economy, but how should one characterize this relationship? 
Thomas Pepinsky considers “government patronage” like in my research, but his 
consideration is more closely linked to political patronage and electoral results. Using the case of 
Malaysia, he argues that authoritarian regimes use fiscal policy to “reward political supporters 
and to punish political opponents.”102 Pepinsky considers the idea that economic performance is 
indicative of a regime’s legitimacy, as assumed in this thesis. But in the case of Malaysia, the 
government manipulates the economy before the election as opposed to “violence and 
intimidation”103 to ensure its success. Ruling elites will “spend more in periods preceding an 
election.”104 This PhD research, however, is more focused on patronage outside of the political 
realm, i.e. those forms of patronage specifically needed to maintain and increase industrial 
production as part of the larger development project. Of course, the rationale behind such 
patronage is to boost development, which would give further legitimacy to the ruling regime. 
This thesis places less emphasis on elections, given the inconsistencies in such results and the 
recurring upheaval of political institutions in Pakistan.  
Scott and Kerkvliet note that “legitimacy could be viewed as a service the client can 
potentially give the patron” and vice versa.105 In his book, Private Patronage and Public Power 
(1982), Christopher Clapham notes that such patronage relationships are defined by “regularity 
and persistence,” creating a pattern of “expectation.”106 Again, the implication is that if the 
patronage payment – in this case an excludable good or service – cannot be given by one 
individual to the other and thus the expectation is not met, then the patronage relationship loses 
its legitimacy. But these academics fail to acknowledge the specific connection between 
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declining legitimacy in patronage relationships and hence declining legitimacy of the state that 
can contribute to regime breakdown. 
Carl H. Lande, in Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism 
(1977), provides an answer as to how to overcome the “infinite” nature of such networks for the 
sake of academic study. He notes how many writers have identified the “unbounded”, “infinite” 
and “everlasting” nature of the “total network.”107 Lande points out that, to be studied, a scholar 
should thus “limit his attention to a finite number of individuals.”108 He references the idea of 
Barnes’ “partial networks” which is “any extract of a total network.”109 I apply such thinking to 
this thesis by focusing in on one specific form of patronage involving the regime’s economic 
policies to boost industrial production; also, I only focus on the state-labour dynamic This is not 
to suggest that other types of patronage do not exist – for instance, several authors writing on 
Pakistan have already considered the link between elite patronage and electoral votes, despite the 
recurring view that most elections have been rigged. 
Perhaps Pranab Bardhan’s ideas on state patronage are also relevant to the Pakistani case 
and this thesis, though he is referring to India. He explains how “tensions and frustrations” with 
the “patronage distribution network” means a loss of legitimacy and civil unrest results. “The 
hegemonic hold of the dominant proprietary classes over the subordinate classes starts slipping 
away even when their economic grip still remains strong.”110 This also fits in well to the Pakistan 
case in which the ruling regime is less able to control their industrial workers when there appears 
to be a disruption in expected patronage, leading to protests; the regime consequently 
experiences a decline in legitimacy. 
	   	  
	  
A FRESH APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING PAKISTANI POLITICS 
 
 These three bodies of literature on Pakistan, moral economy and regime breakdown 
hence give us a good starting point from which to better conceptualize Pakistan’s unstable 
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politics. At the same time, it sheds light on the gaps that can be filled, in particular through the 
lens of this specific moral economy in Pakistan. 
 Before I outline the proposed argument, it is important to clarify the conceptual apparatus 
of this thesis. What particular mind-set should one have when understanding this particular case 
study and this proposed argument for challenges to state legitimacy and eventual regime 
breakdown in Pakistan? I consider three sets of analytical subcomponents to do with how the 
moral economy operates, the factors limiting each regime’s patronage to labour within this moral 
economy and how clients – i.e. industrial workers – react to drops in subsistence patronage from 
their patron government. 
  
 First, I consider those conceptual subcomponents relating to how the moral economy 
operates. I borrow Kitschelt’s definition of the political regime. I will not talk of democracy or 
dictatorships in Pakistan, but simply the ruling political regime either led by civilian or military 
rulers, given the lack of consolidation of either system.111 Kitschelt defines the political regime 
as “essentially a way of allocating resources in society.”112 This is precisely what I assume in this 
thesis, but through the lens of a specific moral economy of development policy associated with 
the military or civilian regime in power. 
Then I apply the idea of patron-client ties from sociology to illustrate the state-labour 
relationship in Pakistan’s moral economy. Eisenstadt and Lemarchand describe such relations as 
“dyadic bonds between individuals of unequal power and socioeconomic status.” 113  It is 
“conditions of extreme economic insecurity”114 that have pushed all individuals into such 
patronage relationships115 – this mirrors the Pakistani case in which industrial workers have 
formed expectation bonds with government in part for their own economic survival; in the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Of course, some might argue that there has never been a democratic government or a civilian government free of 
military and ISI influence from behind-the-scenes and in this sense Pakistan has always been an authoritarian state. 
But such an assumption is difficult to pinpoint in an academic study, given the lack of transparency of the ISI and 
military. 
112 Herbert Kitschelt, Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations? American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 86: 4, pg 1028–1034, 1992. Kevin Morrison applies this definition as well in his analysis of 
nontax revenue and regime stability in his article: Oil, Nontax Revenue and the Redistributional Foundations of 
Regime Stability (International Organization, Vol. 63, pg 107-138, Winter 2009). 
113 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981: 15 
114 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981: 20 
115 Pg 7. Christopher S. Clapham, Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State, 
Pinter Press, London, United Kingdom, 1992 
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way, the ruling regime needs labour to perform its role in development policy.116  Such 
relationships within the moral economy are thus “voluntarily entered into and derive their 
legitimacy from expectations of mutual benefits.”117 
Furthermore, I assume each regime believes economic growth is paramount to it 
maintaining its legitimacy118; in this way, the patron-client relationship embedded in the moral 
economy of development policy is critical to the ruling regime’s survival. This is precisely why I 
focus in on one specific state policy that exists in each regime – that of increasing production 
which is said to boost overall growth and hence the legitimacy of the ruling regime. Related to 
this, the state focused on achieving the “normative” and “cognitive” aspects of “policy 
legitimacy”119 – i.e. framing development policy in terms of shared national “values” and 
showing labour how it could realistically achieve such policy using specific measures.120 
Since the existing literature has already highlighted in some detail the elite relationship 
with government in terms of development, I only consider the patronage given by the ruling 
regime to clients comprising industrial labour involved in maintaining production, which also 
helps to cope with the seemingly infinite nature of patronage relationships.121 Being more 
specific with the state-labour focus also helps to tackle the limitations of a legitimacy study; after 
all, “there are inherent difficulties in isolating legitimacy as a variable” such that “there are 
almost always real questions about the extent to which legitimacy (or its absence) can be said to 
cause the endurance (or collapse) of a government, a regime or even a nation-state.”122 
The second set of conceptual subcomponents is focused on what limits the moral 
economy in terms of the ability of the ruling regime to distribute subsistence patronage to labour. 
I rely on the argument of Jalal’s political economy of defence to reinforce the very limited 
patronage each government can offer its clients, even before a crisis in local economic conditions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 At the same time, patronage links groups from various classes independent of government (e.g. between feudals 
and tenants, industrialists and their labour), but this thesis focuses in on government-linked patronage relationships 
primarily between she ruling labour and industrial labour. This point is made in Clapham’s book, Private Patronage 
and Public Power (1982: 6): “Even the patron-client is inherently dyadic, it lends itself very easily to the formation 
of chains of dyads, in which the same individual is simultaneously a client in relation to those above him in the 
hierarchy.” 
117 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981: 15 
118 Alagappa 1996 
119 Smoke 1994: 100 
120 Smoke 1994: 100 
121 Schmidt1977 
122 MacIntyre 1996: 173 
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may occur. Each regime is restricted in terms of development expenditure, given the budgetary 
emphasis on defence123; it is also heavily dependent on foreign funding (e.g. IMF tranches).124 
In this sense, the economy is always struggling to stay afloat and the risk of an economic 
crisis always seems imminent. As a result, the ruling regime has limited patronage to offer and 
tends to distribute most to the most dominant groups – the elites of the feudal and industrial class 
in particular – because they presumably have the best chance of promoting growth as soon as 
possible. As one analyst put it, “Pakistan’s [chronic] fiscal troubles arise partly from the size of 
its defence expenditures … and partly from the cost of servicing its domestic and foreign debt. 
These two obligations consume virtually all government revenues; hence the government must 
borrow money even to pay salaries and expenses.”125 Only minimal resources can then be 
offered to industrial labour.126 
Third, I make certain claims about the behaviour of each client when there is a perceived 
crisis in patronage expected from the state. Effectively, I take on the role of the “moral 
economist” as described in economic anthropology127 and political sociology to understand how 
a decline in expected patronage might prompt protests among certain clients. As previously 
explained, these industrial workers expect the state to ensure subsistence-related provision for 
their labour. It is when the state fails to offer this that these groups react. Industrial workers are 
pushed too close to what they feel is their minimum level of subsistence, leading to subsistence-
related protests. Such unrest represents an attack on state legitimacy. 
The fact that labour acts out against the state when it feels basic subsistence needs are not 
delivered is reflective of the expectation relationship. In this sense, the patronage payment they 
expect for their role in development does not correlate to what they have received. When the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Jalal 1995 
124 As former Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin put it in 2009 when talking about Pakistan’s chronic economic failure: 
“We have avoided the tough decisions, and we just keep hoping that something will happen, and we will get this 
infusion of foreign aid.” He added that, “you cannot achieve economic stability without political stability.” The lack 
of urgency to create systemic change is “the long-term history of Pakistan. This is not one government” (New York 
Times Sunday Magazine, James Traub, April 5, 2009). 
125 Pg 122. Anwar H. Syed, Pakistan in 1997: Nawaz Sharif’s Second Chance to Govern, Asian Survey, Vol. 38: 2, 
pg 116-125, 1998 
126 This relates to the idea of the elitist state, as theorized by Ishrat Husain in his book, Elitist Model of Growth 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1999). Husain talks of Pakistan’s “elitist model of growth” in 
which “both economic and political power are held by a small coterie of elites, the market is rigged and the state is 
hijacked in order to deliver most of the benefits of economic growth to this small group.”126 This elitist model of 
growth obviously correlates to Pakistan’s moral economy that focuses the bulk of its financial forms of patronage on 
the elites, while only limited patronage can be offered to clients like industrial labour for their basic subsistence. 
127  Pg 187-188. Jean Ensminger, Theory in Economic Anthropology, Society for Economic Anthropology 
Monograph Series No. 18, AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek, California, United States, 2002 
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ruling regime quickly addresses these concerns through speeches, conferences and legislation, it 
regains some legitimacy in the eyes of labour, who then stop or at least reduce their civil unrest –
 this is evidence of the state-labour relationship in the moral economy of development policy. 
I also note, however, how in the final years each military or civilian-led regime, labour 
unrest appears to shift to a more prominent focus on subsistence patronage relating to prices; and 
the state response appears to have limited impact. These growing bouts of labour-led civil unrest 
appear to coincide with unrest involving other groups in society and a decline in general 
subsistence conditions. The patronage payment they expect for their role in development does 
not correlate to the living conditions in which they find themselves. The situation may not have 
deteriorated radically but workers feel prices are not being provided relative to what is expected. 
In this sense, the ruling regime has failed to fulfill its expected role in the moral economy of 
development policy, which poses a threat to its legitimacy. 
 
This thesis thus builds on the work of such theorists from various disciplines and 
connects it to Pakistani politics. Ultimately, by reading this thesis with the moral economy lens, 
one should understand how bottom-up pressures from industrial labour have consistently 
challenged state legitimacy and even contributed to regime breakdown. At times, such unrest has 
created legitimacy strain for the state, while other times it has contributed to a crisis in which the 
entire system – military or civilian-led regime – is challenged enough to break down. With both 
elite-driven factors and to a certain extent labour protest, Pakistan has never had a chance to 
consolidate democratic institutions in its six decade-existence and, short of a revolt against this 
system, is unlikely to break out of its pattern128 of regime instability and breakdown. 
It might seem relevant to draw on the literature exploring the link between economic 
crises, government breakdown and regime change, but the focus is more on causes of regime 
breakdown, rather than the mechanism behind it which I address in this thesis. For instance, 
Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman129 explain that when a factionalized military regime faces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Of course, one could argue that Pakistan’s democratic transition has finally begun in that General (Rtd) 
Musharraf’s regime finished its full term and, with what were perhaps the country’s first legitimate elections, his 
party was routed. In this sense, perhaps the pattern of regime instability and breakdown has ended. Then again, one 
must consider how much influence the military still has in politics unofficially and in this sense the new democratic 
government is limited severely and speculation is rife that a military coup could occur once again. This was even 
revealed in recent Wikileaks documents in which General Kayani said he was pondering whether a military takeover 
was needed given the perceived corruption and instability of President Zardari’s government. 
129 Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, United States, 1995 
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an economic crisis, a change in regime to democracy is likely. Jeffrey Frieden130 also suggests a 
dictatorship (e.g. Argentina, Brazil), rather than a democracy (e.g. Mexico, Venezuela), is more 
likely to experience government breakdown and even regime change when faced with an 
economic crisis because of elite social groups’ dissatisfaction with specific economic policies. 
Amitav Acharya131 talks of how the Asian financial crisis showed that an “economic downturn 
can precipitate the downfall of authoritarian rule”132 as dictators like Suharto in Indonesia could 
not adjust accordingly, relative to his democratic counterparts. These theorists thus talk of the 
effect of the crisis on government at the elite level, while I consider it through the lens of a very 
specific state-labour relationship. 
More importantly, I present each government simply as a political regime that struggles 
to allocate resources to society, as opposed to distinguishing between authoritarian and 
democratic regimes; my portrayal of Pakistan suggests the experience of military and civilian-led 
regimes is very similar in that they both struggle to distribute limited resources to organized 
industrial labour through this particular lens of the moral economy of development policy. 
	  
My main purpose is to prove that a disruption in subsistence patronage from the state to 
labour can lead to bouts of civil unrest that effectively attack state legitimacy through out 
military and civilian-led eras in Pakistan. When elite-driven factors are in play and general 
economic conditions appear to worsen, such unrest can also escalate as the ruling regime is less 
capable of keeping the moral economy afloat – this can contribute to regime breakdown.133 134 
This implies that when there is no decline in patronage, the patron-client relationship in 
the moral economy is relatively stable – i.e. patron and clients are receiving their expected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Jeffrey Frieden, Debt, Development and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, United States, 1991 
131 Amitav Acharya, Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment, Asian Survey, Vol. 39: 3, pg 418-432, May-June 1999 
132 Acharya 1999: 432 
133 See Recessions Don’t Start Revolutions (Foreign Policy, Vol. 118, pg 138-151, Spring 2000) for the counter-
argument. Minxin Pei and Ariel David Adesnik suggest that an economic crisis does not lead to a fall in or change in 
government in their survey of 22 developing countries in Asia and Latin America from 1948-1998. However, they 
do acknowledge that in countries (e.g. Pakistan) that have weak civilian control over the military, labour unrest, 
insurgency movements then government collapse is more likely after an economic crisis – much like in Pakistan 
where all these factors are in place. And the possibility of regime breakdown depends on the type of regime in place. 
134 Pei and Adesnik define an “economic crisis” as including one of the following: annual inflation of rate greater 
than 15% and stagnant or negative annual GDP growth. Or, in cases with chronic high inflation (e.g. certain Latin 
American countries), a crisis should also include a “significant deterioration in economic or financial circumstances, 
as described by historians or other analysts” (pg 139). 
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patronage payments, labour unrest is minimal and so the chances of regime instability or 
breakdown are reduced; or labour unrest is promptly dealt with through state institutions. 
 But the first goal of the thesis is to describe the specific patron-client relationship 
embedded in the moral economy that has characterized both military and civilian rule in 
Pakistan. I do effectively consider organized industrial workers as one social group135 who 
receive payments from their state patron, rather than as individuals, though there is presumably 
competition within groups (or among various labour unions) to receive more patronage than 
others. 
Because of the challenges of illustrating a seemingly infinite network of expectation 
relationships, I focus in on a specific production-linked expectation relationship. Each military 
and civilian regime tailors some of its policies to boost growth and one way is to increase 
industrial production; this means the regime offers specific goods to its industrial labourers to 
ensure production is unhindered. It is a mutually beneficial expectation relationship in that such 
economic development provides legitimacy to the ruling regime as well as varied forms of 
benefits to the labour force. Again, as Posusney put it, this consideration of the moral economy is 
at the macro-political level. 
I focus less on traditional forms of goods such as political goods (e.g. votes) given the 
emphasis already placed on this in existing literature136 on Pakistan; I also recognize that most 
elections were rigged so the value of studying patronage-related votes seems at least 
questionable. Instead, this thesis considers only those forms of patronage directly related to 
helping clients boost industrial production – the recurring development policy of each military 
and civilian regime. 
What is key to understanding the patron-client relationship is to focus on the expectation 
embedded in the moral economy – i.e. what labour feels it is entitled to from the ruling regime. 
To capture this expectation, like Posusney, I highlight government speeches (e.g. emphasizing 
national sacrifice and the labour’s critical role in development) and related policies (e.g. 
subsidies, minimum wage) to show what state provision labour should expect for its role in 
production. It is harder to capture the workers’ voices about their role and expectation in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 This idea of focusing on state patronage to social groups or “coalitions” rather than individuals mirrors Pranab 
Bardhan’s ideas (1984). 
136 For instance, Maleeha Lodhi’s PhD thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science researches 
the PPP’s use of patronage, particularly with respect to votes (Bhutto, the Pakistan People’s Party and Political 
Development in Pakistan: 1967-1977, 1981). 
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moral economy, but one does get a sense by examining labour conference literature and labour 
journals. And of course through an examination of civil unrest at certain points, it is clear which 
aspects of state rhetoric and policies labour feel they are entitled to. Posusney explains how 
“feelings of entitlement are … evident in protests that erupted when management or the 
government failed to fulfill its promises.”137 In this sense, labour’s expectation in the moral 
economy is made quite clear by these “entitlement protests.”138 
   
Let’s now consider an overview of Pakistan’s moral economy at the macro-political 
level. This thesis highlights the informal patron-client relationship between the state and labour. 
The ruling military or civilian regime commits to offering certain subsistence provision to 
organized industrial workers in the form of wages and prices, as part of shared norms in the 
moral economy – this is reinforced by the state through public speeches, policies and legislation. 
In return, workers give their labour to facilitate the state’s industrial development policy that 
gives the regime one type of legitimacy – this is shown through the lack of protest when 
presumably workers are receiving what they expect from the ruling regime. 
 However, at different points in a regime’s tenure, industrial labour has felt that expected 
subsistence patronage from the state was not being delivered. Workers often protested first 
through official mechanisms and then through specific anti-state strikes when they felt these 
mechanisms failed. This created legitimacy strain for the state. The ruling regime responded with 
specific speeches and policies to regain legitimacy in the eyes of labour. This typically saw 
industrial labour going back to work and production resumed. 
What I also found is that at the end of a regime’s tenure, when labour felt prices were not 
being delivered by the state, industrial workers would resume their anti-state unrest but at a more 
rapid pace than before. This would once again create legitimacy strain for the state. However, at 
this point other groups would also be protesting alongside labour. The ruling regime at times 
responded with new promises to deal with labour’s concerns but this was not sufficient for 
workers who no longer saw the state as legitimate. Such anti-state unrest from these groups and 
certain elite-driven factors thus also contributed to a legitimacy crisis that led to regime 
breakdown. 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Posusney 1993: 88 
138 Posusney 1993: 100 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Now the question is how I will demonstrate this new perspective that explains Pakistan’s 
political pattern. How do I go about illustrating the moral economy and its informal patronage 
relationship that can challenge state legitimacy and even contribute to regime breakdown? This 
thesis follows a process tracing139 approach140, a trend commonly used in such qualitative 
research and single case studies.141 It will allow us to “obtain information about well-defined and 
specific events and processes.”142 Andrew Bennett and Alexander George have suggested such 
within-case analysis is an effective way to explore cause the “causal mechanism that links causes 
to effects.”143 They continue: “The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening 
causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable or 
variables and the outcome of the dependent variable.”144 145 So I put forth the hypothesis that, 
when there is a decline in subsistence provision (wages or prices) from a ruling regime to 
workers (the independent variables), labour reacts through protest and the Pakistani state 
experiences legitimacy strain that can contribute to legitimacy crisis and the breakdown of the 
ruling civilian or military regime (the dependent variable). 
I adopt Posusney’s macro-political approach to first establish the moral economy. She 
highlights the various state strategies used  (e.g. – through speeches or policies) to reinforce what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 See Andrew Bennett and Alexander George’s book, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States, 2005), for a more comprehensive overview of the process 
tracing method. 
140 Bennett and George cite two key limitations of process tracing – namely that it “provides a strong basis for causal 
inference only if it can establish an uninterrupted causal path linking the putative causes to the observed effects” and 
“that there may be more than one hypothesized causal mechanism consistent with any given set of process tracing 
evidence” (Bennett and George 1994: 222). But they refer to Olav Njolstad’s work to explain how “differing 
interpretations may arise for several reasons” and note his suggestions to overcome the limitations of process tracing 
(Bennett and George 1994: 222-223). 
141 Bennett and George do raise the issue of the validity of conclusions in such single case studies. They cite 
Designing Social Inquiry (Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey, United States, 1994) where King, Keohane and Verba argue that such studies produce findings that are 
“limited by the possibility of measurement error, probabilistic causal mechanisms and omitted variables (Bennett 
and George 1994: 220). But Bennett and George deal with such critiques, proving the value of such single case 
studies (Bennett and George 1994: 220-222). 
142 Oisin Tansey, Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling, Political Science 
and Politics, Vol. 40: 4, pg 765-772, October 2007 
143 Tansey 2007: 765 
144 Tansey 2007: 766 
145 Barbara Geddes also discusses this idea of “examining the mechanism and processes” in such an academic study 
in her book, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics 
(University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States, 2003). 
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labour should expect from the state for their role in development. This establishes the 
“entitlement expectations” in Pakistan’s moral economy. The state’s influence on or hold over 
labour unions also factors as well as the effect of nationalism and sacrifice, as Posusney also 
shows in the case of Egypt. Also, like in Posusney’s portrayal of Egypt, in Pakistan “preventing 
any escalation of the protest, and maintaining an image of national harmony and worker 
satisfaction” seems to be the priority of each ruling regime in setting up the moral economy 
initially, though of course the “consequence of these actions is to reinforce the moral economy 
and thereby pave the way for future protests.”146 
I have drawn on archival materials to flesh out the relationship between the ruling regime 
and industrial labour. By studying local media and government documents, I have gained 
significant insight into the patronage needs of these actors and their mutually beneficial 
relationship, while also considering how this relationship has evolved under each civilian and 
military regime.147 Given the historical nature of my research (1947-1971), doing real-time 
interviews was not a possibility; gaining access to labour leaders from four to six decades ago 
proved to be a real challenge. However, my emphasis on written documents, especially media 
over time, helped to track the ebbs and flows in industrial unrest and state-labour relations in a 
way no one else has. In fact, by examining media over time I was able to unearth the rapid rise in 
price-unrelated unrest before each regime – something which does not appear in any of the 
existing literature. 
While it may seem that I have simply adapted Posusney’s methodology for the Pakistani 
case, I should point out that I decided on this approach only after critical examination of labour-
focused studies on Pakistan. I evaluated comparable works on Pakistani labour to determine the 
best way forward for my own data collection. Among the labour-focused literature, there are 
three discernible types. One is purely descriptive and rooted in state documents and statistics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Posusney 1993: 114 
147 At times it may seem that I am generalizing about the feelings of all industrial workers based on the reported 
reaction of a few, but this is a widely accepted shortcoming of such a patronage and legitimacy-focused study. Does 
civil unrest among one disgruntled group of clients in one province necessarily translate into broader disillusion with 
the existing patron-client relationship and the government itself? As Eisenstadt and Lemarchand have said, the 
infinite nature and constantly changing nature of patronage relationships means there will always be some level of 
generalization. The key is to keep our discussion within the defined analytical framework and so be as specific as 
possible. If one accepts that production and related growth gives the state its legitimacy locally, then disruption in 
production – e.g. brought on by rising civil unrest by industrial clients in some parts but not necessarily in all parts – 
will then challenge the legitimacy of the patron regime. 
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(e.g. Amjad 2001, Da Costa 1963, Khan 1992), but lacks analytical power to be able to track big-
picture trends in labour unrest that might correlate to state legitimacy. 
The second is rooted in individual case studies based on in-depth fieldwork. This is 
epitomized by Zafar Shaheed’s study (2007), which includes interviews with workers in specific 
factories (e.g. cotton textiles) in Karachi, but again lacks an appropriate overview of broader 
state-labour relations needed for my thesis. The third approach is rooted in a combination of 
statistics, state documents and media sources. This proved to be the most thorough, as depicted 
by Christopher Candland’s book (2007). The reader does get some sense of how unrest 
developed over time, gaining momentum at the end of the regime. Yet at times it still lacks 
sufficient detail about the unrest itself and how it impacted the state – e.g. the discussion of the 
flawed 1955 labour policy leads to news of Ayub’s 1958 coup without any real detail on changes 
in labour activity (Shaheed 2007: 39). In this sense, my approach of sustained analysis of various 
written documents is new vis-à-vis the labour literature and far more empirically rich than what 
has been done before on Pakistani labour. 
 
To set up the moral economy, Posusney identifies specific policies of the new regime that 
directly relate to the subsistence conditions of labour. For instance, in the early 1950s, the new 
regime implemented a specific strategy of “co-opting” labour union leaders so that they would be 
emphasize the role that workers play in national development.148 As she explains, “unions were 
formally charged with educating workers about the new national ethos”149 and the ruling 
government appealed to workers with calls “to sacrifice for the “battle””150 for development 
through their labour. She also points out specific economic policies to at least ensure basic 
subsistence to workers, such as food subsidies and price controls.151 In addition, she mentions 
labour-specific policies to do with working conditions such as reduced “industrial workweek,” a 
“minimum wage for many was doubled” as well as improved “pensions, injury compensation 
and health insurance.”152 I apply a similar strategy for the Pakistani case to set up the moral 
economy and identify the basic subsistence expectations embedded in this patron-client 
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relationship through government speeches and policies. I highlight such subsistence patronage 
and the appeal for workers to sacrifice for their role in the national drive for development. 
Using media and government sources, Posusney then notes the labour unrest that occurs 
when such expectations of patronage are not delivered by the ruling regime. For instance, in the 
1970s, food subsidies were reduced due to “pressure from the International Monetary Fund” and 
led to “aggravated inflation.”153 This led to labour “intensifying [their] protest activity” against 
the state’s new economic policies. But such protests often ended when the government would 
offer concessions – in this case a reinstatement of subsidies.154 Posusney classifies such protests 
as “entitlement protests” that are a “reaction to takeaways”155 156 which also apply to the 
Pakistani case.  
She also discusses another type of entitlement protest that is rooted in “unmet 
promises”157 which apply to our analysis of Pakistan too. These are “demands to which workers 
feel entitled because of promises made by company management, the government or the courts. 
Thus, again, anger over unmet expectations is the impetus to workers’ actions.”158 So too, this 
thesis focuses in on these two types of entitlement protests in Pakistan – in terms of reactions to 
“unmet promises” or “takeaways” – both of which highlight a moral economy at work. But, 
unlike Posusney, I consider in more detail how such unrest over unmet expectation relates to 
state legitimacy and regime breakdown. 
 
At various libraries, research sites and databases worldwide159, I found several archival 
sources to generate rich empirical data. The microfilm archives of English-language newspapers 
from Pakistan were extremely helpful for this research. In particular, Dawn and Pakistan Times, 
which has been in publication since partition, were a useful source in terms of documenting 
specific patronage relationships involving the ruling regime and various industrial workers. 
Curiously, both papers at times had identical coverage on key issues. Perhaps the journalists 
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from both establishments adopted a similar strategy for researching their articles, relying on 
similar sources to quote (e.g. official press notes and publications from the regime). 
But press freedom was (and continues to be) a concern in a country like Pakistan. Some 
analysts felt when General Ayub Khan was in power (1958-1969), this was the “beginning of a 
completely chained press for all times to come.”160 On April 18, 1959, the military regime took 
over the more “progressive” papers161 and in 1960 the Press and Publications Ordinance was 
promulgated “to emasculate the press.”162 Journalist Mazhar Ali Khan noted: “Since 8 October, 
1958, our journals had been published under Censorship, and when the Censorship order was 
formally withdrawn and the euphemism Press-advice substituted for it, we chose to be “advised” 
daily, unlike some other newspapers more confident of being able to interpret the Government 
mind in respect of the draconian laws to which the Press was subject.”163 
Yet Dawn and the Pakistan Times still managed to report on specific events representing 
subsistence patronage – for instance the regime’s decision to introduce new labour policy after 
increasing unrest. It has also adequately reported on specific disruptions in patronage and thus 
instability in the state-labour relationship – for instance through reports on bouts of civil unrest 
involving industrial workers, especially in the months and weeks before regime breakdown. 
Other papers like the Pakistan Observer and Morning News also helped tell the story of 
patronage flows through their news reporting on such events. But non-media, government 
sources do help paint a picture of moral economy violations. The state’s East Pakistan Labour 
Journal, Pakistan Labour Book and Pakistan Labour Gazette did reveal the various industrial 
disputes of the 1947-1971 period in much detail, giving insight into labour’s subsistence needs. 
Several journal articles written at the time of both civilian and military rule offer an 
additional perspective on significant developments impacting the moral economy and ebbs and 
flows in subsistence patronage in Pakistan. International journals including Asian Survey, Far 
Eastern Survey, Pacific Affairs, Pakistan Forum and Third World Quarterly for example have 
identified the key social groups and their influence on governance. Pakistan-focused journals like 
the Monthly Economic Review, Pakistan Development Review, Economic Journal of Pakistan 
and India’s Economic and Political Weekly have at times pinpointed the major underlying 
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economic issues faced at specific points in the country’s history that have impacted patronage 
flows. 
The perspective of each ruling elites is integral to this patronage story embedded in the 
moral economy and state-labour relations. By considering various state documents, one does get 
a better sense of the policies and forms of basic provision offered to industrial labour. By 
studying the rhetoric of ministers’ budgets speeches (especially from the Ministry of Finance), 
publications of the Planning Commission, White Papers on the budget, Annual Economic 
Surveys, as well as Bulletins of the State Bank of Pakistan, I offer the reader a clearer 
understanding of the economic policies of each regime, especially those involving industrial 
production, as well as the expectation of subsistence in this moral economy that prompted 
workers to protest against the state. 
 
 
CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
 
Chapter Two illustrates how the existing literature has alluded to certain challenges to 
state legitimacy that at key points contributed to regime breakdown. Yet these authors have 
failed to sufficiently incorporate the notable role of organized industrial labour that is 
emphasized in this PhD thesis. This chapter should serve to reinforce to the reader that an 
understanding of challenges to state legitimacy and regime breakdown in Pakistan is incomplete 
without acknowledging the significance of the state’s relations with groups like industrial labour, 
particularly within the framework of informal institutions like the moral economy. It should also 
be a sufficient overview of Pakistani politics for those who may be new to this country as a case 
study in political science. 
 Chapter Three goes into detail about the moral economy of development policy of the 
first civilian-led era in 1947-1958. It first explains how expectations of certain patronage in this 
moral economy are partly created by the state’s rhetoric on its industrial development policy and 
its strategic hold over certain key unions. It then considers moral economy violations that 
prompted workers to strike and protest against the state, creating legitimacy strain. It ends by 
considering how moral economy violations contributed to legitimacy crisis for the Pakistani state 
preceding regime breakdown. The same structure is offered in Chapter Four but it considers the 
first military-led era in 1958-1971. 
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I conclude with Chapter Five that offers a recap and critical review of the argument of 
this PhD thesis and a cursory look at state-labour relations and political changes during 1971-
2007 that may hint at a moral economy at work. It also indicates areas for future research, 
including the relevance of this PhD to development policy and the foreign aid relationship today, 
as well as the role of other groups (like agricultural labour) in challenging state legitimacy at 
certain points in Pakistan’s history. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR LEGITIMACY STRAIN  
AND CRISIS OF THE PAKISTANI STATE IN 1947-1971 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, it simply offers the uninitiated reader a brief 
introduction to Pakistan’s turbulent political history. Who are the actors involving in shaping 
governance and what significant events have taken place during the civilian and military-led 
regimes of the 1947-1971 period? It underlines how, even before challenges to state legitimacy 
became apparent, ruling elites faced certain obstacles that prevented political stability; it also 
reinforces the elite-driven mode of governance that seemed to exclude any input from groups 
like industrial labour. 
Second, this chapter highlights how the existing literature as a whole alludes to largely 
elite-driven challenges to state legitimacy that have created strain for the ruling regime at 
different points in Pakistan’s political history. In doing so, I reinforce the obvious gap in the 
literature which this thesis fills in the subsequent two chapters, using a new perspective164 – 
namely the role of organized industrial labour in creating legitimacy strain repeatedly during a 
regime’s tenure (i.e. in 1947-1956 and 1958-1969). 
Third, this chapter extrapolates from other authors the largely elite-linked factors that 
contributed to legitimacy crisis preceding regime breakdown during both civilian and military-
led rule in the country. In doing so, I again reinforce the obvious gap in the literature which this 
thesis fills in the subsequent two chapters, using a new perspective165 – namely the role of 
organized industrial labour in creating legitimacy strain that contributes to regime breakdown 
(i.e. in 1957-1958 and 1970-1971). 
What is clear in the existing literature on Pakistan is that the dominant focus is on elite-
focused factors such as the military, politicians, bureaucrats, feudals and Islamist groups that 
have driven and at times derailed undemocratic politics. Alongside these dominant factors, the 
literature hints at how ethnic groups, relations with the United States and economic crises have at 
times also made it difficult for Pakistan’s ruling elites to govern. Through this illustration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Chapter Three and Chapter Four highlight this new argument for Pakistan’s legitimacy strain, as it plays out in 
the 1947-1958 and 1958-1971 civilian and military-led eras, respectively. 
165 Chapter Three and Chapter Four highlight this new argument for Pakistan’s legitimacy crisis and regime 
breakdown, as it plays out in the 1947-58 and 1958-71 civilian and military-led eras, respectively. 
	   46 
existing arguments, it becomes clear that the focus of this thesis – on industrial labour and its 
anti-state unrest – is a complementary piece of the puzzle to fully understand what has repeatedly 
challenged state legitimacy and later contributed to regime breakdown in Pakistan in both 
civilian and military-led eras in the 1947-1971 period. 
While other authors do give some consideration as to how civil unrest impacts state 
legitimacy,166 167 usually it is suggested that elite groups have orchestrated such unrest by 
manipulating certain subordinate classes. This is unlike what is proven in this thesis (in the 
subsequent chapters) where labour is portrayed as an independent force with its own relationship 
with the state, through the moral economic lens. Additionally, the literature mentions such 
labour-led unrest as a sudden occurrence at the end of a regime’s tenure – unlike in this thesis 
where it becomes clear that labour has recurrently attacked state legitimacy, long before regime 
breakdown appears imminent, due to lapses in expected subsistence provision. 
 
 
CIVILIAN-LED REGIME: 1947-1958 
 
After the partition from India in 1947, Pakistan was born a “fragile nation-state”, 
“burdened with ideological and ethnic cleavages and administrative chaos.”168 It had a “lack of 
geographical contiguity” as well as “the problem of linguistic and cultural differences.”169 Those 
areas comprising Pakistan were “educationally backward, socially conservative, predominantly 
rural, and politically inexperienced.”170 Pakistan found itself struggling to establish its most basic 
institutions, including a political infrastructure. “The first and foremost problem was the exact 
character that the state should take.”171 
Unlike neighbouring India, Pakistan did not inherit the colonial state’s central government 
apparatus. It was essentially starting from scratch, having had “practically no organizational 
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presence in Muslim-majority provinces”172 in pre-partition India. It also had to cope with the 
“turbulence” of partition, including “communal riots, an influx of refugees, protection of 
religious minorities, the distribution of assets of the British Indian government and the military, 
the canal water dispute, the evacuee property issue, concentration of Indian troops in the Punjab 
sector of the Indo-Pakistan border in 1950 and 1951, and the suspension of bilateral trade in 
1950.”173 
It was clear that in this early years, “the new state [did] not have a chance to settle down”174 
and deal with its numerous problems. What initially saved the Pakistani state though was a 
“centralized polity with an entrenched bureaucratic apparatus and a strong military.”175 But, with 
the demise of Pakistan’s founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 from tuberculosis and the 
assassination of the first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951, there was a “political 
vacuum”176 of sorts, with no one to “manage the transition from political movement [in pre-
partition India] to [the Muslim League] political party” in newly independent Pakistan177 – “the 
Muslim League gradually ceased to be the guiding force of the infant democracy.”178 Though 
Jinnah had spent so much effort on the Pakistan movement, the “League leadership could not 
concentrate on the task of building a political administrative structure for the new state.”179 
The subsequent weakness of parliamentary politics was thus linked to the “decline of the 
Muslim League,” as well as its “corruption, institutional weakness and the dominance of 
landlord interests.”180 Provincial governments were also “in danger of disintegration”181 – 
Punjab’s government was first dismissed in January 1949 for being “defiant and corrupt” and 
Sindhi politics were marked by “the usual see-saw for political power between competing and 
intriguing politicians.”182 
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Other “major signposts” showing the weakness of the polity were the “February 1948 
Pakistan Muslim League Council decision to separate the part from the government by debarring 
ministers from holding any office within it”, Liaquat’s assassination in 1951 before he could 
“reactivate” that party, the defeat of the Muslim League in first general elections in East Pakistan 
in 1954, the West Punjab landlord defection to the Republican Party in 1956 and the resignation 
of Prime Minister Chaudhri Muhammad Ali in 1957, which “signalled the end of a Muslim 
League government presence at both the centre and the provinces.”183 
Political development was thus stunted by the failure of civilian politicians to “work for the 
creation, construction and consolidation of federal, parliamentary and democratic structures.”184 
Corrupt, repressive actions by the ruling government included the arrests of political opponents 
(PRODA) and ban of public processions.185 In fact, the ruling PML became “merely a clutch of 
corrupt and quarrelsome caciques.”186 No consensus could be reached about the country’s 
constitution187 until 1956 – nine years after independence. There was also the issue of deciding 
the “proper role” of religion in Pakistan, which was founded in the name of Islam.188 
There was limited scope for policies to be effectively implemented as an array of prime 
ministers “moved through the revolving doors of office with increasing rapidity as power slipped 
form Karachi to army headquarters in Rawalpindi.”189 It appeared that “governmental ineptitude, 
largely the result of romantic politics combined with the struggle of certain leaders for personal 
power, bred confusion and corruption and brought the country to the verge of chaos.”190 
In this sense, even before challenges were posed to state legitimacy, the polity was clearly a 
very weak entity with obvious limitations for effective governance (or democratic consolidation). 
Political elites thus relied on local bureaucrats to govern. Provinces were stripped of their 
powers, making the “position of an essentially migrant political leadership at the centre even 
more precarious” and “forcing it to rely on the administrative bureaucracy to counter the 
mounting resentments in the provincial and local Leagues.”191 
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After Prime Minister Liaquat’s death in 1951, bureaucrats like Ghulam Mohammad and 
Iskandar Mirza “dominated the national political scene,” establishing a “paternalistic relationship 
with the politicians and thus [aborting] the process of party politics.”192 Mohammad in particular 
was a “hardened bureaucrat who had no appetite for democratic practices” – for instance, he 
dismissed the first constituent assembly when it tried “curb some of his powers”193 thus proving 
himself to be “the strong man”194 of Pakistan. After 1955, Ghulam’s successor, Mirza, was “no 
less interventionist,” using his “linkages with the Army Chief and senior bureaucracy to assert 
his centrality to the political process”195 – “the veiled diarchic character of government remained 
obvious to all.”196 
Furthermore, Pakistan became obsessed with state security and defence against its larger 
neighbour – particularly in light of the looming war with India over entitlement to Jammu and 
Kashmir. The centre thus focused on defence rather than strengthening provincial ties, making 
“reliance on civil bureaucrats ... the only option for the central leadership sensing not only its 
own demise but, possibly, the state’s demise.”197 The central government allocated a “substantial 
portion” of national resources to finance the military and thus adversely affected the economy. 
This was the advent of the struggle between the military and the country’s developmental 
needs.198 
In the early 1950s, the army still followed the British doctrine of being removed from 
politics.199 “This view [was] transmitted to each succeeding Pakistani generation at the Pakistan 
Military Academy, the Staff College and in informal discussions in the messes.”200 The British 
had “envisioned the ‘proper’ relationship between military and civilian as that between two 
‘separate spheres’ of military and civilian influence, while acknowledging that the ultimate 
responsibility lay in the hands of duly appointed (or elected) civilians.”201 Even General Ayub, 
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who was to later stage the 1958 bloodless coup, told his troops in 1951 that they were “the 
servants of Pakistan and, as such, servants of any party that the people put in power.”202 
But bureaucrats like Muhammad and Mirza “relied on the military for support.”203 In fact, 
Muhammad’s dismissal of the Constituent Assembly in 1955 could not have happened “without 
the support of the military.”204 At this point, the military had grown in power partly due its very 
positive public image of “prestige,”205 given its increasing “role in the non-military field to help 
preserve, stabilize and build the new nation.”206 Other characteristics of the Pakistani military – 
its “marked superiority in organization”207 relative to the civilian government, “social cohesion” 
and “ethos of public service and national identification”208 – only aided its strength in politics. 
During Mirza’s presidency 1955-1958 – when “bureaucratic manipulation [was] at its peak,”209 
the “influence of the military increased in decision-making.”210 
Over time, General Ayub and other officers were “persuaded that they would be 
continually used and abused by civilians and that their own interpretation, integrity, and fighting 
efficiency would eventually suffer”211 if they did not play some role in governance. From the 
perspective of the army, it was the “quality” and “very existence of the military as an 
organisation” that was at stake, which could “threaten what it believed to be the only real line of 
defence against India and one of the main forces holding the state together.”212 
Pakistan’s military after 1955 saw the advent of the “American generation” of its soldiers, 
who benefited from exposure to US military training and “modern” equipment after joining the 
Baghdad Pact (CENTO). In the context of the Cold War, the US superpower sought to “make 
weaker nations [like Pakistan] strong enough to resist Soviet aggression.”213 On February 25, 
1954, President Dwight Eisenhower announced the decision to give military assistance to 
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Pakistan for the reason of “strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Middle East.”214 US 
aid amounted to between $1.2 and $1.5 billion from 1954 to 1965,215 creating one of Pakistan’s 
first “outside linkages” with a “foreign government”216 that impacted its domestic political 
developments. 
The military thus had an “exaggerated estimate of their own and Pakistan’s martial 
qualities, with some believing that one Pakistani solider equalled ten or more Indians.”217 Such a 
grandiose self-image made it appear ready to tackle anything, including domestic politics. 
Defence expenditure rose from Rs 153.8 million in 1947-48 to Rs 854.2 million in 1957-58.218 
The civilian government bolstered by bureaucratic-military elites also recognized the need 
for “tacit support of at least some of the dominant social classes”, including the big landowning 
families of West Pakistan and a growing industrial bourgeoisie. 219  Muhammad was the 
bureaucrat who was “instrumental in initiating a number economic policies and in building 
economic institutions that defined the parameters of the patron-client relationships between the 
bureaucratic elites and the financial-industrial groups.”220 In fact, ruling elites often offered 
financial incentives in return for political allegiance. “Import permits and licenses for various 
kinds of commercial and industrial activity were often issued on political considerations.”221 
Beyond the key role of bureaucratic-military elites, industrialists and feudals in this 
civilian-led regime, some argue that this system of governance was also covertly supported by 
foreign powers – the United States and United Kingdom in particular. “The dominance of the 
non-elected institutions was a result of a concerted strategy by the higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy and the military to exploit rivalries among Pakistani politicians and systematically 
weaken the political process by manipulating their connections with the centres of the 
international system in London and Washington.”222 
Thus a weak polity – manipulated quite openly by a powerful bureaucracy, a strong 
military and other elite groups – controlled governance during the civilian-led regime of 1947-
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1958. The literature, however, does not relate this elite-driven “overdeveloped state”223 and 
system of governance to other groups like industrial labour in any significant way. The 
overarching idea given by preceding authors is that only elites are relevant to “the state” and 
political developments. But, as this thesis shows in the subsequent two chapters, the state and 
organized workers were in fact connected through an informal expectation relationship that at 
times had a significant impact on state legitimacy and workers even influenced the state (through 
their unrest) in terms of certain (labour-specific) policies. The question now is how the existing 
literature portrays challenges to state legitimacy at different points in 1947-1956 and that later 
contributed to regime breakdown in 1957-1958. 
 
LEGITIMACY STRAIN OF CIVILIAN-LED REGIME IN 1947-1956 
The literature suggests that, throughout this civilian-led era, challenges to state legitimacy 
came from three groups in particular – certain feudals, Islamist groups and ethnic groups. While 
there is some mention of subordinate classes (i.e. unemployed workers in West Pakistan, East 
Pakistani students), it is usually framed in elite terms – how they were influenced by elites to 
protest as part of a larger political game. There is minimal consideration of such groups (like 
industrial labour) acting independently to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling civilian regime 
during this period, unlike what is illustrated later in this thesis. 
Although considered a key component of the political system, certain feudals challenged 
the legitimacy of this particular regime through their actions against provincial governments. In 
fact, from 1947 to 1955, the Noons and Daultanas effectively brought down ministries in Punjab 
province and in the centre through their manoeuvring.224 These “robber barons” also became 
powerful enough to influence government policy.”225 It was clear that the “economically 
powerful landlords … of West Pakistan had a dominating influence in Pakistan politics during 
the period 1947-1958.226 227 This was contrary to the situation in East Pakistan where certain 
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legislation – the East Pakistan Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1951 – had actually been 
“upheld,” freeing the province from the “feudal grip.”228 
In West Pakistan, the Mamdot-led provincial ministry was taken over by the Daultanas 
and then the Noons – “through intrigues.”229 In Sindh province, the Ayub Khuro cabinet (1947-
1948) was brought down repeatedly by various feudal contingents, including Pir Ilahi Bakhsh 
(1948-1949), Yusuf Haroon (1949-1950), Qazi Fazlullah (1950-1951) and Abdus Sattar Pirzada 
(1953-1954). After being ousted from their ministries, feudal politicians would challenge the 
legitimacy of the new leadership through new opposition parties in the hope of regaining their 
hold on power. 
Some feudals even made reforms that would adversely affect their landed interests, such 
as those introduced by the Daultana ministry in 1952 and annulled by the Noon ministry in 
1953.”230 There was no question that feudals were “divided by rival factions” that cut “along 
personal, tribal or caste-like”231 lines; they clearly attacked state legitimacy through their 
predatory actions against specific governments, when it suited their own interests.232 
Islamist groups also posed a threat to state legitimacy during this civilian-led era. 
Initially, the country’s religious groups felt “empowered” by the “emphasis on Islam as an 
element of national policy.”233 The first step taken by the regime to make Pakistan an “Islamic 
ideological state” was in 1949 with the Objectives Resolution.234 This legislation was supposed 
to be a “tool of mobilization”235 but unfortunately only led to further complications down the line 
as to what role religion should play in governance. The “controversy between mullahs and 
progressives” over Islam in politics was undoubtedly a recurring source of “disunity,”236 hitting 
at the civilian regime’s legitimacy.237 
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Often these religious groups allied with certain elites to challenge the ruling regime in 
terms of specific policies and even particular political officials. For instance, in 1953, certain 
Islamist groups allied with certain political elites to spur anti-Ahmadi protests in Lahore to help 
destabilize the central government. The Punjab Chief Minister apparently used “links the 
provincial secret service had with Islamist groups to foment popular agitation, calling for 
legislation that would declare the Ahmadis non-Muslims for legal purposes.”238 The “violent 
street protests” were supposed to call for Foreign Minister Zafarulla Khan to resign, since he was 
an Ahmadi. Ideally, this would destabilize the government enough for Punjab Chief Minister and 
feudal Mumtaz Daultana to “benefit” by becoming prime minister.239 This, however, led to a 
severe law and order disruption which was only resolved through a military presence and martial 
law in Lahore. 
Since early in this period, the religious party Jamaat-e-Islami also attempted to challenge 
the civilian regime through its political organization. It had cadres of students240, trade unions, 
professional organizations and media at its disposal and aimed to eventually launch an Islamic 
revolution and overthrow the civilian regime. At certain points, it did manage to spur student-led 
riots.241 242 But this long-term approach was thwarted by ruling elites, who often banned Jamaat’s 
newspapers and even arrested its leaders243 while still trying to appeal to them with talk of 
religious ideology in governance.244 
At certain points, ethnic groups challenged the legitimacy of ruling regime at certain points 
because they felt it was too Punjabi-centric and thus prejudiced against non-Punjabi provinces 
(i.e. Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, East Pakistan). While the “leaders of the new state assumed 
Jinnah’s leadership and a common faith would [eventually] override any differences between the 
major ethno-linguistic groups,” this was not the case. The regime’s “narrative barely 
acknowledged Pakistan’s [ethnic] separatist and autonomist movements.” Each leader during this 
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period “stressed the importance of a strong centre and criticized the idea of greater provincial 
autonomy.”245 In fact, “every ambitious and greedy, feudal, provincial and tribal chief [continued 
to fight for their] claims to power, provoking linguistic, provincial and sectarian conflicts, blood 
feuds and bitter personal rivalries.”246 
This ethnic tension also extended to certain non-Punjabi groups. In West Pakistan’s Sind 
province, for instance, there were a few bouts of rioting in the early 1950s. These rioters were 
unemployed workers who felt “the economic situation … was appalling.”247 It was reported that 
“people were literally dying of starvation or were resorting to desperate measures to stay 
alive”, 248 particularly in 1952-53 during a “massive food shortage and a famine” in the 
province.249 One newspaper editorial remarked that: “an unemployed worker was driven to sell 
his son for a paltry sum of Rs 22 in order to pay off a loan incurred to keep himself and his 
family alive.”250 But such infrequent reports of unrest are portrayed in the literature as either 
being orchestrated by political elites who wanted to challenge the Punjabi-centric polity or as a 
reminder of how provincial elites were mistreating their constituents in Sind too. There is limited 
consideration of how such groups who were not part of the Punjabi minority may have been 
challenging the state and civilian regime in some way, unlike in this thesis. 
Besides the tension with non-Punjabi provinces in West Pakistan, the central government 
faced obvious issues with East Pakistan. This Punjabi-centric regime was often viewed as having 
looked for “ways to deprive the East Bengalis of their democratic majority which, if effectively 
deployed, would threaten both the foreign policy orientations of Pakistan’s “guardians” and their 
domestic priorities.”251 This only further fuelled ethnic and linguistic tensions, “though not all 
Punjabis shared the military and bureaucratic elites’ interests.”252 
At certain points in 1947-1956, the military had been called upon by the civilian regime to 
control bouts of linguistic unrest with force in East Pakistan, rather than through political 
dialogue.253 This elite-driven unrest was often directed at the state who had said Urdu would be 
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the only state language and not Bengali which East Pakistanis spoke.254 In fact, this was visible 
as early as 1948 during Jinnah’s first and only visit to East Pakistan. At a convocation address at 
Dacca University, “he was greeted with large-scale heckling, walk-outs and chaos. He could not 
finish his speech.”255 
Such linguistic-rooted unrest meant that army troops were called on regularly to maintain 
law and order – e.g. in Dhaka in 1950, in certain cities in East Pakistan in 1952 in 1954.256 But 
such reports of unrest are usually portrayed in the literature as either being orchestrated by 
political elites who wanted to challenge the Punjabi and West Pakistani-centric polity and state 
or as a reminder of how provincial elites were not doing enough for their constituents in East 
Pakistan too. There is limited consideration of how these groups who were not part of the 
Punjabi minority may have been challenging the state and civilian regime independent of any 
larger political strategy, unlike what is illustrated later in this thesis. 
East Pakistani elites also challenged the central government on economic grounds. The 
literature reveals how many Bengalis felt the province had been “economically exploited” by its 
Western counterpart since partition.257 258 For instance, “industrial enterprises set up in East 
Pakistan were … controlled by non-Bengali businessmen and financed by West Pakistani capital. 
… [Also] Bengalis were not welcomed into the ranks of bureaucracy or the army” thus 
institutionalizing “a form of ethnic discrimination.”259 Such widespread sentiment of inequality 
contributed to recurring ethnic-focused frustration that posed a threat to state legitimacy. 
In this way, the literature does give consideration of some legitimacy challenges 
involving certain subordinate classes. But, unlike this thesis, this is largely framed in elite and 
political terms. It is not directly related to an informal patron-client relationship with the regime; 
there is also limited detail given on how this unrest develops over time and in this sense 
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recurrently challenges state legitimacy. What’s undoubtedly missing is the specific industrial 
unrest that recurred through out this period, which is featured in this thesis. 
 
LEGITIMACY CRISIS AND BREAKDOWN 
OF THE CIVILIAN-LED REGIME IN 1957-1958 
Much of the literature explains the legitimacy crisis and subsequent breakdown of the 
civilian regime in 1957-1958 through an elite lens. It is suggested that the military, bureaucrats 
and military-bureaucratic links with the United States contributed to regime breakdown in 
significant ways; the legitimacy crisis is explained in political terms as three different prime 
ministers took the reins in this short period. There is some mention of unrest among groups like 
agricultural and industrial labour who faced declining economic conditions – the insinuation is 
that this added to the declining legitimacy of the civilian regime. But such unrest is usually 
framed in terms of anti-elite sentiment – i.e. against a particular feudal lord or industrial 
employer, rather than the state or civilian regime. There is insufficient consideration of the 
particular role of industrial labour in directly attacking state’s legitimacy and thus contributing to 
regime breakdown in this specific way, unlike what is emphasized later in this thesis. 
The dominant focus of preceding authors is on how it was in the military’s interests to 
finally allow the parliamentary façade to fall and so end this regime type in Pakistan. The 
military-bureaucratic elites could have in theory continued to control the political system from 
behind-the-scenes even in the face of recurrent attacks on state legitimacy from various groups. 
But what likely prompted the military’s intervention and regime breakdown was that, “once the 
process of constitution-making had been completed, a reference to the people was 
inescapable.”260 Most authors agree that the military-bureaucrats’ “dominance over the state 
apparatus did not guarantee control over the political process” and so a coup and change in 
regime was a necessary step.261 
The military had successfully “discredited” political actors and organizations that 
contributed to the civilian regime’s legitimacy crisis. At the same time, they “were unsure of 
maintaining their dominance within the state structure after the general elections scheduled in 
1959.”262 The idea was that the military feared a “major realignment of political forces after the 
elections” and so this prompted the military and key bureaucrats to official take over in October 
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1958, thus “[deterring] all potential challenges to a position of privilege they had long 
enjoyed.”263 
The military’s business interests – what is termed “milibus” – were also a factor. These 
interests had grown significantly since 1954 when the army’s political power had begun to 
develop.264 The military’s pursuit of “economic activities” was for the “betterment of the 
institution and its members” in keeping with its “institutional self-interest paradigm”265 and it 
was felt that an official military-led regime, rather than a civilian-led regime guided by the 
military, would better protect these interests after 1958. In this sense, it was the idea that a new 
civilian regime with more power may threaten the military’s professional and business interests 
that pushed the military to play a role in the breakdown of the civilian regime. 
In addition to this, there was also increasing tension between the military and existing 
bureaucratic leadership in 1957-1958 that inadvertently contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the 
civilian regime. On separate occasions, Governor-General Mirza and General Ayub both 
expressed their view to the US Ambassador that a dictatorship was the only way forward for 
Pakistan.266 But they later differed on when the civilian regime would end and what would 
replace it and released “contradictory statements concerning the timing of the lifting of martial 
law. … There may also have been friction resulting from the promotion of Lieutenant-General 
Musa to Commander-in-Chief of the army, although Ayub continued as Supreme Commander. 
The catalyst for Mirza’s dismissal however was his reported meddling in army affairs.”267 268 
Pakistan’s relationship with the United States also contributed to regime breakdown at this 
point. Initially, the United States government officially discouraged Mirza and General Ayub 
about their plans to stage a coup as “there was insufficient cause for abandoning the democratic 
path.”269 But US President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles “responded with understanding” to 
Mirza’s plans to impose martial law. In fact, Dulles wrote back in a letter to Mirza: “the changes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Jalal 1995: 54 
264 Siddiqa cites the Fauji Foundation as an example of the “milibus” – it invested in “various industrial units in 
areas with high consumer demand, such as tobacco, sugar and textile production” (Pg 131. Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, 
Military Inc, Pluto Press, London, United Kingdom, 2007). 
265 Siddiqa 2007: 130 
266 Talbot 2005: 146 
267 Talbot 2005: 146 
268 After the coup in 1958, Mirza and his wife were reportedly given an hour to pack and leave the country (Talbot 
2005: 146). 
269 Pg 99. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, Maryland, United States, 2001 
	   59 
which have occurred do not alter in any respect the close ties which exist between our two 
countries.”270 Thus the civilian regime had clearly lost legitimacy in the eyes of foreign allies 
like the United States. 
The legitimacy crisis evident in 1957-1958 is also explained in political terms in the 
literature – three civilian-led governments fell during this brief period before regime breakdown. 
This can partly be attributed to the resurgence of ethnic rivalries. While Prime Minister Husain 
Shaheed Suhrawardy was supposed to appeal to East Pakistan given his Bengali background, his 
“hold over his supporters” in the province was weakened for different reasons, including his 
“[backing] down over the Awami League’s call [in East Pakistan] for land reforms because of 
the resistance of the West Punjab rural elite.”271 
But the more prominent issue was the ethnic discrepancy in foreign aid. Suhrawardy 
offered the bulk of a $10 million US aid package to East Pakistan to ease recurring inter-
province relations. But this effectively ended his political career as it “evoked the ire of the 
western province’s business class … [who felt Suhrawardy had] the temerity to tinker with the 
longstanding regional economic imbalances in distributing the lion’s share of American aid to 
East Pakistani industrialists.”272 This led to West Pakistan’s political elite to pull their support 
from Suhrawardy’s coalition government. Soon after, I. I. Chundrigar took over the civilian 
government for two months, “staying sufficiently long enough to further widen the gulf between 
the eastern and western wings by reversing Suhrawardy’s decision on the allocation of the US 
$10 million aid package.”273 This further reinforced the injustice felt by East Pakistanis and 
contributed to ongoing political unrest in the province. 
West Punjab politician Firoz Khan Noon took over the final government before this 
civilian-led era ended in 1958. Like his predecessors, Suhrawardy and Chundrigar, Noon 
struggled to stabilize his government from day one, particularly due to the rivalry between Noon 
and his fellow feudals. At this point, however, “the Byzantine goings-on in Karachi were 
positively gentlemanly compared to the bear-pit in Dhaka.”274 
The frustration of various actors who increasingly felt their government was not a 
legitimate authority led to more political violence, reinforcing the notion that this civilian-led era 
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was coming to an end. In March 1958, “fist-fights broke out” in the West Pakistan legislature. 
“All this commotion occurred not because one party sought to reduce the miseries of the 
common man and others tried to add to them … All this infernal row was over a dozen 
Ministerial chairs which in the situation prevailing today are hardly worth the wood they are 
made of.”275 The killing of the Chief Minister of West Pakistan and the Deputy Speaker of the 
East Pakistan legislature followed soon after, epitomizing the political unrest during the civilian 
regime’s obvious legitimacy crisis. 
Beyond the tensions at the elite and political level, deteriorating economic conditions were 
affecting poorer classes276 across all provinces in Pakistan, leading to increasing civil unrest 
among certain groups. This unrest naturally contributed to the growing legitimacy crisis of the 
civilian regime but it should be noted that the literature portrays such unrest as being directed at 
feudals and industrial elites, rather than explicitly against the state or civilian-led regime. Such 
unrest is also only briefly described so as to suggest that it had limited relevance to overarching 
political developments – again this is contrary to what I show in the subsequent chapters. 
Peasant organizations were “beginning to illicit an encouraging response in both East and 
West Pakistan”277 as they attempted to mobilize against their feudal lords for mistreatment. But 
the result of such protests was that peasant leaders were “victimised and landlords threatened that 
their paid gangsters would ‘deal’ with peasants” who protested, even burning down their 
homes.278 According to some accounts, industrial strikes “reached new heights” in this period; 
yet such strikes are portrayed in the existing literature as attacks on their employers – rather than 
the state as articulated in this thesis. Police “resorted to violence and intimidation of the worst 
order. Where police were not available, the employers had their own hired thugs who performed 
the same task.”279 
Overall the literature does allude to certain elite-driven factors contributing to the 
legitimacy crisis of the ruling civilian regime before its breakdown in 1957-1958. However, 
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unlike in this thesis, there is insufficient consideration of how groups like industrial labour might 
specifically attack state legitimacy or be part of an informal patron-client relationship with the 
regime; there is also limited detail given on how industrial unrest develops over time, particularly 
with a possible shift in focus (from wages to prices) towards the end of this civilian-led era, 
which is featured in the subsequent chapter. As a whole, the literature’s illustration of Pakistan’s 
legitimacy crisis and regime breakdown in 1957-1958 is thus incomplete. 
 
 
MILITARY-LED REGIME: 1958-1971 
 
 When General Ayub staged a coup in October 1958, Pakistan was viewed as “a nation 
struggling to overcome the aftermath of eleven years of economic chaos and political 
floundering.”280 General Ayub repeatedly stated that, “our ultimate aim is to restore democracy, 
but of the type that people understand.”281 He contended that, because Pakistan’s literacy was so 
“appallingly low” and its communication “primitive”, a different type of democracy – what he 
termed Basic Democracies – was the best way to proceed. The Basic Democracies approach 
aimed to develop a political system through “a comprehensive structure of local councils 
composed largely of elected members”282 and “appointed representatives”283 which would in 
theory allow more groups to be a part of the political process. In this respect, General Ayub 
provided leadership with a specific agenda to move the country forward – unlike the first decade 
of Pakistan’s rule, which suffered from an apparent lack of vision on the part of politicians. The 
military leader saw himself as a “stern tutor for a divided and undisciplined people.”284 
But the reality was that an elite-driven system of governance persisted during this military-
led era under General Ayub and later General Yahya Khan, similar to the civilian-led regime of 
the previous decade. This time, however, it was an overtly “military hegemonic system” which 
aimed to openly promote “corporate interests” of the army; exclude political leaders, parties and 
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the urban middle classes; control media and labour; and see to the “co-optation and consolidation 
of bureaucratic elites, financial industrial group and feudal class.”285 
General Ayub’s rule initially existed “with a military face” in 1958-1961 and then involved 
the “civilianization of presidential system and … client relationships” in 1962-1969.286 During 
the period of martial law in 1958-1962, he made every effort to restrict political parties from 
holding any elective office, removing any chance of a “loyal opposition”287 that could possibly 
derail his policies. 
The 1962 constitution was a “planned disengagement of the military from power and a 
careful transition to civilian rule by political and constitutional engineering, a careful tailoring of 
the political institutions and processes and a co-option of a section of the political elite.”288 The 
general was the executive authority who could “exercise substantial powers in respect of 
administration, law-making policy execution and key appointments, enabling him to determine 
the nature and direction of governance at the federal and provincial levels. He appointed 
members of his cabinet who held office at his pleasure and were not answerable to the federal 
legislature.”289 Politicians were clearly kept at bay during this military-led era. 
With a stunted polity, this allowed for the military’s power to become further embedded in 
economic and political aspects of society. General Ayub oversaw the “military’s penetration of 
the rural structure of Pakistan.”290 For instance, one estimate suggested that in Sind province, 
300,000 acres were given to the military after it was bought and developed with state funding.291 
“The regime also enhanced the scope of the military’s corporate interests by presenting great 
incentives” including prestigious jobs in certain key industries.292 
It also became clear that the military regime “played a crucial role in the realignment of 
classes, groups and elites in Pakistan.”293 General Ayub recognized that “the feudals were the 
legitimate power-holders in rural Pakistan.”294 295 The military regime thus had to tread lightly 
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with its agriculture-related policies. For instance, the 1959 land reforms “avoided denting 
Pakistan’s agrarian structure”296 and agricultural income tax was not imposed on landlords. 
Through the Basic Democracies system, General Ayub created a “dependency relationship” with 
the landlords who belonged to his Convention Muslim League.297 “The military regime co-opted 
and provided patronage to feudal classes, embarked on a policy of rural penetration, [and] 
acquired control over key public and semi-public enterprises.”298 
The military-led regime also saw the value of industrial elites in governance. Certain 
economic policies, “such as the bonus voucher scheme and the devaluation of the currency”, 
benefited industrialists and were designed to promote the economic growth General Ayub felt his 
regime needed for its survival. Private entrepreneurs and other industrial elites were provided 
with “financial loans and other incentives” like tax breaks to help build up industry and 
economic modernization.299 The goal was to “promote the expansion of the financial-industrial 
groups and [make] their linkage with international capital.”300 
But above all, General Ayub knew “better than anyone that both his survival and success 
depended upon the continued support of Pakistan’s essentially, if not exclusively, Punjabi federal 
bureaucracy.”301 They were key in facilitating economic policies that made them indispensible to 
elite feudals and industrialists. “In fact, the civil-military bureaucracy played a key role in giving 
birth to the indigenous bourgeoisie or the business-industrialist class … The transformation of 
the trader-merchant class into the business-industrial class through institutions such as the 
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) resulted in national economic uplift as well 
as creating new partners for the bureaucracy.”302 
In this sense, this military-led era early on revealed that the participation of certain 
bureaucrats, feudals and industrialists was necessary for this elite-driven system of governance to 
operate. General Ayub saw labour and media as mere tools he could manipulate to support his 
regime. He also saw the role of religion and American support as central to his regime in the 
early years of his reign. General Ayub was “a firm believer in the policy tripod developed within 
the first few years of Pakistan’s creation: he identified [Hindu] India as Pakistan’s eternal enemy, 
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Islam as a national unifier and the United States as the country’s provider of arms and 
finances.”303 The question is how the existing literature portrays challenges to this particular 
system of elite-driven governance at different points in 1958-1969 that later contributed to 
legitimacy crisis and regime breakdown in 1970-1971. 
 
LEGITIMACY STRAIN OF MILITARY-LED REGIME IN 1958-1969 
The literature suggests that during the first half of this period of military rule, challenges to 
state legitimacy came primarily from two groups – Islamist and ethnic groups. After the war with 
India in 1965, such legitimacy strains were further reinforced for the military regime. Certain 
authors do mention how East Pakistanis experienced significant bursts of frustration over 
political, economic and linguistic inconsistencies coordinated by a West Pakistan-dominated 
central government, yet this is typically framed in elite terms. Specific bouts of such unrest are 
only presented as a rather sudden occurrence toward the end of this era in 1968-1969, right 
before General Yahya’s takeover, when in fact this type of attack on state legitimacy had 
occurred recurrently in 1958-1969, as shown later in this thesis through the lens of industrial 
unrest in both East and West Pakistan. 
Islamist groups challenged state legitimacy by being openly “critical” of certain laws and 
policies of the military regime, voicing their dissension publicly on several occasions in the first 
half of 1958-1969. For instance, they did not approve of the Family Laws and the regime’s plans 
to promote family planning and population control.304 “They also resented the decision of the 
government to take over the management of some important shrines and mosques and their 
property and placing these under the control of the newly established Auqaf department.”305 
Some Islamist groups perceived this as “unjustified interference in the religious domain and an 
attempt to control religious institutions.”306 These groups actively looked for new recruits, 
particularly through its Islamic Students Organization in East Pakistan where they were coming 
out to “support” provincial autonomy”307 and so go against the official state position. 
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But it was the ongoing disparity across provinces and ethnic groups that posed the most 
serious threat to the legitimacy of the military-led regime. The Bengali elites’ “alienation was 
intensified by the fact that the economic development of the Ayub era largely passed them 
by.”308 And it was felt that the province’s “economic handicaps were rarely appreciated, nor was 
any effective remedy ever attempted.”309 This idea of ethnic challenges to the state are largely 
painted in elite terms in the literature – for instance, from 1962 to 1967, only 22% of the state’s 
Pakistan Industrial and Credit Investment Corporation (PICIC) loans went to elite East Pakistani 
industrialists, reinforcing the “Bengali alienation from the centre, despite such window dressing 
as establishing a separate [state development corporation] for each wing.”310 
In fact, “with the coercive powers of the armed forces … at their disposal, the bureaucratic-
bourgeois alliance sought to exploit the resources of East Pakistan in order to aid economic 
development in the West. [Such] economic deprivation led to the growth of a Bengali national 
consciousness in the Eastern wing of the country.”311 In East Pakistan, economic growth rose 
from 0.6% during 1954-1960 to 2.6% during 1960-1965; in West Pakistan, economic growth 
rose from 0.9% to 4.4% during the same period,312 reinforcing the ethnic economic disparity.  
Beyond economic distress, there was obvious frustration among East Pakistan’s leaders 
who felt they had no real political stake in any state institutions. In fact, “dissatisfaction with the 
central government and the consequent demand for provincial autonomy seemed almost 
universal in East Pakistan.”313 Bengalis also continued to feel linguistic discrimination314 despite 
the state having given into their earlier demands for a second national language in May 1954; 
this still made them second choice for government jobs that were the “monopoly of the Urdu-
speaking people of West Pakistan.”315 Thus it was clear that as a Punjabi leader, General Ayub 
“failed to read the political mind of the Bengalis. The movement of the Bengalis to secure their 
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legitimate democratic rights reached unprecedented heights”316 with each burst of unrest in 1958-
1965 creating legitimacy strain for the state.317 
But it was the 1965 war318 with India over Kashmir that posed the most serious threat to the 
legitimacy of the ruling regime and its system of governance through to 1969. First, the 
devastating loss in the war – the first major conflict since the bloody partition of the Indian 
subcontinent in 1947 – meant that tensions between the military as government and the “military 
as institution”319 only grew stronger in General Ayub’s ranks. According to certain factions, if 
the military could not decisively defend itself against India, perhaps it should not occupy itself 
with governance and political affairs any longer, but instead spend more time improving its 
capabilities as an institution. In the same way, it was harder for the Pakistani people to view the 
military as the most stable and powerful institution in the country after the defeat. By 
comparison, political elites did not look as ineffective in comparison any longer. 
Second, the war represented a “serious strategic error”320 for General Ayub that was deeply 
rooted in ethnic discrepancies. The war only served to reinforce to East Pakistanis that Pakistan 
was a “Punjab-centric state whose army defined both the idea of Pakistan and the security of 
parameters of the state of Pakistan in a manner that was incompatible with Bengali interests.”321 
Ethnic rivalries only intensified because Pakistan’s central government “diverted precious 
resources away from economic development and weakened the links between the country’s two 
wings.”322 It also challenged the religious nationalism that the military regime used to unite its 
people. “Basing Pakistani nationalism on hostility toward India had led the country into a war 
that had attained none of Pakistan’s war aims.”323 
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Third, the war reinforced that American support for General Ayub and the military regime 
was waning – it thus “unhinged the delicate alliance system being evolved in Washington”324 
thereby affecting one form of (international) legitimacy of the Pakistani state. The suspension of 
supplies or arms by the United States to Pakistan and economic aid during the 1965 war caused 
“disappointment” given the country’s “dependence on US weapons” and funding.325 326 The fact 
that the United States was giving India military aid made Pakistani ruling elites “bitter,” despite 
reports that “these differences were fully and frankly discussed” when General Ayub met US 
President Johnson in Washington on December 14 and 15, 1965. 327  This contributed to 
increasing anti-American sentiment, even leading to protests, and a brief moment of unity for 
Pakistan.328 
Fourth, the war gave political elites, like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, more leverage to attack the 
military regime’s legitimacy. It was General Ayub’s decision to put more power into the hands 
of non-representative elites that effectively ensured political parties and elites would at some 
point fight back. In 1966, Bhutto had left General Ayub’s cabinet “after developing policy 
differences.” His new organization, the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP), offered a clear alternative 
to the military regime, publicly critiquing General Ayub and his socioeconomic policies.329 “The 
formation of the PPP was a major blow for the Ayub regime.”330 
In the years after the 1965 war through to 1969, it seemed General Ayub’s regime 
experienced more legitimacy strain. Bhutto’s growing presence as an alternative political 
authority figure challenged General Ayub’s legitimacy as a leader. But it also gave the wave of 
unrest in these later years a “political organization and charismatic leadership”331 to better 
challenge the state. In a sense, it reinforced the failure of the Basic Democracies system to ever 
sufficiently include the input of the urban middle, industrial labour and rural peasantry classes. 
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The literature also frames General Ayub’s declining legitimacy in terms of his failure to reach 
out to civil and political groups as required of an effective military-led democratic transition332 –
 that spelt his downfall. This was a significant mistake as such military regimes are expected 
“develop mass political organisations of a civilian type”333 to be effective in initiating a 
democratic transition, but clearly this was not a goal for this regime at this point. 
Preceding authors consider how industrial workers did protest against their employers 
about their failure to “share in the profits which were accruing to the business class”334 in the 
post-1965 period of this military-led era. But the literature seems to suggest that industrial labour 
“around the country [also] provided the background for the opposition’s renewed efforts to settle 
old scores”335 – in this sense, they are portrayed as mere tools of political elites like Bhutto to 
strategically attack the legitimacy of the military-led regime and ideally (re)gain power. Such 
industrial unrest is thus presented as a sudden and elite-driven occurrence in the final years of 
General Ayub’s regime, rather than a recurring and independent source of legitimacy strain as 
articulated in this thesis. 
By the end of the 1958-1969 period led by General Ayub, especially between November 
1968 and March 1969, “students, industrial labour, professional groups, low-ranking government 
employees and the ulema all took to the streets in massive anti-government demonstrations in 
key urban centres [in both East and West Pakistan].”336 This period reportedly culminated in 
more than 250 deaths at the hands of the military and police. 
But again, such unrest was seen as being motivated by certain political parties who had 
their own strategic interests to create more legitimacy strain for the increasingly weak Ayub 
regime, especially in case civilian rule ever returned. “The disorder which preceded the 1958 
coup appeared like child’s play in comparison with the anarchy which ... prevailed in some 
towns and rural areas of East Pakistan.”337 It seemed that “the uprising in West Pakistan had 
[also] embraced every major city in the province and had not paused for breath since it began on 
November 7, 1968.”338 
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With increasing legitimacy challenges by various groups, General Ayub planned to impose 
martial law in various cities across Pakistan to cope with such civil unrest. But “the top brass of 
the Army refused” immediately, as they felt “he was totally discredited at the popular level.”339 It 
seemed General Ayub had “erred gravely in overestimating the loyalty of the military in 
clamping down on the urban protesters bent upon [throwing] him out of office.”340 The military 
thus recognized its declining legitimacy. Yet the literature as a whole is limited in terms of more 
details on the specific nature of the protests. It hints at protests rooted in a burgeoning 
democratic and anti-military movement, but does not sufficiently consider more economic 
concerns of labour. 
At this point, the military regime was also exposed for corruption at its highest levels, 
further creating more legitimacy strain. “It was claimed that all the evils, which existed in 
Pakistan before [General] Ayub took over in 1958, had again grown out of proportion and it was 
difficult for an ordinary person to have his work done in government offices without promising 
bribes.”341 One estimate suggested that in March 1969, General Ayub and his family’s assets 
were worth between $10 and 20 million.342 “An ailing man whose personal reputation had been 
marred by his immediate family’s well advertised nepotism and corruption, he was not up to the 
task of salvaging something out of the wreckage.”343 
To cope with his weakening position, General Ayub began negotiations with opposition 
party leaders about restoring parliamentary democracy and appeared to accept that a transfer of 
power was badly needed. The opposition party leaders formed the Democratic Action Committee 
(DAC) and participated in Round Table Conferences with General Ayub, though Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, who later became prime minster, insisted he would only talk about the country’s future 
with the people themselves.344 
But, despite such discussions with opposition party leaders, General Ayub and his 
supporters could not accept a transfer of power to civilians and a change in regime. He still 
believed this pool of politicians was corrupt and “not uncompromised by the loss of efficacy”345 
of previous civilian regimes. In his public resignation speech on March 25, 1969, General Ayub 
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explained that, due to a “fast deteriorating” situation in the country, “administrative institutions 
… [being] paralyzed”, there was no other way to deal with the situation except with military 
assistance. He saw no potential in the leaders of the opposition political parties. The legitimacy 
strain of General Ayub’s regime was significant, but had not yet experienced a full-blown crisis 
as another military ruler was to take over the regime. 
Clearly, the 1958-1969 period saw the domination of military-bureaucratic elites in an 
undemocratic Pakistan. But the influence of various groups, and most significantly marginalized 
and politically manipulated ethnic groups, ensured that state legitimacy was repeatedly 
challenged, particularly after the 1965 war. But ultimately, it was an elite actor – i.e. the military 
– who decided that another general, Yahya Khan, would take over from Ayub for a change in 
government and not in regime. But unlike in this thesis in a later chapter, the literature fails to 
adequately consider how a labour-specific lens might relate to state legitimacy before 1958-
1969.  Because of the “mounting chaos” and the army commanders “becoming impatient,”346 
General Yahya “took up the reins of power” per the army’s request347 for another military 
regime. 
 
LEGITIMACY CRISIS AND BREAKDOWN OF  
THE MILITARY-LED REGIME 1970-1971 
General Yahya’s regime initially received positive responses from political circles, 
students, labour and urban unemployed, who had repeatedly and publicly questioned the 
legitimacy of the previous military regime. In a speech on March 27, 1969, General Yahya 
declared: “It is my firm belief that a sound, clean and honest administration is a prerequisite for a 
safe and constructive life and for the smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the 
people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise.”348 
In this way, General Yahya’s chief stated goal was to help transition Pakistan to democracy 
over two years. The 1970 elections for the National Assembly were a testament to this. General 
Yahya looked to the politicians to come up with a “workable constitution, which would ensure 
the integrity of the country.”349 Even during martial law, the general allowed complete political 
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activity in preparation for the elections. The military regime was thus working out “viable 
relations with civilian political groups” to ensure its success and ease a democratic transition.350 
The fact that the 1970 elections under General Yahya were largely regarded as legitimate is 
a testament to his regime’s belief in democracy. Political parties produced election manifestoes 
and ran public campaigns in both East and West Pakistan to rally support before the elections. 
Here was a military ruler who saw Pakistan’s future in the hands of the people and, more 
significantly, in the hands of the polity. In December 1970, the Awami League won most votes 
in East Pakistan, while West Pakistanis cast their vote to Bhutto’s PPP for the National 
Assembly. These parties were relied upon by General Yahya to produce a constitution and so, in 
this respect, the he did try to give the civilian polity a voice in state affairs. The military appeared 
to be responsible for initiating a democratic transition. 
But, in the end, General Yahya’s downfall lay in the very fact that he really did not know 
how to handle the ethnic tensions surging in East Pakistan or the underlying Islamic conflict this 
represented. He simply could not cope with these significant challenges to his legitimacy as a 
leader. After the general’s first address to the nation, General Yahya “sat down holding his head 
in dismay and woefully remarked, ‘What should we do now.’”351 Later, he remarked, “I made no 
particular attempt to know how to run a government … for 32 years I had been in the army … 
and so I thought running the army was no different from running the country.”352 
The military regime failed to deal with the demands of many East Pakistanis for greater 
autonomy and a stronger federation. General Yahya did not expect such a huge victory for East 
Pakistan’s Awami League party in the 1970 elections. Widespread rioting took place in East 
Pakistan as people protested to be able to “assert their [democratic] rights”353 which the Awami 
League had legitimately won in the election; the general’s response was to launch a military 
offensive against the “armed rebellion.”354 The East Pakistanis clearly did not see the existing 
military-led system of governance as legitimate and in no uncertain terms attacked the state on 
democratic and political grounds; this thesis adds an additional non-political perspective that 
emphasizes unmet expectation over subsistence needs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Janowitz 1977: 77 
351 Pg 16. F. M. Khan, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1973 
352 Pg 113. Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 
1994 
353 Pg 101. Robert LaPorte Jr, Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation, Asian Survey, Vol. 12: 2, pg 97-108, 
1972 
354 LaPorte Jr 1972: 101 
	   72 
The literature highlights ethnic rioting and related military violence, most notably 
“Operation Searchlight” which led to the deaths of hundreds of students in East Pakistan.355 
There is also consideration of how the Pakistani military “projected the conflict in East Pakistan 
as a counterinsurgency drive and at home the troops were presented as mujahedeen fighting the 
enemies of Islam. Propaganda emanating from West Pakistan also focused on the Hindu 
influence and the actions of anti-Muslim forces as responsible for the crisis in the eastern 
wing.”356 Ultimately, a civil, bloody war began on December 3, 1971. India assisted the East 
Pakistanis in this war and the ultimate result was the creation of Bangladesh. General Yahya thus 
suffered “personal humiliation both on the battlefield and the domestic front,”357 experiencing 
significant legitimacy strain as a political leader of a now shrunken Pakistani state.  
The loss of East Pakistan was a terrible blow for the military – both as an institution and a 
government, pushing the state into a full-blown legitimacy crisis. Nation-wide demonstrations 
demanded the immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people, after over 
a decade of military-led rule. The loss of East Pakistan brought back memories of the 1947 
partition, and newspapers sported headlines such as “Yahya Khan is responsible for Pakistan’s 
defeat”358 and “One voice, one declaration: Yahya Khan is the murderer of the nation.”359 
Public sentiment had turned on the general and his departure, along with the elite-centric 
and undemocratic system he represented, was imminent. The failed campaign in East Pakistan 
essentially confirmed the legitimacy crisis of the military as the saviour of the country, leading to 
its withdrawal from politics (at least formally and for the next five years). The “American 
generation” of Pakistani soldiers was coming to an end as there was little Western support, most 
notably financial support from the US, for the war – this only worsened the existing economic 
crisis as defence had to take priority over development. 
Since the military as an institution had suffered considerably with the secession of East 
Pakistan, another military regime in newly created Pakistan was untenable having lost legitimacy 
as a political system too. This made way for the politicians, led by Bhutto, to take the lead in 
governance and attempt a democratic transition. 
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In the 1970-1971 period, the ability to maintain legitimacy was indeed heavily stunted by 
ethnic strife against the state in East Pakistan. The literature frames such unrest in political terms 
as Bengalis demanded democracy and ultimately freedom. But, as illustrated in subsequent 
chapters, this regime breakdown could also be understood in the context of industrial unrest that 
repeatedly attacked regime legitimacy on more economic (subsistence) grounds. As a whole, the 
literature insufficiently considers how groups like industrial labour might specifically attack state 
legitimacy independent of any larger elite-driven political agenda or be part of an informal 
patron-client relationship with the regime; there is also limited detail given on how industrial 
unrest develops over time, particularly with its shift in focus (from wages to prices) towards the 
end of this civilian-led era, which is featured in a later chapter. As a whole, the literature’s 
illustration of Pakistan’s legitimacy crisis and regime breakdown in 1970-1971 is thus 
incomplete, suffering from a largely elite-centric and political focus. 
 
The preceding illustration of Pakistan’s political history in 1947-1971 thus reveals the 
significance of the military, bureaucrats, politicians, feudals, Islamist groups, ethnic groups, the 
United States and certain subordinate classes in terms of hindering state legitimacy at different 
points and even contributing to regime breakdown. But while such factors might explain attacks 
on state legitimacy, there is insufficient development of how other groups like industrial labour 
were in fact recurrently challenging the legitimacy of the regime, given their particular 
relationship with the state. 
The subsequent chapters will detail the morally embedded patron-client relationship 
between the state and labour that reveals a new way to understand the chronic legitimacy strain 
and eventual crisis of each regime in Pakistan. Let’s now consider each civilian and military-led 
era in 1947-1971 through this specific lens of the moral economy of development policy and 
thus better understand the significance of labour’s “entitlement protests”, particularly in relation 
to state legitimacy and the process of regime breakdown. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MORAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY  
DURING CIVILIAN RULE: 1947-1958 
 
 
In August 1947, Pakistan had just come into existence after a bloody partition from India. 
Anti-Indian hatred was flaring among the Pakistani people. “The disputes over Kashmir, the 
division of assets and water at the time of Partition increased anxieties about Pakistan’s 
precarious geopolitical situation in relation to its much larger neighbour.”360 Burdened with this 
“sense of inferiority and insecurity”361, newly created Pakistan desperately wanted to prove its 
Indian counterpart wrong about its very existence by showing it could flourish as an independent 
state. Despite this significant chip on its shoulder and outside observers publicly labelling it an 
“economic monstrosity” that was doomed to fail,362 Pakistan’s government identified its two 
priorities – defence and development.363 
The 1947-1948 war with India established “the primacy of the national security agenda.” 
From then onwards, military security was given maximum priority, resulting in the government 
allocating about 70 percent of the estimated budget in the first year for defence364 in Pakistan. 
With the constant threat of larger India on its borders, three quarters of the central government’s 
revenue budget was allotted to defence and civil administration in this ten-year period.365 This 
contributed in part to the emergence of the “milibus” later in this period – the “economic empire” 
of the military.366 
In the country’s first budget speech, the finance minister openly admitted that “the 
expenditure on defence is higher than would be normally justified for a young state like ours. On 
the other hand, the dangers surrounding us make it essential for us to maintain an effective 
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defence force and we are, therefore, reluctantly constrained to spend on the Armed Forces money 
some of which, under better conditions, should have been available for the social, industrial and 
economic development of the country.”367 In 1950, the finance minister made similar comments: 
“The scale of expenditure on Defence is disproportionately high and for a new country where 
every rupee ought to be spent on development and production.”368 This excessive focus on 
defence spending over development was repeated in subsequent budget speeches until 1954-
1955, when the finance minister instead emphasised the generous US military aid package and 
funding from other donors globally.369 
With what limited funds were left, the state focused on development. This was seen as an 
uphill battle as “Pakistan was left with hardly any well organized industry and had to begin 
almost from scratch.”370 It was considered to be a “long-range problem” and “slow affair,”371 but 
this was also considered a necessary step for the “legitimacy of the [new] state.”372 The finance 
minister remarked in his 1947-48 Budget Speech: “overall trading, business and economic 
conditions have been so seriously dislocated that it now depends largely on the initiative, power 
of recuperation and adaptability of the people of Pakistan, how quickly and effectively it may be 
possible to repair the damage done and to reconstruct the fabric of our economic life.”373 He also 
noted the “gigantic” problem of absorbing six million refugees into the economic structure of 
West Pakistan. Beyond giving them food and shelter, there was a need to bring refugees into 
“our economic life”374, which he suggested would only happen after there was a significant surge 
in development. 
To move development forward as quickly as possible, the emphasis was undoubtedly on 
“state facilitation of industrial growth through the concentration of capital” which was “rooted in 
American neo-liberal economic thought of the 1950s” 375  and developed by the state’s 
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Development Board and Planning Advisory Board.376 In December 1947 at the Government’s 
first Industries Conference377, “it was decided that the central government would plan the 
development of 27 urgently needed industries which included textiles, sugar, cement, electricity, 
heavy chemicals, heavy engineering, and arms and ammunition”378. 
The first and subsequent budgets of this period focused on industrial development, 
though the publicly stated goal was for more “balanced development” through both increasing 
industrial and agricultural production.379 The “herculean task of building an economic base was 
left to the state as the private sector was still in embryo and did not have the capital to lead an 
industrial revolution in the country”380. The government’s credit (PICIC) and development 
(PIDC) corporations381 played an integral role in developing certain key industries such as 
agricultural processing (jute, rice, wheat), food manufacturing (vegetable oil, sugar) and textiles 
(cotton, silk, wool).382 Pakistan’s “distinct economy” became “a source of supply of raw 
materials and a market for manufactured goods.”383 As the finance minister remarked in his 
1947-48 Budget Speech: “Pakistan is at present mainly an agricultural country [but] in rapid 
industrial development lies our chief hope of increased prosperity.”384 
The initial budget speeches of this period repeatedly acknowledged that development 
could not alone be driven by the state – “private enterprise must also naturally play its big and 
rightful part.”385 The ruling civilian government thus singled out a small elite of industrialists to 
help build the new state’s economy. Given the “net outflow of human capital” after partition with 
the departure of “skilled Hindu businessmen and technical migrant workers to India”, these few 
industrialists were of considerable importance to the state. 386  The state’s non-devaluation 
decision for its currency, resultant trade wars with India in jute and other commodities, as well as 
the struggling agricultural sector (e.g. the weak wheat harvests in 1952-1953 brought about by 
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drought conditions in West Pakistan)387 added to the country’s economic vulnerabilities in these 
initial years. 
Politicians regularly called on entrepreneurs388 – who initially were “hesitant to engage in 
new enterprises”389 especially if it took away from the “prestige of landownership”390 – to invest 
capital in various industries for Pakistan’s “prosperity.”391 This development focus was largely 
restricted to West Pakistan, until 1955 when more “balanced regional growth” was explicitly 
proposed in the First Five Year Plan.392 Because many of these “merchants were shy [about] 
making industrial investments”393, the state offered incentives like reduced taxes, permits, tariffs, 
reduced duties394 395 – even if such elite-focused benefits disadvantaged smaller businessmen and 
traders.396 397 
This approach was in line with import substitution industrialization that was popular in 
many developing countries in the 1950s; in Pakistan, this meant that the state provided certain 
industrialists with “generous fiscal incentives, heavy protection, preferential access to foreign 
exchange allocation for imports of capital goods and credit at low, controlled sizable rents.”398 
This aspect of development policy encouraged a “private-public sector relationship where 
clientelism and patronage predominated.”399 400 Elite industrialists came to expect preferential 
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policies to run their businesses, reinforcing a state-industrialist expectation relationship within 
development policy. 
As the industrialization process became more entrenched in Pakistan’s economy, 
“industrialists earned extremely high profits, [many] investing mainly in consumer-goods 
industries where the entire initial investment could sometimes be recovered within a year.”401 By 
the early 1950s, this “new, able, ruthless group of industrial entrepreneurs”402 like the Wazar Ali 
and Ghulam Faruque clans403 became powerful enough to “influence government policy and 
even to bring about the fall of a Cabinet unresponsive to their pressure.”404 By the late 1950s, 
“sixty industrial groups (out of 300 firms) controlled 24.4% of private industrial assets.”405 It was 
obvious that “the Pakistani state explicitly privileged economic growth”406 for this elite. 
For their role in the state’s new development policy, industrialists – largely in West 
Pakistan – became influential in terms of wealth and their power over government and its 
policies grew. They “made huge mark-ups for themselves and their families, but the spill overs 
to the rest of the economy were at best marginal.”407 Like in other developing countries, this was 
an obvious “elitist model of growth, where both economic and political power [were] held by a 
small coterie of elites” – it ensured that the “market [was] rigged and the state [was] hijacked in 
order to deliver the most of the benefits of economic growth to this small group.”408 
But what did labour gain from such elite-skewed industrial development? It was clear the 
civilian regime was “concerned primarily with accelerating the rate of growth of gross national 
product … [while] other possible social goals were neglected.”409 This translated to “little 
development” for the majority of Pakistan’s population, including labour.410 Yet the state still 
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managed to ensure that labour played a role in this elitist model of growth throughout this 
civilian-led era. 
  The state repeatedly insisted it would provide “very basic necessities” to its workers, 
which it claimed was its “primary task.”411 This became part of the civilian regime’s strategy to 
promote a “moral economy” centred on its industrial development policy, so workers would play 
their role in national development for the basic subsistence promised by the state. This 
“subsistence ethic”412 thus became the “norm and standard”413 which labour expected the state to 
maintain, in return for its role in the country’s development project. 
  However, as explained later in this chapter, the state did not always uphold its promise of 
subsistence provision for labour, frequently hindering the state-labour expectation relationship. 
As a result, at certain points in this period, organized industrial workers challenged the state 
through unrest, impacting state legitimacy that even contributed to regime breakdown by the end 
of this civilian-led era. The question to consider first though is how the moral economy and 
labour’s expectation relationship with the state were derived. 
 
 
SETTING UP THE EXPECTATION RELATIONSHIP IN THE MORAL ECONOMY 
OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN PAKISTAN: 1947-1951 
 
To set up the expectation relationship in the moral economy, the state took a multi-
pronged strategy. First, it cashed in on the nationalist sentiment of this post-war era in a new 
nation-state. It egged on labourers to work in the name of national duty as the Indian threat 
loomed over Pakistan, economically and otherwise. It also urged workers to be ready to sacrifice 
for their country as Pakistan fought a significant trade war with India. This introduced the notion 
that labour should not expect more than mere subsistence provision from the state in this initial 
period of stabilizing Pakistan. 
Second, the state supported some trade unions over others to ensure the anti-government 
unions would struggle to find their footing and pro-government unions would not only survive 
but thrive. The state’s message for labour to do their duty was relayed to these unions, the idea 
being that they would then spread the message to their workers and so create “collectively held 
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goals”414 among labour that reflected the needs of the state to promote industrial development at 
all costs. The unions themselves also highlighted their expectation of the state to keep up with 
their promise of subsistence patronage. 
Third, strategic communication and policies were introduced by the state to offer basic 
subsistence to industrial workers in terms of a stable level of wages and prices. This was key to 
creating a sense of entitlement of labour and expectation from the state for particular patronage. 
It formed the core of the legitimacy of the state-labour relationship, reinforcing for labour that 
the state would be “responsive” if the expectation of subsistence provision was not met by the 
state.415 
 
LABOUR’S NATIONALISTIC ROLE OF SACRIFICE IN 
PAKISTAN’S “ECONOMIC WAR” WITH INDIA416 
While Pakistan’s “survival as a nation-state”417 was especially brought into question after 
the deaths of leaders Jinnah and Ali Khan in 1948 and 1951 respectively, the Pakistani state still 
fervently pursued industrial development throughout the 1947-58 period. The “political system” 
was considered a “farce” with its “short-lived governments”418 but all leaders of this era followed 
the same strategy – industrial development was publicly equated with the country’s feeling of 
anti-India nationalism and Pakistani nationhood as a way for the state to achieve policy 
legitimacy. 
The potential for another army-led battle with India loomed large, yet Pakistan also faced 
a “trade war”419 with its rival, partly due to Pakistan’s decision not to devalue its currency in 
1949.420 Playing a role in industrial development was thus coupled with fighting the Indian 
enemy and framed by successive government politicians and bureaucrats as the individual 
Pakistani’s national duty, even if one was a mere factory worker. In these early years, the state 
frequently commented on India’s “economic war” on Pakistan and the need for Pakistanis to 
sacrifice to combat India421; this set up the idea that workers should only expect basic 
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subsistence support and nothing more from the state during this period of struggle. In this sense, 
the state appealed to the individual Pakistani’s sense of patriotic duty when performing his role 
in national development. 
For instance, during this period, state officials frequently commented on how Pakistanis 
had to combat India in the war over certain commodities like jute. They claimed that India was 
actively smuggling jute from East Pakistan to West Bengal to “shatter the economy”; they even 
suggested that “Indian agents”422 had been positioned all over the India-Pakistan border ready to 
“spread rumours” 423  about Pakistan’s “weak” markets. In response, the Pakistani state 
encouraged East Pakistani jute sellers to counter Indian “propaganda” so it would not “lose its 
monopoly in the world market.”424 
This trade war also applied to the cotton market. India’s “boycott” of Pakistani cotton and 
its export trade was blatant, formalized in certain retaliatory measures. Yet state officials 
reassured the public they would overcome such actions, due to the arrival of Japan, China, 
Russia and other countries wanting to purchase Pakistani cotton.425 There was a significant 
Pakistani movement to “boycott” Indian textiles as well. For instance, M. A. Jawad, leading 
member of Karachi’s Textile Importers and Wholesale Cloth Merchants Association, repeatedly 
spoke out to workers and industrialists that this boycott would continue – until India stopped its 
“unfriendly trade policies” that were designed to “cripple the Pakistani economy.”426 Students in 
East Pakistan also pledged their “full support” to boycott Indian textiles, led by East Pakistan’s 
Muslim Student League.427 
 Besides textiles, Pakistan also felt India had “declared war” because it had suspended 
coal supplies with no warning.428 Pakistani media outlets regularly commented on India’s 
“discriminatory trade practices against Pakistan,” particularly in mustard oil, steel and coal, 
showing that its neighbour was “on the warpath” to destroy the new state “economically”429 in 
various industries. 
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 With such obvious examples of India’s conflict with Pakistan, strong figures in Pakistan 
politics and the army frequently spoke out to the public about the individual Pakistani’s “duty” to 
the nation’s industrial development. Prime Minister Ali Khan, for instance, spoke of how each 
Pakistani had to take a “daily vow to serve the nation” as “duty to the State comes first.”430 On 
another occasion, Ali noted that “the people” should be “ready to sacrifice all” to build Pakistan 
and counter the Indian economic threat.431 Seven years before he would take over the country in 
the 1958 military coup, General Ayub publicly stated in a speech: “your efforts are directed 
towards making Pakistan stronger in whatever walk of life you may happen to be.”432 
In his first budget speech, the finance minister noted that, “the ultimate prosperity and 
security of Pakistan will depend upon our ability for disciplined hard work, sustained sacrifice, 
and the degree of enterprise and skill shown by our people.”433 The labour minister made a 
similar plea for Pakistani workers to sacrifice for their country in 1950: “We must share to take 
the responsibility in shaping the destiny of our nation. ... We are lucky that our people are all one 
in sacrificing their last drop of blood for their dear Pakistan. Let us all realise that oneness and 
take vow before one Allah, to one Prophet and to our one leader, Quaid-e-Azam that the sacred 
duty entrusted to us by them be fulfilled by us.”434 
At the first meeting of the Tripartite Labour Conference in 1949, Prime Minister Ali 
Khan addressed labour and their employers; he reminded them that development would lead to 
the country’s prosperity if they would “sincerely collaborate” with the civilian regime for the 
sake of their country. “I do not promise you a utopia in the twinkling of an eye but I do promise 
you a rosy dawn and bright morning which will see us march on the road to prosperity and well-
being provided – and it is very important proviso – you sincerely collaborate with Government in 
achieving what we all most passionately want to achieve – a progressive and prosperous 
Pakistan,” he said.435 Again, the state promoted the idea of sacrifice in the near-term for the sake 
of improvement in the long term for the individual Pakistani. An informal patron-client 
relationship between the state and workers was also hinted at as part of the moral economy of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Dawn, October 20, 1949 
431 Dawn, July 18, 1951 
432 Dawn, January 23, 1951 
433 Budget 1948: 18 
434 Pg 30. A. M. Malik, Labour Problems and Policy in Pakistan, Pakistan Labour Publications, Karachi, Pakistan, 
1954 
435 Malik 1954: 67 
	   83 
development – if they worked within the state’s purview now, labour would be on the path to 
“prosperity”436. 
In the first general meeting of the State Bank of Pakistan, Governor Zahid Hussain made 
similar remarks about sacrifice, nationalism and development. He noted: “the common man’s 
faith in the country’s destiny and enthusiasm for sacrifice” are “invaluable assets” in this nation-
building period. The governor pointed out that if they work and sacrifice, they would be helping 
the country to progress. He said: “We must be prepared to face hard days ahead, but with trust in 
God and faith in our own power of endurance…”437 Thus, the recurring message of the state to 
the Pakistani public was that sacrifice was necessary to counter India, especially in terms of 
labour’s role in industrial development. 
 
STATE-TRADE UNION RELATIONS 
Beyond speeches to the general public about a trade war with India, the state also focused 
in on certain key labour unions to educate workers specifically about the need to sacrifice in the 
name of national development and so to only expect basic subsistence from the state. There were 
about 300,000 workers and 75 trade unions in organized industry of Pakistan soon after partition, 
which included groups in textiles, cotton, chemicals, paper, wood and glass.438 “The small size of 
the industrial labour force was an initial constraint to trade unionism in Pakistan”439, but it was 
also an advantage for the state to influence these few groups and so shape what “society’s 
collectively held goals”440 should be for national development. 
 Most trade unions were part of the All-India organizations and “had no independent 
existence of their own.”441 Previous union leaders were Hindu and migrated to India at partition; 
thus Pakistan-based unions were initially “deprived of the leadership and active members who 
had previously been provided by the central organisation.”442 This gave the state an opportunity 
to mold the trade unions to operate in line with national objectives from the get-go. By 1951, 
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there were almost 200 unions, the most active unions in “basic industrial infrastructure”, 
including railways, shipping, hydroelectric power, post and telegraph, cement and mining.443 
The state’s chief strategy was thus to “promote the formation of a nationwide labour 
organization which would align itself with its goal of rapid economic development” and 
reinforce a sense of sacrifice among labourers.444 After partition, there were four national trade 
union organizations: All Pakistan Confederation of Labour (APCOL), Pakistan Mazdoor 
Federation, United Trade Union Federation and East Pakistan Mazdoor Federation. But it was 
APCOL that the state promoted at the expense of other smaller unions and that was cajoled into 
promoting subsistence among its members, in keeping with the state’s version of a moral 
economy of development policy. 
APCOL was formed under “government patronage” and came to be recognized as the 
“sole representative of the working class in Pakistan.” It was “given representation in all national 
and international organisations.”445 APCOL also received foreign support in terms of “direct 
financial assistance” that allowed the organization to set up nationwide offices and to “influence 
local trade union leaders.”446 Other trade unions – “either because of a lack of financial support 
or fear of government reprisals – also fell in line with APCOL’s ethos of workers’ sacrifice and 
subsistence, at least in this initial period.447 For many members, “the fear of losing government 
support and in many cases attractive salaries acted as strong disincentive to leave it.”448 
By 1958, APCOL considered itself the “most representative organization of the working 
class in Pakistan” with 635 trade unions and 376,029 in membership449, and a state-influenced 
ethos. “Radical” unions like the Communist-influenced Pakistan Trade Union Federation 
(PTUF) were weakened as the state focused its patronage on other unions. “The period of radical 
trade union activity for all practical purposes had come to an end” as early as 1951.450 
The state also used its influence to remind workers of what they could expect of the state 
in terms of industrial relations. Labour officials spoke to workers regularly about the state’s 
promotion of workers’ rights. For instance, at a speech to union workers in 1951, Labour 
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Minister Dr A. M. Malik “assured” workers that the state’s “chief interest [was] to safeguard and 
maintain the legitimate and reasonable interests for all workers.”451 He noted that the state would 
not “sit idle with the differences between [workers and employers] growing wider and wider 
bringing about strikes and lock-outs to the great detriment of the State.”452 Malik reinforced the 
importance of “Government machinery” and how workers would “always receive a fair deal at 
the hands of the Government.”453 
While the state promoted its subsistence and sacrifice ideology to certain union leaders, 
these union leaders in turn spread this rhetoric to workers that created expectation of certain 
patronage from the state. In fact, at various labour conferences, Pakistani union leaders publicly 
vocalized their expectation of labour to sacrifice for development; these leaders also expressed 
their expectation of the state to provide subsistence patronage in return. 
At the International Labour Organization’s first Asian Regional Conference held at 
Nuwara Eliya (Ceylon) in 1950 for instance, Faiz Ahmad, Pakistan Workers’ Delegate, 
“wholeheartedly supported objectives” of the state and the need for basic subsistence for labour 
to achieve Pakistan’s state-led development. According to the conference report, Ahmad 
“pointed out that a hungry man was not in a position to understand the meaning of political [and 
economic] freedom if he were treated more or less as a commodity [by the state].”454 
At the Committee on Workers Welfare in 1950, Ahmad forcefully represented Pakistani 
labour once again, noting how the state’s “increase in production depends ... upon sustaining the 
welfare standards of the workers.”455 He also stated that it was the responsibility of government 
and its policies to “provide welfare services” and that the “amenities of life for the benefit of 
workers in various undertakings... should be financed by the state.”456 
Of course, this is not to suggest that union leaders did not want more for their members 
beyond immediate subsistence from the state. The West Pakistan Federation of Labour, a part of 
APCOL, for instance aimed to “strive for the amelioration of the economic, political and social 
conditions of the working class; to support and participate actively in the struggle for Pakistan’s 
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political and economic freedom from the point of view of the working class.”457 But these goals 
were considered more long-term, while the state-directed goals of sacrifice and subsistence were 
considered more short-term as a trade war ensued with India and Pakistan struggled to establish 
its economy. 
Union leaders also made it clear to members that, if the state failed to meet such 
expectation of patronage, there would be repercussions – particularly through strikes. The 
APCOL framed its constitution in terms of “securing and maintaining for workers of Pakistan the 
... right to strike or withdraw labour.”458 In fact, at the First Pakistan Labour Conference in 1949, 
Ahmad spoke out for his fellow workers, noting that the state had taken some steps to “move in 
the right direction” to “relieve the distress of the working classes” but there was more to be done 
if the state wanted production to continue “unhindered.”459 He used this forum to reveal to the 
state that some employers were openly “victimising” labour and working conditions were “bad.” 
If state institutions did not deal with this immediately, Ahmad suggested key unions would have 
to “re-evaluate” its position on the ruling regime and its policies,460 thus hinting at the patron-
client link between the state and organized industrial workers. 
Such recurring rhetoric from labour leaders and state officials reminded workers of what 
they should expect from the state within the scope of industrial relations. It also reminded the 
state of its obligation to industrial workers – to provide subsistence conditions, which are 
discussed in terms of wages and prices in this thesis. 
 
WAGES 
In these early years after partition, the state adopted a multi-pronged strategy – strategic 
speeches, conferences and legislation – to show that wages could be sustained for industrial 
labour. This was the first key component of labour’s expectation of the state in this moral 
economy of development policy. It thus formed one part of the core of the legitimacy of the 
state-labour relationship, reinforcing for labour that the state would be “responsive” if the 
expectation of wages was not met.461 
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First, it was clear that state officials wanted to project themselves as pro-labour through 
strategic speeches directed at elite industrialists. Outside parties like the ILO Labour Mission 
revealed to Pakistan’s regime that “management, unable or unwilling, to see the necessity for the 
expense, do not realize that welfare work, by establishing good labour relations, can show results 
on the right side of the balance sheet.”462 Jinnah in 1948 was the first to talk to industrialists 
about fair wages: “I have no doubt that in Pakistan, traders and merchants ... in building up their 
own fortune, will not forget their social responsibility for a fair and square wage [for labour].”463 
Other state officials also specifically encouraged industrialists to offer fair wages to their 
workers. In 1951, State Bank Governor Hussain told a group of industrial elites that they “should 
not hold back today what the workers would seize from them by force tomorrow.”464 In 1948, 
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan made a similar speech to Karachi industrialists: “Pakistan will 
certainly not be a capitalist country; it will not be a communist country, it will function on the 
principles of Islam” and social justice.465 He noted that, “our resources are considerable; we have 
only to harness them to step up the national income and offer a fair wage for the worker.”466 
Labour Minister Dr Malik frequently spoke out about industrialists’ role in furthering the 
state’s commitment to “a fair deal for labour.”467 He told industrialists in 1951: “Pakistan has not 
been established for the benefit of any group or class of people. It has been established for the 
good and prosperity of its general masses. The working population forms the majority of its 
people. Their prosperity is therefore the prosperity of Pakistan. ... Heavy responsibility lies upon 
you – the employers. ... [You are] trustees on behalf of the nation entrusted with the job of 
looking after the workers and meeting their legitimate needs and demands. ... A contented and 
happy worker is not only an asset to himself, but an asset to the industry as well as to the nation. 
… Those on whose lot have fallen the responsibilities of looking after labour [must] play their 
part fairly and justly.”468 This was not mere rhetoric – these public comments were extensive, 
elaborate, frequent and explicit. They were part of the state’s strategy to achieve policy 
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legitimacy in terms of shared norms about the significance of boosting industrial development 
for Pakistan. 
Second, the state appeared to push further for labour’s wages through specialized and 
highly publicised conferences involving government, industrialist and labour representatives. 
Documentation from such conferences was then widely distributed to key trade unions to further 
influence labour about the state’s commitment to their needs and the relevant laws in place. This 
was another key way for the state to monitor and shape industrial relations, while reiterating to 
labour about wages that they should expect in this moral economy of development policy. 
At the first Pakistan Labour Conference in 1949, for instance, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali 
Khan acknowledged that, “labour constitutes not only the largest section of the population of any 
country but also the most important. It is obvious that if a Government really intends to improve 
the lot of its people, it is the worker, the man in in the street, it has in its view. My Government is 
fully determined to ... make every possible effort to improve the lot of the common man. ... 
Pakistan based on the Islamic principles of freedom, equality and social justice. Therefore the 
first and foremost duty of my Government is to end all exploitation of one group of people by 
another. There can be no greater guarantee of justice to labour.”469 He specifically directed his 
comments to industrialists in attendance: the “Holy Prophet, Peace be on Him with His deep 
wisdom, had understood this well and he said it again and again that every man must receive the 
wages that are his due and the full fruits of his labour.”470 
At the All-Pakistan Confederation of Labour in 1950, Labour Minister Malik also told 
employers directly – “Please read the writing on the wall. If you keep your labourers contented 
with fair wages ... you will get much better return from them than what you are getting now.”471 
He then told labour representatives: “You have one great advantage in Pakistan, your 
Government is prepared to help you and your employers are sympathetic. I tell you this from my 
own experience.”472 
Third, through various laws inherited from pre-partition India, Pakistan’s government 
organized industrial-labour relations at the national and provincial level, thus explicitly making 
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the state accountable for wages for workers.473 While there was no official labour policy until 
1955, ruling politicians and bureaucrats were still seen as central to industrialist-worker relations 
through such legislation. 
This included the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act, which served to “promote measures for 
securing and preserving amity and good relations between employer and workmen.”474 It was 
supposed to “provide a speedy remedy to workers and officers of trade unions for redressing 
grievances”, particularly in term of labour’s wage-related issues.475 Through this law, the state 
encouraged labour to settle any wages disputes through the Central Conciliation Department or 
the Industrial Tribunal − both of which were run by government appointees.476 The impetus of 
this machinery was also to limit strikes that would hinder national production; strikes and lock-
outs could not be declared without first going through appropriate state mechanisms.477 
The Factories Act 1934 was considered “of vital importance for labour”478, giving 
specific regulations about maximum working hours for industrial factory workers and required 
rest periods, as well as other minimum working conditions which industrialists were legally 
expected to provide for their workers. It was the “responsibility of the Provincial 
Governments”479 to administer the various labour-related acts. But it was the Payment of Wages 
Act 1936 that explicitly guaranteed a subsistence wage for labour. “Central and Provincial 
Governments [were] empowered to extend all or any of the provisions of the Act.”480 It specified 
a monthly wage limit of Rs 200, applying to all industry workers.481 
Although it became questionable as to how effective strategic speeches, conferences and 
laws were in providing wages for labour, the state clearly made considerable effort to show that 
it was pro-labour. It also highlighted to labour that state institutions existed to guarantee wages 
within this moral economy of development policy. Of course, as was evident throughout this 
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period, industrial workers held strikes – or what can be termed “entitlement protests”482 – against 
the state when it felt expected wages were not being offered by the state. 
 
PRICES 
In this initial period, the state adopted a similar multi-pronged strategy – speeches, 
conferences and legislation – to show that prices could be offered to industrial labour and so 
achieve policy legitimacy. This was the second key component of labour’s expectation of the 
state in this moral economy of development policy. It thus formed the second part of the core of 
the legitimacy of the state-labour relationship, reinforcing for labour that the state would be 
“responsive” if the expectation of prices was not met.483 
First, it was clear that state officials wanted to project themselves as pro-labour through 
public speeches specifically about keeping basic prices low. In 1950, the civilian regime vowed 
to “bring down prices” to “benefit” workers and also ensure that increased taxes would not 
“burden” the poor.484 The Labour Minister pointed out the need for “price control” to ensure a 
subsistence standard of living for labour,485 noting the “huge discrepancy between wholesale and 
retail prices of various imported consumers’ goods.”486 
In this early period, there was a widespread perception of hoarding and black-marketing 
by certain elites that drove up prices of basic goods. State officials frequently spoke out against 
suspected industrialist offenders. As early as 1947, the state highlighted the questionable increase 
in local salt prices: “The Government views with concern the manner in which some traders have 
taken advantage of a temporary shortage of supplies in certain areas to push up the local salt 
prices to unconscionable heights in total disregard of the hardships thus inflicted on the 
community.”487 
In 1951, Deputy Finance Minister Ghayasuddin Pathan actually publicly connected the 
salt shortage in East Pakistan with the actions of particular industrialists in the black-market. 
Pathan said, “the black-marketers have again been able to blacken the face of holy Pakistan and 
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are making profits at the cost of the poor people by unfair means.”488 This led to significant 
speeches by state officials about the need to set a minimum price on basic goods. For instance, 
prominent politicians like Begum Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz489 reiterated on many occasions how 
the “Government should give a constitutional guarantee of basic minimum prices”490 for the 
poorer classes, including industrial labour. 
Second, the state highlighted labour’s need for prices in its highly publicised conferences 
involving government, industrialist and labour representatives. Documentation from such 
conferences was then widely distributed to key trade unions to further influence labour about the 
state’s commitment to low prices. This was another key way for the state to monitor and shape 
industrial relations, while reiterating to labour about prices to which they were entitled in this 
moral economy of development policy. 
At the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1949, for instance, Labour 
Minister Malik highlighted explicitly to workers how the state would “put as many checks on 
inflation as may be practicable, in order to keep prices under control and to avoid a spiral of 
wages chasing prices.”491 At the state-organized Pakistan Tripartite Labour Conference in 1950, 
Malik again reasoned that: “The country is poor and hunger is great. The wage-earners do not get 
enough to make both ends meet. They starve. They die for want of food and lack of medicine. It 
is no surprise that they are discontented. You cannot expect good output and efficient work from 
a starved person who cannot afford to pay for basic items.”492 
At the next Tripartite Labour Conference in 1951, he reinforced this point: “Since wage 
earners constitute the largest section of the people of the country, it is they who are most hard hit 
if there is any price increase. There is, therefore, the largest share of responsibility for building 
up an economically sound and stable nation with stable prices.”493 
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Third, through specific laws and policies, the Pakistani state tried to control prices, thus 
explicitly making the state accountable for prices for workers.494 Although some state officials 
viewed the rise in prices of essential goods as the “price of industrialisation” that had to be 
paid,495 the rise in prices was also widely attributed to hoarding and black-marketing by certain 
elite industrialists. Controlling food prices was thus a recurring step taken by ruling political 
elites during this period, using different strategies.496 
To tackle high salt prices from elite hoarding, for instance, the state created a monopoly 
procurement system in the 1950s to ensure the distribution of salt to workers at fair prices. There 
were also a few rounds of heavily publicized arrests of lower level industrialists and seizure of 
their salt stocks.497 
The state introduced “fair price shops” across Pakistan to ensure “regular supplies”498 and 
“fixed prices” of “essential goods” 499  for workers. Specific government ordinances were 
announced in the early 1950s to control prices and dictate the specific amount of a commodity 
that each individual could buy. For instance, in 1950, the Governor General had announced that 
“premises may be searched” to see if “wholesalers, retailers, traders or anyone else” was 
hoarding a commodity, and thus going against the law.500 
The state even intervened directly in the sale of commodities in the market to reduce the 
risk of price manipulation by certain groups. For instance, in 1951, Punjab’s provincial 
government monitored the sale of local and United States imported wheat and flour through 
depots. The state offered specific instructions as to how the sale would be carried out to counter 
those who “were selling their quotas in the black-market since the failure of rains had caused a 
rise in prices in wheat in open market.”501 
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A Food Grains Order was also created to counter smuggling of goods leading to high 
prices, particularly in Sind. While it had limited results, it at least showed labour that the state 
was taking concrete action to ensure prices that they expected for their role in development. As a 
Dawn editorial noted, for the worker, “the efficiency of the Provincial Government in dealing 
with the food crisis, which means in dealing with [elite] hoarders and smugglers, will be the acid 
test of their honesty and sincerity.”502 
Although it became questionable as to how effective public diplomacy and specific 
government orders were in providing prices for labour, the institutions did exist for them to have 
their voice heard and have their subsistence needs met within this moral economy centred around 
development policy. It appeared that the state was taking appropriate measures to ensure that 
labour would be offered prices in return for their role in industrial development. Of course, as 
was evident especially during the end of this civilian-led era in 1957-1958, industrial labour 
would stage “entitlement protests”503 against the state when it felt prices were not being 
delivered. 
 
 
MORAL ECONOMY VIOLATIONS AND LEGITIMACY  
STRAIN OF THE STATE 1952-1956 
 
During this early nation-building period of 1947-1951, the state thus did work to both 
build the expectation of what labour should receive for its role in national development through 
public communication and take specific measures to follow through on this identified goal – it 
effectively tried to achieve “policy legitimacy.”504 At the same time, workers also expressed their 
expectation of the state in terms of their subsistence needs. In this sense, the moral economy 
centred around development policy was established during this initial era of civilian rule in 
Pakistan, with specific expectations built into the state-labour and patron-client relationship. The 
state clearly used this “ideology” of subsistence and nationalistic sacrifice “to build legitimacy” 
among unions and industrial workers. It aimed to create “unity of national purpose”505 to reduce 
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the risk of strikes and so maximize industrial productivity that would in one sense legitimize the 
new state. 
But after 1952, the state spent less time on building up expectation and more of its focus 
simply reacting to labour unrest over specific moral economy violations. This was in the 
backdrop of legislation to “control” workers and unions such as the Pakistan Essential Services 
(Maintenance) Act and Section 23 and 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act that made strikes 
“illegal.”506 Effectively, the significant build-up in 1947-1951 later led to legitimacy strain for 
the state when it appeared it was not fulfilling labour’s expectation for specific subsistence 
goods. Previously, the state’s moral economy “ideology [had repeatedly promised] a bright new 
future as the principal means for establishing legitimacy” but such performance-based legitimacy 
became “hazardous”507 with increasing moral economy violations involving wages; this was 
particularly the case in terms of wages in 1952-1956 as strikes steadily increased508 against the 
state. In effect, when labour’s expectation of wages was not met and thus “promises [were] not 
realized,” the authority of Pakistan’s political leaders quickly “eroded”509 in their eyes, which led 
to industrial unrest directed at the state. 
Since civilian leaders in the new Pakistani state did “not yet have an easy command of 
power” and institutions were not firmly entrenched, industrial workers appeared to be evaluating 
the new state “within a very narrow range of acceptability, requiring only a minor [issue] to 
spark a crisis.”510 Such moral economy violations represented workers’ temporary “loss of public 
confidence” in the state and increased “the potential for disorder.” 511  The disruption in 
production created legitimacy strain for the new state struggling to develop its industrial 
economy. This reflects the hypothesis of this thesis: when there is a decline in subsistence 
conditions (i.e lower wages, labour stops production through unrest and thus creates legitimacy 
strain for the Pakistani state. 
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Two types of wage-focused strikes against the state can be inferred from available data. 
First, workers would strike against the state when it appeared the state was not taking necessary 
action against industrial elites who were unfairly firing workers or limiting their wages in some 
way. It was thus rooted in “workers’ sense of injustice, a feeling that they were being denied 
something to which they were entitled”512 as part of the moral economy of development policy. 
Second, industrial workers would strike against the state when they felt state-run institutions and 
policies did not follow through on delivering expected wages. This could be termed “entitlement 
protests” rooted in “unmet promises” embedded in state institutions and policies – “anger over 
unmet expectations [was] the impetus to workers’ actions.”513 
After both types of wage-focused labour unrest, the state immediately responded with 
specific speeches or policies to limit any further legitimacy strain. This typically saw the end of 
industrial unrest and the resumption of labour’s role in production. During this period, this 
pattern of events occurred repeatedly in various industries. The wage data below reinforces that 
subtle changes in industrial wages overall had no significant impact on labour unrest. Whether 
general wage levels increased or decreased, it was specific moral economy violations at the level 
of individual or a group of industrial outlets that labour perceived as broken promises by the state 
to maintain wages and which prompted workers to engage in unrest. 
 
Real Wages of Industrial Workers514 (Rs per year per worker) 
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There was, however, a noticeable drop in industrial unrest after the state’s announcement 
of its labour policy it 1955 – the first and only official labour policy of this civilian-led era. For 
workers, this policy finally represented state progress towards meeting workers’ expectation of 
wages through specific policies. However, a year later, it appeared labour’s expectations of this 
policy were not met as industrial unrest began to increase again, in fact doubling in one year 
from 75 incidents in 1955 to 150 in 1956 – its highest point in the 1952-1956 period. By this 
point, even amendments to the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act515 in 1956 could not appease labour 
who did not expect the civilian regime would be able to deliver wages. This added to the 
legitimacy strain of the state.516 
 
Period Number of Unions Members Labour Unrest Over 
Wages517 
Production Days Lost 
1952 352 394923 93 126178 
1953 394 424563 99 79058 
1954 382 410755 107 283994 
1955 474 325610 75 121312 
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1956 542 316642 150 374915 
 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST OVER FIRST WAGE ISSUE: 1952-1954 
 The first type of industrial unrest focused on industrialists’ treatment of workers with 
respect to expected wages. In this case, workers held strikes against the state because it appeared 
the state was not taking necessary action against industrial elites who they felt were unfairly 
limiting their labour’s wages and so threatening their subsistence. Such a moral economy 
violation was thus rooted in “workers’ sense of injustice, a feeling that they were being denied 
something to which they were entitled.” 518  This was clear evidence of industrial labour 
independently attacking the state in a period not necessarily preceding the decline of the ruling 
regime – unlike what is suggested in the existing literature. After this type of wage-focused 
labour unrest, the state responded strongly with specific speeches to industrialists and labour to 
limit any further legitimacy strain. This saw the end of industrial unrest and the resumption of 
labour’s role in production. 
This pattern of events was obvious in the textiles industry, particularly in certain silk, 
cotton and jute factories that sprang up soon after partition. Such textiles represented over 40% 
of Pakistan’s industrial employment, plus over 30% of its value added in manufacturing and 40% 
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of exports.519 It was thus crucial for the state to attend to textile workers’ welfare in the interest 
of maintain industrial production and one form of legitimacy of the state. 
From 1951 to 1952, the amount of industrial disputes involving wages significantly 
increased from 64 to 95 incidents, after a modest rise from 1947-1951 during the initial build-up 
of the moral economy. In January 1952, for instance, more than 4,000 industrial workers 
marched through Karachi to highlight the failure of industrialists to deliver promised wages; 
these labourers came from several textile outlets including Valika Textile Mills, Alamin Silk 
Mills, Zebtan Textile Factory and Dyer Textile Mill.520 Workers rallied together to specifically 
speak out against the state to take some action and “fulfill their promises” of ensuring that 
industrialists deliver expected wages.521 
Some workers at Valika Textile Mills and Alamin Silk Mills claimed they had been 
unexpectedly fired with no severance pay, while others at Zebtan Textile Factory and Dyer 
Textile Mill spoke of their employers’ decision to reduce their wages with no apparent warning 
or rationale.522 Effectively, through such unrest, workers were first challenging their employers 
about their mistreatment and broken promises. But they were also questioning the legitimacy of 
the state-labour relationship, pointing out to the state their considerable “sense of injustice”523 
involving the lack of wages the state had guaranteed repeatedly. 
In earlier years, the state’s hold over certain unions via patronage seemed impenetrable in 
that state and labour interests seemed aligned along similar nationalistic lines. But, with the 
failure of the state to uphold its expected guarantee of wages, it became apparent that labourers 
would speak out for their rights and against state inaction – in this specific sense, labourers were 
acting independent of any state or elite influence to demand their wages and attack the 
legitimacy of this particular moral economy centred around industrial development policy. Union 
leaders like APCOL President M. A. Khatib repeatedly accused “the state” of allowing 
industrialists to put their own interests ahead of the nation and “exploit” existing surplus labour 
with limited wages – a result of the influx of refugees after partition.524 
There were immediate public statements from various state officials, including the prime 
minister and industries minister, saying these disputes should be resolved as soon as possible in 
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the national interest.525 But, weeks later, in February 1952, the textile workers’ strikes continued 
in different cities including Karachi and Lahore. Industrialists once again publicly refused to give 
into labour’s demands. They asked the government to end such strikes, which the owners said 
were “foreign” inspired and aimed at paralysing Pakistan’s textile industry. The Karachi Mills 
Owners Association insisted that the “demands of labour [were] both illegal and uncalled for”526, 
only serving to hinder production and go against the national agenda. 
The workers and industrial elite had appeared to reach an impasse in their negotiations 
and the break in production clearly created legitimacy strain for a state that focused significant 
energy on national development. It was at this point when it became abundantly clear how the 
state was the key arbitrator in Pakistan’s industrial relations. After weeks of labour strikes and 
employer speeches against such unrest, the state offered a strong response in favour of labour 
and clearly against industrialists, in the interest of resuming production. 
Punjab Minister for Industries Syed Ali Husain Gardezi told textile owners that they 
should not forget the needs of labour when setting up industries as satisfied labourers were an 
asset to Pakistan, while disgruntled labourers were a hindrance to both industrialists and 
Pakistan.527 Labour Minister Malik echoed these sentiments, saying that the government would 
ensure fair wages for industrial labour and protect textile workers from “capitalist exploiters and 
political blackmailers.”528 With such public approval from the state, these specific cases of 
industrial unrest among textile workers reduced. Workers went back to work and industrial 
production resumed at these mills.529 The state-labour relationship appeared to be legitimate 
again in the eyes of labour, with the state no longer experiencing legitimacy strain brought on by 
industrial unrest. 
In 1953, there were a few more cases of industrial unrest at textile factories. But more 
notable was the increase in activity at those outlets that supported Pakistan’s industry. One such 
example is that of the Karachi Port Trust, which represented a key component of the state’s 
industrialisation policy and as such the workers’ welfare was critical for the state to maintain.530 
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More than 30 percent of workers were involved in strikes over several days to protest 
unpaid wages that they had been “promised” repeatedly.531 To limit further disruption to the port, 
the state soon stepped in to mediate the dispute between the Karachi Port Trust and its labour 
union. Aslam Haque represented the state and announced, after some deliberation, that the port 
should “cooperate with labour union in all important matters,” particularly with respect to 
promised “wage levels.”532 The state did note that it would not accept all the demands of workers 
– for instance, the demand that “a daily wage worker who has been employed continuously for 
six months must be absorbed in the permanent establishment” was not adopted.533 Labour 
resumed their work and the state’s legitimacy strain was resolved with respect to this group of 
workers.534 
The cement industry saw significant turmoil during this period, with recurring tensions 
growing between the Karachi-based employers of the Dalmia Cement Ltd and the Cement 
Factory Workers’ Union that created complications for Pakistan’s growing manufacturing 
industries.535 The core of the industrial dispute lay in the fact that expected wages that had been 
promised by the employers for over one year were simply not delivered to workers. S. Z. 
Hussain, President of Dalmia Cement Factory Workers Union, finally served a “strike notice” 
against the employer, Mohammad Hafeez. Within a week, the union furthered its cause by 
holding its first official strike in which participants aggressively demanded their wages at the 
levels originally promised. They said their “basic pay” of Rs 100 had never been paid and so this 
was “insufficient to meet their essential demands of life”536 – i.e. their wages. 
After a few days of strikes at the industrial site, the Dalmia Cement Factory Workers’ 
Union officially called on government officials to resolve this dispute; state official Abdul 
Hamid Puri immediately intervened.537 The state declared that Dalmia’s workers were deserving 
of their wages and had a legitimate claim against their employers. This declaration was heavily 
publicized by state media538 and said to “be binding on the parties.”539 This case of industrial 
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unrest subsided, production resumed and the state regained its legitimacy in the eyes of this 
particular set of industrial workers at the Dalmia Cement Factory. 
In East Pakistan, there were considerable disruptions in electricity-linked companies that 
hindered industrial production in this period. Most notable was the dispute between the Dacca 
Electric Supply Company and the Dacca Electric Supply Workers’ Union. In this case, workers 
had negotiated a “basic pay” of Rs 40 per month with a Rs 30 dearness allowance.540 All 
involved parties previously agreed upon the terms which were reinforced in the government’s 
Central Pay Commission Report541, yet workers still felt their employers and the state had failed 
to follow through. 
Members of the Dacca Electric Supply Workers’ Union also felt frustration over the 
“unfair” firing of several workers by the resident engineer.542 One in particular was a powerful 
member of the workers’ union – Fagu Parey, union vice President, who had “great organising 
capacity” and thus the employers “did not like him,” finding any reason to “dismiss him on 
flimsy grounds.”543 On orders of his employers, the resident engineer reportedly fired him while 
he was on legitimate paid leave for the death of his wife in “his village home.”544 
Appeals to the state about unpaid wages and firings rendered limited response, while 
workers continued their work at the electric supply company. It was only after a series of strikes 
were announced on specific dates and would halt work that the state took notice. Various 
members of the Labour Ministry and the state’s Electricity Directorate545 spoke out for workers, 
calling for the employers of the Dacca Electric Supply to pay due wages.546 For the moment, the 
potential for industrial strikes had been quashed. 
Similar pattern of events took place at the Chittagong Engineering and Electric Supply – 
calls for strikes over wage issue were quickly nipped in the bud by public state support in favour 
of labour.547 There were also significant labour disruptions in the oil industry, in particular 
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between the Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of Pakistan Limited and Burmah 
Shell Employees Union.548 
By 1954, it was the textile industry that once more experienced significant labour unrest. 
Tensions among textile workers resurfaced with numerous cases of strikes and protests that 
hindered production and thus created legitimacy strain for the state yet again. For instance, there 
were industrial strikes involving textile workers at Karnafuli Paper Mill, Adamjee Jute Mills, 
Hafiz Mill and Landhi Mill at different points in 1954. The strike at Karnafuli on March 24 was 
particularly violent, with several managers of the mill being killed during severe rioting. The 
crux of labour’s demands was focused on wages that their employers had promised them and 
which the state had not yet ensured. Still, only four days later after state involvement, the mill 
was back into full production and the workers had backed down from their original wage-
specific demands, appeased with state promises of fairer treatment and patronage to their 
union.549 
Similarly, a strike in May at Adamjee Cotton Mill was resolved before it even started – 
3,000 workers called off their three-day strike because their demand for bonuses and six yards of 
cloth each on Eid were granted only after the state publicly called on the mill owner. That same 
month, the workers of Nagaria Cotton Mills called off their planned two-day strike because 
management − under pressure from the state − agreed to their demands for a bonus and paid 
leave.550 
The most violent labour riot of this period took place at the Adamjee Jute Mill at 
Sidirgunj in East Pakistan. The state attributed the rioting to “Communists and Bharati Hindus, 
mostly RSS men,” but noted the underlying wage-specific issues of labour as well. In this case, 
the violence reportedly started due to “two rival sections of labour [who] clashed, leading to a 
heavy loss of life and arson in the living quarters of labour force.”551 Media reports suggested it 
was an Indian attempt to sabotage Pakistan’s jute industry, this mill being the heart of East 
Pakistan. 
About three weeks later, in June, the mill resumed production, amid repeated state 
prodding of the industrialist.552 But this occurred after the owner, Adamjee, denied allegations of 
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any labour or discrimination issues at his mill, noting that his employees were eager to get back 
to work. He explained that there was no wage discrepancy between the various sections of 
workers. Relief measures for the labourers included Rs 100,000 to 12,000 workers and families, 
as well as six tons of rice and wheat flour, onion and spices on a daily basis. Of the 12,000 
workers, only 6,000 lived in permanent quarters, while the rest lived in huts due to the lack of 
cement for construction.553 
This mill area was declared “protected” by the state as of July 1, in that only those with a 
permit from the mills manager, the Dacca district magistrate, police superintendent or the sub-
divisional officer at Narayanganj could enter. In this sense, the state appeared to take note of 
labour’s concern over moral economy violations and subsequently took concrete measures to 
react to it for the sake of industrial peace and development policy. 
  
INDUSTRIAL UNREST OVER SECOND WAGE ISSUE: 1952-1954 
 Second, industrial workers would strike against the state when they felt state-run 
institutions had failed in some way. At times, workers felt that official mechanisms simply did 
not deliver the expected wages that had been promised repeatedly by the state. The lack of a 
concrete labour policy554 despite public guarantees by the state only ensured that such labour 
unrest would recur during this period. Most often, it was clear that the Industrial Tribunal itself 
was a source of conflict – the problem with this state institution was that it had no real power to 
hold employers accountable to an “award declared.”555 As a Dawn editorial noted, “although an 
Industrial Tribunal is given some of the minor powers of a civil court, it has not the power to 
enforce its own orders and awards. If an employer chooses to defy the law or treat the Tribunal’s 
award with contempt, he can do so with comparative impunity, unless the government promptly 
launch prosecution proceedings under the Act.” 556 So, although it showed that workers’ demands 
about moral economy violations were being taken seriously by the state, the tribunal ultimately 
had no real legitimacy and recurring industrial unrest was inevitable. 
 Such unrest could be termed “entitlement protests” rooted in “unmet promises” of state 
institutions and policies – it was “anger over unmet expectations [that was] the impetus to 
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workers’ actions.” 557  Once again, this was clear evidence of Pakistan’s industrial labour 
independently attacking state legitimacy in a period not necessarily preceding the decline of the 
ruling regime – unlike what is suggested in the existing literature. After this particular type of 
wage-focused labour unrest, the state immediately responded with specific speeches about how 
to resolve such industrial disputes or consider new policies that would limit any further 
legitimacy strain. This typically saw the end of industrial unrest and the resumption of labour’s 
role in production. 
 This backlash against labour-focused state institutions became apparent with certain 
disruptions in the oil industry that was one of the key components of Pakistan’s industrialisation 
policy. Most notable was the dispute between the Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing 
Company of Pakistan Ltd and about 2,000 Burmah Shell Employees in 1954.558 Due to recurring 
unrest over moral economy violations focused on wages, the state referred this dispute to 
conciliation proceedings. When these proceedings “failed” and “internecine quarrels sprang up” 
among workers, the state appointed a specific Industrial Tribunal for “adjudication of the 
dispute.”559 
 At the Industrial Tribunal, both a representative for the company and employees were 
involved in discussions with state-appointed officials.560 Both parties “stated their respective 
cases and also asked for time to file written statements of their claims.”561 They were also given 
time to “come to terms amicably”562 but it was quickly clear to the tribunal officials that a state 
settlement was needed. Workers insisted that employers of Burma Shell had failed to offer them 
the wages they had been promised; they also failed to follow through on the state’s earlier 
decision in conciliation proceedings to pay due wages. The employers simply denied that wages 
were due and suggested the problem was with the specific members of the Burmah Shell Union 
who were creating “squabbles” for their own “selfish interest.”563 
 After a few days of mediation, the state-appointed Industrial Tribunal decided in favour of 
labour and some of their wage demands. However, when the employer of Burmah Shell once 
again declined to follow through on labour’s state-approved demands, the union finally “took the 
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precipitate action of staging a strike”564 that would halt operations at the oil company. Within a 
day, the state declared the strike “illegal” on account of the Industrial Disputes Act but also 
publicly called on Burma Shell to pay labour its due wages.565 The workers decided to 
“postpone” the strike and went back to work the very next day.566 For the moment, the industrial 
dispute had been resolved and the state’s goal of continuous production would not be affected. 
 Similar events occurred at another large oil company, Standard Vacuum Oil Co. earlier in 
1952.567 Once again, workers and employers took the time to file their written statement for the 
Industrial Tribunal. The Karachi Oil Installations Workers’ Union also filed an application under 
Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 “complaining” about certain “illegal acts 
committed” by their employers and seemingly ignored by the state.568 
 The crux of this dispute lay in the seemingly sudden and unfair firing of a key member of 
the Karachi Oil Installations Workers’ Union – Abdul Qayyum, who was an “ordinary worker in 
the Company” but also a member of the Managing Committee of the Union.569 He was widely 
seen as a constant “champion” of the cause of the workers and the spokesman and leader of the 
union. In particular, he stood up for his co-worker, Munawar Khan, who was fired while he was 
ill. This represented a threat to the wages of these employees and a potential threat to other 
employees who supported these workers. After doing preliminary planning for a strike, Qayyum 
himself was subsequently laid off. His supervisor said this was due to Qayyum’s “inciting 
workers to strike” that would disrupt operations at the oil company.570 
 But amid more calls for strikes by other members of the union, representatives of the 
state’s Labour Ministry immediately stepped in to mediate the Vacuum Oil Co. dispute more 
closely through the Industrial Tribunal. State-appointed officials found in favour of Qayyum but 
felt Khan was fired on legitimate grounds. They also called on the employer to work on better 
relations with the Karachi Oil Installations Workers’ Union. The strike was then called off and it 
seemed the attempt to halt operations at the oil company were quashed. 
 Textile workers also took a stand against what they felt were faulty state mechanisms that 
could not deal sufficiently with labour issues. The September 1954 strikes at the Adamjee Cotton 
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mills in Landhi, East Pakistan, were a prime example of this. According to the Karachi Textile 
Labour Union, the strikes were due to the management’s uncooperative and anti-labour attitude, 
which meant expected wages were often not delivered on time. On this occasion, the state 
declared the strike illegal on the basis of the Industrial Disputes Act, after 3,000 workers stopped 
working. On this occasion, the labourers fought back, noting that the state was breaking its 
promise and changing the terms of the moral economy centred on development policy. 
 The Adamjee Cotton Mills Labour Union filed a petition in the Sindh Chief Court, 
challenging the validity of the state’s order that deemed their strike “illegal.”571 Management 
said the workers would have to report to work by Oct 2 or they would be fired and this is exactly 
what happened. More than 3,000 workers were dismissed from their jobs, but after an 11-day 
closure, 2,100 workers returned to work and the mill was reopened. Management revealed that 
75 percent of the workers hired were from the original pool of labourers. A state-sponsored 
agreement was signed between the mill’s management and its labour union in the interest of 
industrial peace and production at this cotton mill.572 So, while initially cotton workers disagreed 
with state rulings on their labour issues and strike activity, ultimately a tripartite solution 
appeased all parties involved and industrial production continued. 
 In another case of mill unrest, after a month of striking by 1,500 workers at Zeb Tan Mill 
in 1954, the state agreed to appoint the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate this labour dispute. The 
workers wanted the mill managers to recognize several aspects of its working conditions such as 
union activity but also wage-specific issues such as grant bonus allowances and paid sick leave 
that were required for their very survival. The tribunal, consisting of Mansur Alam, the 
Custodian of Evacuee Property in Sindh and Federal Capital for Adjudication and other 
government officials, was asked to resolve this dispute.573 The state filed partially in favour of 
labour and partially in favour of the mill owners. For fear of more broken promises by 
employers, the union began preparations for another series of strikes.574 This captured the 
attention of Labour Ministry officials who personally visited the Zeb Tan Mill to speak to its 
owner and workers.575 Soon after, the strikes were called off by the union and mill production 
continued. 
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 Transportation workers also took a stand against the state when it seemed official 
mechanisms to deal with labour issues appeared ineffective. In 1953, local trade unions staged a 
token strike with 20,000 people in sympathy for the Mohammad Ali Tramway Company workers 
who had been locked out by management for over a month. Twenty-one foreign and local 
businesses in Karachi also staged a one-hour sympathy strike.576 Workers had originally started 
the strike due to low wages and poor living conditions, but management staged a lock-out for a 
month. They refused to pay for workers’ wages during the lock-out, despite a state-sponsored 
Industrial Tribunal Award stating the contrary. 
 The state did in fact publicly order for the prosecution of the owner of the tramway 
company proprietor for alleged defiance of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, as noted in a Dawn 
editorial, “the industrial dispute [had] brought to light more clearly than any of the previous 
cases the glaring defects and loopholes in the existing Industrial Disputes Act. It [left] defiant 
employers free to persist in their defiance of the law.”577 Still, in this case, the effect of state 
influence was apparent. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali himself stepped in to show the state was 
not only willing to hear the workers’ plight but also to apply pressure on industrialists; he let 
workers know that the state took their issues seriously and would “look into it” fully.578 While 
this did not resolve all labour-employer issues, at this point the lock-out ended and workers 
appeared satisfied enough to go back to work. 
 There is also evidence of national labour union protests specifically directed at state 
policies – or lack thereof – that related to industrial disputes. In 1954, several labour groups, in 
particular the West Pakistan Federation of Labour (WPFL), repeatedly and publicly criticised the 
state for its what it deemed a “vague” labour policy.579 The WPFL decided to organize a one-day 
token strike on July 26 if demands focused on how to “better the wage conditions” of the 
working class were not adopted by the state.580 WPFL said its main concern was to ensure that its 
members in various industries could make ends meet for an “honourable” life.581 
There was some reaction from the state in terms of announcing a concrete labour welfare 
plan to address labour’s concerns.582 A Dawn editorial noted “that the Government [would] not 
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allow themselves to be dictated by [industrialists] in a matter concerning the welfare of millions 
of workers and thus ultimately the welfare of the state itself.”583 Yet no official labour policy was 
announced by state officials at this point. Plans for further protests by WPFL were being 
publicized to apply further pressure on the state. 
Given the recurring industrial unrest during this period, APCOL also called on the state to 
improve the country’s labour policy, which it deemed “incomplete.”584 Although APCOL had 
benefited significantly from state patronage in earlier years, the organization openly noted the 
state’s inability to control rising livings costs and growing unemployment, low wages, as well as 
the suppression of union activity; without giving consideration to labour, the organisation 
believed that an industrialisation-led development policy was not going to be achievable in 
Pakistan. 
APCOL offered a public statement directed at the state: “The Government must give up its 
complacent attitude towards labour problems, lay down its labour policy in clear and 
unmistakable terms, bring about satisfactory settlement of all disputes, amend the outmoded 
labour laws and enforce the existing labour laws so as to create conditions conducive to the 
growth of trade unionism in the country.”585 M. A. Khatib, President of APCOL, even openly 
accused Pakistani industrialists of “making fantastic profits under the sunshine of Government 
protection” and at the expense of labourers who he said did not even make adequate wages to 
begin with.586 
And yet during this period, the state still failed to offer increasingly frustrated industrial 
workers with an official and concrete labour policy. In fact, incidents of industrial unrest had 
steadily increased in 1952-1954. While the state appeared to appease workers who engaged in 
strikes or had plans to, it also strategically used state legislation like the Industrial Disputes Act 
and Industrial Tribunals to limit unrest.587 Moral economy violations specifically focused on 
wages thus continued to be an issue for Pakistan’s industrial workers in 1952-1954. 
 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST POST-1955 LABOUR POLICY: 1955-1956 
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It was only in 1955 that there was finally a significant drop in industrial unrest over wage 
issues, from 107 incidents in 1954 to 75588 incidents a year later. The number of production days 
that were lost dropped by more than 50 percent, from 283,994 to 121,312.589 This significant 
drop in strikes and production days lost can largely be attributed to the state finally announcing 
an official labour policy – eight years after partition and the first time during this civilian-led era. 
For labour, this policy finally represented state progress towards meeting workers’ expectation of 
wages through specific policies – it also became part of the state’s efforts to regain “policy 
legitimacy”590 in its ongoing “legitimation project”591 with labour, hence the decline in protests. 
However, this ambitious labour policy had limited impact as, only one year later, protests 
increased once again, doubling to 150 industrial strikes in 1956 from 75592 in 1955 – this also 
occurred despite pro-labour amendments made to the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act in 1956. The 
number of production days lost also reached an all-time high for this civilian-led era, increasing 
by more than triple in one year – from 121,312 the previous year to 374,915 in 1956.593 It also 
seemed that the behaviour of these industrial strikers had changed towards state mechanisms for 
resolving industrial disputes in that they began bypassing such mechanisms completely and went 
straight to unrest. 
By this point, it thus seemed that organized workers saw such state institutions and the 
state itself as increasingly incapable of providing wages that they had been promised since 1947. 
Rather than wait to see if the labour policy and changes to the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act 
actually facilitated the expected wages, organized workers engaged in more “anti-state protest” – 
an indicator of their declining “confidence in the [civilian] regime” 594 and the declining 
legitimacy of the state-labour relationship within the moral economy of development policy. 
 
In May 1955, the first ever nation-wide token strike led by all organised unions in 
Pakistan was scheduled to take place over the lack of labour policy. Union president B. A. Khan 
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Bakhtiar said the state’s apathy over industrial workers’ legitimate needs “must end.”595 But, 
after talks with Labour Minister Malik who promised an official policy shortly, the strike was 
postponed. By early August, a new labour policy was finally being discussed by the state. Ruling 
elites first offered the labour unions an inquiry body to probe labour problems and then offer a 
realistic solution. This proposed body included two representatives each of employees and 
employers, as well as a representative from the Defence, Communications, Industries, Interior 
and Labour ministries. 
On August 15, 1955, a “much-awaited”596 labour policy was finally announced by the 
civilian regime. It aimed to re-emphasize the terms of the moral economy of development policy, 
but the state now officially took into account the perspective of labour unions so workers felt 
they were a legitimate part of policymaking. The new policy promoted trade union activity, 
called for the end of the exploitation of the workers and ensured labour’s welfare. 
The state also took special effort to make sure that the policy addressed labour’s specific 
grievances about wages from the past few years. First, it ensured that industrialists could not 
abruptly end the wages of its workers without significant notice or a valid reason for dismissal. 
One way to do this was to “ensure that factories [had] proper … systems of work committees and 
joint consultative committees, labour officers and similar organizations for looking after the 
welfare of labour and for permitting labourers to bring their legitimate grievances to the notice of 
the employers.”597 In the event of dismissal, the state promised to “provide social security for all 
workers by means of social insurance,” though this was only if “economic conditions” permitted 
it.598 
Second, the 1955 labour policy specified certain improvements in the industrial tribunal 
so disputes would be more efficiently resolved and labour would receive its “awards” in the most 
“speedy and effective” manner.599 The civilian regime reinforced its support of “promoting the 
settlement of disputes between employees and employers in the interest of industrial peace 
through constitutional means such as joint consultation, mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration.”600 To ensure that tribunal awards were “enforced,” the state proposed certain 
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revisions “so as to secure settlement with the minimum expenditure of time and money.”601 This 
included reducing “the legal technicalities and formalities … to the barest minimum.”602 
At the same time, the state’s rhetoric continued to emphasize the link between labour’s 
key role in industrial production and the need to sacrifice for the sake of national prosperity for a 
while longer. Ruling elites focused less on appealing to anti-India sentiment in the country as it 
did in 1947-1951, but instead highlighted the larger goal of Pakistan moving past the early stages 
of industrialization to achieve “economic progress”603 – with the help of labour. The civilian 
regime noted that although they wanted industrial workers to get their “just rights, industry 
should not be hampered by unnecessary upheaval and strikes.”604 It stated in clear terms that its 
“fundamental” objective through industrial development policy was to “raise the living standard” 
in the long term, but in the short term workers should expect to “sacrifice.”605 
The terms of the moral economy of development policy thus once again implied that 
workers should continue to only expect subsistence – at least until industrial production 
increased enough to deliver them with a higher standard of living. The state also reaffirmed its 
role as a key arbiter of “industrial peace” to promote a “sound and healthy relationship between 
the employers and employees.”606 In this sense, labourers once again were to expect the state to 
ensure that their industrialist employers would maintain their wages for their work, reinforcing 
the significance of the expectation relationship between state and labour. 
It appeared that unions did largely see the merits of the new labour policy and felt some 
satisfaction that their years of recurring anti-state unrest had finally contributed to policymaking 
in a notable way. The significant drop in industrial strikes – from 107 in 1954 to 75 in 1955607 – 
reflected this. There were also comments from powerful labour leaders like Faiz Ahmad about 
the benefits of this labour policy. In fact, he publicly spoke out about how the country’s 
industrialisation program would “not have any setbacks” anymore with this new policy in place. 
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He even called on his fellow workers to help “maintain industrial peace” through hard work and 
sacrifice for the country.608 
This is not to say that there were no industrial disputes in 1955 soon after the labour 
policy was announced, but in many cases it seemed the disputes were resolved quick enough to 
forgo the need for a strike. One notable example is the dispute at the Karachi Port – a key source 
of support to many of West Pakistan’s export-based industries – which was resolved before any 
strike actually took place. It involved the Karachi Port Workers Union and eight shipping firms –
 Pestonjee Bhicajee, Dinshaw & Co, Brigstocke Eduljee & Co, Kanji Jadavji, Burjorji Cowasjee 
& Co, Cowasjee & Sons, A. R. Khan & Sons, Ameejee Valeejee & Sons. The main issue was 
that the expected increase in wages was not given to port workers by these various firms. Both 
parties attempted to “come to terms” internally but as they could not reach a consensus, they 
together approached the state via its Industrial Tribunal.609 The tribunal took oral statements of 
both the employers of the shipping firms and the workers union. Within a week, the wages were 
increased for one year. 
A similar pattern of events took place between Dock Labourers Union in Chittagong, 
East Pakistan, and Shipping and Jetty Handling Contractors for Chittagong Port. Dock labourers 
of Chittagong Port took issue with the lack of pay increase they had been promised for working 
night shifts; the employers insisted they did make their payments. Both parties filed written 
statements to explain their position to the Industrial Tribunal. It turned out that the intermediaries 
(“Sardars and Majhis”) were “taking away some portion of the [wages.]”610 As a result, the 
tribunal declared, “a member of the Union to which the workers belong would be present when 
payments would be made to the workers.”611 There was no need to strike. 
But in 1956, less than a year after the debut of the civilian regime’s first official labour 
policy, it seemed that increasing numbers of industrial workers had lost their faith in the state in 
terms of its ability to uphold its promises – industrial unrest doubled to 150 incidents.612 The 
time for calm debate between employer and employee in 1955 had been replaced with lengthy 
strikes and at times even violence in 1956. The ruling regime’s pro-labour amendments to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 Dawn, August 27, 1955 
609 Pakistan Labour Year Book 1955: 144 
610 Pakistan Labour Year Book 1955: 190 
611 Morning News, June 5, 1956 
612 Pakistan Labour Gazette, Various Years 
	   113 
1947 Industrial Disputes Act613 – epitomized by the “central conciliation machinery” – also 
seemed to fall short of workers’ expectations; the amendment was to “provide a speedy remedy 
to the workers and officers of trade unions for redressing grievances such as dismissal or other 
punishments.”614 But through their increasing unrest that at times bypassed state mechanisms 
completely, industrial workers showed that they felt the state and their expectation relationship 
with the state was increasingly de-legitimized. 
 
The documented cases of industrial disputes in 1956 were focused on similar issues – 
unpaid wages and ineffective state institutions – but led to a “dramatic increase” in “man-days 
lost”615 in the country’s industrial production, tripling in one year.616 Unlike industrial disputes in 
earlier years of this civilian-led era, workers sometimes bypassed certain elements of state 
protocol and went straight to holding strikes. This was very apparent in the textile industry where 
several mills617 in East and West Pakistan experienced significant labour unrest over wage 
issues. In such instances, workers ploughed ahead with strikes before trying to engage with state 
mediators or the industrialists themselves. In these cases, state officials spoke directly to 
industrialists and their workers to resolve the wage dispute. 
The strikes involving Adamjee Jute Mills and Chanderguna Paper Mills workers were 
“high water marks” of the increasing frustration in the industrial sector in East Pakistan.618 More 
than 300 workers were killed at these sites during strikes that became violent. This was also the 
case at Colony Mills in Multan, West Pakistan. According to Mohammad Hassan Siddiqi, 
General Secretary of the Colony Textile Mills Workers Union, workers were being “crushed 
with an iron hand” so they would not strike over wage disputes and the management’s 
“callousness towards their demands.”619 In these disputes, the strikes lasted many days and the 
short-lived resolutions only came after months of state-directed debate with labour and 
employers.  
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The same was true at Sutlej Cotton Mills, where over 300 members of the labour union 
held a strike for several days about wage disputes before approaching a state mediator or giving 
any notice about halting production.620 At Firdous Textile Mills, workers engaged in a five-day 
strike over wages621 that bypassed the industrial tribunal until the state itself intervened. 
Similarly, in the Premier Sugar Mills, over 500 workers staged a strike over one week about 
unpaid wages that the employer had twice promised.622 They avoided any state intervention until 
the last day of their struggle. The words of senior government officials no longer had much 
impact on the outcome of these industrial disputes. For instance, West Pakistan Chief Minister 
Dr Khan Sahib visited this West Pakistani mill – he advised management to pay due wages to 
their labour623 but, unlike in the 1952-1955 period, there was minimal reaction from industrialists 
or workers. 
But perhaps most significant was the dispute between Port Commissioners and the 
Chittagong Port Mariners and Employees Union which had first started in 1949. The union had 
been expecting a “Pay Commission Award” to make up for lost wages, but insisted that it had 
not been “rightly implemented.”624 This led to the union setting up “new grievances” over pay 
scales in 1956. State officials, including the Deputy Central Labour Commissioner, pushed the 
Port Commissioners to agree to these terms. However, the union once again felt they were not 
being given what they had expected and immediately renewed their strikes, unconvinced that the 
state would hold the employer to the award. 
 By the end of 1956, it was clear that workers increasingly felt the state and its industrial 
tribunals were inept, despite the 1955 labour policy and 1956 amendments to the Industrial 
Disputes Act. More than thirty-five union leaders rallied to push the civilian regime to make 
further adjustments to state mechanisms for labour to receive its expected wages – for instance, 
to appoint high court judges to industrial tribunals so that the awards would be binding.625 
However, this didn’t generate any real response from the state – another indicator of the 
declining legitimacy of the state-labour relationship and the state within Pakistan’s particular 
moral economy. 
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Undoubtedly, in the 1952-1956 period, increasing moral economy violations challenged 
the legitimacy of the state-labour expectation relationship and the state itself. When industrial 
workers perceived that expected wages were not delivered, they would voice their concerns 
through certain state mechanisms. But, when it seemed such mechanisms were not delivering, 
they would often stop production through anti-state unrest, thus creating one form of legitimacy 
strain for the Pakistani state. The ruling regime would then intervene directly through specific 
speeches and at times certain policies to limit any further strain such that production would 
resume as quickly as possible. 
However, by 1956, this strategy no longer worked as workers often bypassed state 
mechanisms regarding their wage issues. This represented industrial workers’ “loss of … 
confidence” in state mechanisms and the state itself, increasing “the potential for disorder”626 and 
industrial unrest. The terms of the moral economy of development policy no longer seemed to be 
legitimate for labour. 
While industrial workers created legitimacy strain for the state through their unrest, 
challenges to state legitimacy also came from other groups in 1952-1956, as illustrated in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. Certain feudals, Islamist groups and ethnic groups posed a 
considerable threat to state legitimacy, in terms of specific provincial governments and policies. 
Feudals fought with each other to maintain or gain political power in provinces, while Islamist 
groups took issue with the liberal leanings of the ruling regime and certain religious minorities in 
the government (i.e. anti-Ahmadis); ethnic groups challenged the Punjabi and West Pakistani-
centric policies of the central government. All these groups contributed to legitimacy strain in 
1952-1956 and to a full-blown legitimacy crisis in 1957-1958. 
 
 
MORAL ECONOMY VIOLATIONS AND  
LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF THE STATE 1957-1958 
 
Industrial workers continued to challenge the legitimacy of the state-labour relationship 
over wages in 1957-1958. The state’s attempts to reinstate the terms of the moral economy and 
regain “[development] policy legitimacy”627 through the 1955 labour policy and the 1956 
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amendments to the Industrial Dispute Act clearly had limited long-term impact on organized 
workers. There were over 243 incidents of unrest in this short period and over 500,000 
production days lost in each year over wage issues – this was almost double the amount of 
production days lost from 1956 (374,915) and the highest amount of the 1947-1958 era.628 
Significant numbers of workers felt “those in power [were not] acting in the best interests of the 
governed”629 in that that they could not provide the expected wages, hence the rapid rise in anti-
state protests630 in 1957-1958. 
 
Period Number of 
Unions 
Members Labour Unrest Over 
Wages631 
Production 
Days Lost 
1957 611 366317 150 516971 
1958 621 337064 93 530573 
 
What is also apparent is that there was another type unrest in 1957-1958 that was not 
documented in the state literature632 but is obvious in certain media archives. There was a 
noticeable shift in the focus of these bouts of unrest – labour protests and strikes no longer only 
focused on wages, but at this point considered the state’s failure to deliver prices as well. General 
price increases in consumer goods may not have been dramatic in 1957-1958, but at this point 
even minor fluctuations were perceived by labour as major moral economy violations. Since 
civilian leaders of this tumultuous era still did not have “an easy command of power” and 
political institutions were not firmly entrenched even a decade later, industrial workers continued 
to evaluate the state “within a very narrow range of acceptability, requiring only a minor [issue] 
to spark a crisis.”633 
As indicated in the table and graph below, in both East and West Pakistan, the consumer 
price index634 for industrial workers steadily increased during this civilian-led decade, but 
reached its highest points in 1957-1958. In fact, in East and West Pakistan, the prices for 
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industrial workers reached highs of 94.75 and 98.44 by 1957-1958, up from an index level of 
89.35 and 90.71 in 1957, respectively.635 This coincided with sudden and numerous protests and 
strikes by industrial workers against the state, specifically over price-related issues involving 
basic commodities across the country. 
 
General Consumer Price Index Numbers  
for Industrial Workers636 (Base: 1959-1960 = 100) 
 
Period West Pakistan East Pakistan 
1948-49 80.28 82.13 
1949-50 77.40 82.54 
1950-51 76.39 80.89 
1951-52 79.77 85.85 
1952-53 85.55 89.17 
1953-54 88.93 83.53 
1954-55 85.85 71.90 
1955-56 85.24 85.39 
1956-57 90.71 89.35 
1957-58 98.44 94.75 
 
 
 
Thus the civilian regime’s moral economy “ideology that [had initially guaranteed] a 
bright new future as the principal means for establishing legitimacy”637 – a future that was 
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supposed to include prices for labour – evidently backfired for the state by 1957-1958. From the 
perspective of labour, the state committed more and more moral economy violations over prices 
during these final two years of the civilian regime. In effect, when labour’s expectation of prices 
was not being met and thus “promises [were] not realized,” the authority of Pakistan’s civilian 
leaders increasingly “eroded”638 in their eyes – this was on top of the broken promises that 
workers felt the state had already made concerning wages recurrently in 1952-1956 and had 
continued to make in 1957-1958. Industrial workers thus became a source of two separate 
legitimacy strains through their anti-state unrest over wages and prices, adding to the growing 
legitimacy crisis of the state and civilian regime in 1957-1958. 
 
 Two types of price-focused strikes against the state can be inferred from available data. 
First, workers would strike against the state when it appeared the state was not taking necessary 
action to reduce prices they promised they would maintain (e.g. bringing elite manipulators of 
the market to book). It was thus rooted in “workers’ sense of injustice, a feeling that they were 
being denied something to which they were entitled”639 as part of the moral economy of 
development policy. Second, industrial workers would strike against the state when they felt 
state-run institutions and policies were not effective at delivering expected prices. This could be 
termed “entitlement protests” rooted in “unmet promises” embedded in state institutions and 
policies – “anger over unmet expectations [was] the impetus to workers’ actions.”640 
After both types of price-focused labour unrest, the state would sometimes offer a public 
response to reduce unrest and so limit further legitimacy strain. However, these minor remarks 
appeared to have no real impact as protests and strikes against rising prices continued and at 
times even escalated, hindering industrial production. This was unlike in 1952-1955 period when 
state responses to moral economy violations over wages usually appeased workers to stop their 
anti-state unrest and resume their role in production. But by 1957-1958, it seemed workers from 
various industries no longer saw the state as a viable authority that could respond to moral 
economy violations, as the state experienced increasing legitimacy strain and crisis. 
These findings thus support the hypothesis of this thesis: when there is a decline in 
subsistence conditions in terms of prices, labour stops production through unrest and thus 
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creates legitimacy strain for the Pakistani state that can contribute to legitimacy crisis and 
regime breakdown. Along with other groups identified as causing legitimacy strain, industrial 
workers thus contributed to the legitimacy crisis that preceded the regime breakdown of this 
civilian-led era in 1958. 
 
ECONOMIC DECLINE 
With rising industrial unrest that was one factor that hindered production, there was 
undoubtedly a significant impact on Pakistan’s overall growth. This created further legitimacy 
strain for the state that had partially defined itself in terms of increasing production and high 
growth since 1947. As the table and graph indicate, industrial production dropped by almost 50 
percent, from 8.1 in 1956-1957 to 4.9 in 1957-1958, hindering the level of overall growth. This 
was after a steady decline that began in 1953-1954 when industrial production reached its 
decade-high of 28.7. 
  
Annual Industrial Production and Growth: 1950-1958 
Year641 Production Growth 
1950-51 23.5 3.9 
1951-52 18.7 1.8 
1952-53 23.6 1.7 
1953-54 28.7 9.4 
1954-55 24.1 2.7 
1955-56 17.5 3.4 
1956-57 8.1 3.0 
1957-58 4.9 2.6 
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But production and growth also suffered because of the general decline in economic 
conditions that caused further strain to the civilian regime. In the last two years of the 1947-1958 
period, the economic crisis and especially the country’s food deficit, were perceived to be rapidly 
worsening, leading to deteriorating living conditions. The State Bank of Pakistan’s Report for 
1957-1958642 revealed that this was a year of “great difficulty” due to excessive government 
expenditure and large deficit financing. The Bank cited inflation as the “main evil” faced by the 
country, particularly with the rise in prices of everyday commodities. Academics like Gustav 
Papanek identified this period as one of “apparent stagnation and mounting economic problems, 
when early dire predictions seemed to be fulfilled.”643 Finance Minister Syed Amjad Ali also 
noted that Pakistan’s “economic dependence on America [had] grown beyond [its] 
expectations.”644 The “difficult food position, decline in foreign exchange earnings and large 
demand of the development programme on [the country’s] limited resources”645 in 1957-1958 
made the overall economic situation very tenuous. 
There was also particular concern in the East Pakistan Assembly about the severe 
economic conditions of the province, especially relative to the western wing. Chaudhri 
Mohammad Ali, for instance, accused the ruling regime of being responsible for the “miserable 
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condition of Pakistan’s economy.”646 He pointed out that there should not be two economies – 
one for East Pakistan and another for West Pakistan, but one economy for the whole country.647 
In September 1958, only weeks before the coup, an economic affairs debate lasting more 
than five hours in the National Assembly talked about the widespread “gloom over the 
economy.” Opposition members, including former prime ministers I. I. Chundrigar and H. S. 
Chundrigar, accused the ruling regime of ruining the economy through the misuse of and 
dependence on foreign aid, widespread corruption, heavy taxation that was most detrimental to 
the “common man” and a neglectful attitude towards small-scale and cottage industries. Amjad 
Ali, former Finance Minister by this point, said if the “rot” is not removed, “We shall be 
bankrupt in one year’s time. We shall not be able to meet our foreign commitments.”648 
 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST OVER FIRST PRICE ISSUE: 1957-1958 
 Amid this backdrop of declining economic conditions, industrial workers continued their 
anti-state unrest over wages as in 1952-1956. But they also engaged in unrest over prices during 
this turbulent two-year period in 1957-1958. In some cases, these strikes against the state were 
focused on the ruling regime’s apparent inability to keep prices low – this represented broken 
promises and moral economy violations to labour. For instance, this included the official price 
increase of certain basic commodities that the civilian regime had said it would never do and the 
elite manipulation of the market that the state had promised it would curtail. Such industrial 
unrest was thus rooted in “workers’ sense of injustice, a feeling that they were being denied 
something to which they were entitled”649 and had been promised as part of the moral economy 
of development policy. 
 First, industrial workers took issue with the state’s sudden price increase of certain food 
items that was announced in January 1957 – this policy had significant reverberations for the 
entire year contributing to strikes, protests and silent marches directed at the state. At the start of 
the year, the ruling regime suddenly announced that it would have to increase food prices by 10-
25 percent. This included price increases for basic commodities like wheat, flour and sugar –
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647 Pakistan Times, September 10, 1958 – Other politicians like Abdul Rahman of the Awami League complained 
that East Pakistan was being neglected in development; he noted that “an amount negligible in comparison to what 
had been allotted to West Pakistan was given to East Pakistan from foreign aid” and only one third of this amount 
was actually spent. Rahman was particularly critical of the central government’s bias towards rejuvenating the 
cotton trade of West Pakistan, at the expense of the development of the dominant jute trade in East Pakistan. 
648 Dawn, September 10, 1958 
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 staples for many workers which the state had originally said they would never increase in 
price.650 This decision was reached after “high-level food talks” to evaluate the declining wheat, 
flour and sugar position in the country.651 While state officials like Central Food and Agriculture 
Minister Dildar Ahmad, “justified” the rise in food prices as an expected side effect of 
industrialization and understood “the people’s hardships”652, this did not appease industrial 
workers who grew more “bitter.”653 
 Certain trade unions commented on the “cryptic” government press note announcing the 
latest rise in prices” which did “little to justify the [state’s] action.”654 These aggravated workers 
then held widely publicized “city meetings” to discuss how the state’s decision was simply 
“unjustified”655 and they discussed how it would be incredibly difficult for labour to make ends 
meet with such high prices. They “demanded” a suitable state response for their concerns about 
clear moral economy violations over the prices they had been recurrently promised. Key trade 
unions in Karachi and Dacca even threatened hunger strikes if the price of flour, wheat and sugar 
was not brought down by the state immediately.656 But at this point, the civilian regime’s 
response seemed to be muted by other concerns – the rising political violence in East and West 
Pakistan as well as the growing tensions between the military and the polity as it battled its own 
legitimacy strains at the elite and political level. 
 The anti-state sentiment of industrial workers over the regime’s broken promise to keep 
prices low continued to spread to others cities in West and East Pakistan like Lahore and 
Chittagong, respectively, later in the year. In February 1957, the rapid rise in food prices 
prompted various groups – including key trade unions of sugar and wheat mills – to hold protests 
against the state at industrial sites, which hindered production.657 At this point, many workers 
were further aggravated by the announcement of Finance Minister Amjad Ali of the new budget, 
which introduced more taxes and so hit “the common man” hardest.658 Yet there was no real 
response or state intervention at these industrial sites.659 
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 In May 1957, protests over the state’s decision over prices appeared to evolve into silent 
marches in West Pakistan. For instance, silent marches against high prices took place in Karachi 
over several days – this was organised by members of the Consumers Protection Society, a group 
which included many textile workers.660 This month, there was also a “Food Demand Day” 
declared by several groups, including labour unions. Media reports also revealed hunger rallies 
were being held in Jessore661 and Bogra, in East Pakistan.662 Protesters complained of the 
abnormally high food prices and near famine conditions; they demanded province-wide modified 
rationing to be organised by the state. In August 1957, Thatta, demonstrations and silent marches 
persisted specifically over the state’s decision to increase high prices of wheat and foodstuffs.663  
But once again, the direct response from the ruling regime to such unrest over prices appeared 
minimal as it battled its own legitimacy crisis at the elite level. The expectation relationship 
between state and labour within the moral economy and the legitimacy of the state itself 
appeared to be in significant decline. 
 
Second, it was also apparent during this period that workers challenged the state for its 
failure to prevent elite manipulation of the market that drove up prices – in this sense, the state 
had failed to keep its earlier promise to curtail such hoarding and black-marketing as part of its 
constructed moral economy. 
For instance in October 1957, smaller businesses in Karachi like goods carriers held anti-
state strikes over rising vegetable prices – they specifically emphasized that the ruling regime 
had allowed elite manipulation of the market that had artificially driven up prices.664 The 
Consumers Protection Society, including its members from the industrial sector, also organised 
silent protests in Hyderabad in major business centres to highlight the rise in prices and black-
marketing, as well as the state’s passive response to such serious issues.665 
This was also the case in Thatta. Muslim League Representatives had organized 
subordinate classes, including significant numbers of industrial workers, to protest how the state 
was allowing the “common man” to “starve” as certain elites drove prices up through hoarding 
and profiteering. In particular, these protesters pointed out how the ruling regime was allowing 
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low priced foodgrains to be “forcibly taken away” from certain tenants and peasants and resold 
at “exorbitant prices.”666  
Yet, despite such strikes, protests and silent marches, the state seemed to largely ignore 
the hoarding and black-marketing issue at this late stage of the civilian regime’s tenure. Except 
for one announcement that the army “may” be deployed by the civilian regime to combat 
smuggling to help reduce prices667 and a few public comments against hoarding as a “man-made 
scarcity” that needed to be stopped,668 no plan of action was offered to deal with this aspect of 
rising prices. This was perhaps another indicator of the increasing inability of the civilian regime 
to govern. The ongoing labour unrest over these aspects of prices also reinforced how it saw the 
state as less viable as a political authority or a legitimate partner in the moral economy. 
 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST OVER SECOND PRICE ISSUE: 1957-1958 
 Some industrial workers also held strikes against the state when they felt state-run 
institutions and policies did not follow through on delivering expected prices. Specific state 
mechanisms like local food drives and importing foreign food did not deliver the expected 
results, prompting significant industrial unrest. This could be termed “entitlement protests” 
rooted in “unmet promises” embedded in state institutions and policies – “anger over unmet 
expectations [was] the impetus to workers’ actions.”669 
 It was obvious that the food situation was “critical” and political elites did organise an all-
party conference in May 1957 to determine the best way to tackle this issue.670 But such efforts 
didn’t generate any concrete policy response. Months later, in December 1957, the ruling regime 
restarted its food talks.671 However, this never led to any concrete plan of action to deal with this 
aspect of prices and of course did little to reduce the wave of industrial unrest over prices during 
this two-year period. 
 State officials like the Governor of Punjab province did make appeals for “people’s 
cooperation” to launch a “Grow-More-Food-Drive”672 that would help increase food production 
and ideally reduce prices in the near-term. This concrete strategy was in fact carried out by the 
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state in certain provinces but was deemed largely unsuccessful as various groups, including 
industrial workers, felt the extra food was never offered to them at reasonable prices.673 This 
served to aggravate the growing food deficit, reinforcing for industrial labour that the state was 
not capable of keeping its promise of maintaining prices even when attempting specific policies. 
The ruling regime also tried to tackle the food crisis through its relations with the United 
States and so consider more long-term strategies for more food and lower prices that would be 
affordable for groups like labour. At this point, both East and West Pakistan needed at least 
500,000 tons of imported wheat to pull through the 1957-1958 period. Pakistan was to receive 
673,300 tons of American foodgrains in 1958674, as well as 750,000 tons of wheat and rice.675 
This legitimate action on the part of the state, however, had no discernible impact on industrial 
workers who continued to organize their own strikes and participate in those organized by other 
subordinate classes to challenge the state on prices. 
The situation in East Pakistan was particularly difficult – some reports suggested that the 
price of rice in East Pakistan was rising by Rs 1 every day.676 Former Chief Minister Abu 
Hossain Sarkar, whose regime saw one of the worst post-independence famines in East Pakistan 
and whose government was accused of “bungling” power, bitterly criticized the Government’s 
food policy; he said that the views of Central Food Minister Deldar Ahmad on the province’s 
food position were “absolutely ridiculous.”677 Ahmad reportedly stated that 80 percent of East 
Pakistan’s labour force had enough funds to buy basic food requirements, but media outlets, like 
Ittehad, said this view reflected a “daydream” and “such a complacent attitude amounted to self-
description and is suicidal.”678 In this sense, the state may not have had a realistic view of the 
food crisis to formulate the appropriate policies and counter price increases of basic 
commodities.679 
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Amid such intensified protesting against the state over the economic and food crises as 
well as its commitments in the moral economy, the ruling regime threatened to take “drastic 
measures” to ban all strikes in early January 1958.680 Within a few days, the civilian regime 
promulgated an ordinance to counter the ongoing strikes and notice of strikes by various 
organisations including the All Pakistan Posts and Telegraphs Union, Chittagong Port Worker 
Union, as well as jute workers and steamer employees of Narayanganj. These groups took issue 
with rising inflation and their loss of purchasing power. In the case of the steamer workers, more 
than 200 were held in Narayanganj by local police.681 In this sense, by 1958, the state seemed to 
bypass its commitments in the moral economy to provide wages and instead focused on simply 
quashing industrial unrest as quickly as possible. The state-labour expectation relationship within 
the moral economy had weakened considerably. 
For the remaining months of 1958, the economic conditions “deteriorated still further,” 
while agricultural output dropped and the regime was “forced” to increase food prices of 
“essential foodstuffs”682 even further. The cost of living in some Pakistani towns went up by  “an 
average of 8.2%,” according to one estimate.683 Only weeks before the October coup, the 
provincial government still struggled to find a solution to the provinces’ food and fiscal crises. 
On September 20, 1958, a public meeting was held at Paltan Maidan with various labour, 
educational and cultural organizations. They urged both the provincial and central government to 
probe the soaring high prices and demanded an extension of the Anti-Hoarding Act as well as 
fair price shops to supply basic goods in municipal towns. 
Women of the East Pakistan Youth League protested at this point as well, shouting 
slogans against soaring prices. They even carried placards and an effigy of a black-marketer. A 
six-person group, headed by Mrs. Hazera Mahmud Ali, went to the East Pakistan Chief 
Minister’s house to state their demands, which included a Grow More Vegetable Campaign in 
East Pakistan, transport facilities to local salt manufacturers and imposition of further restrictions 
on import of luxury goods and fixation of jute prices. The Chief Minister said he would 
investigate but no action was taken. The remaining weeks of this civilian-led era were consumed 
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by political violence, as mentioned in Chapter Two, and this civilian-led era was coming to an 
end. 
 
Undoubtedly, in the 1957-1958 period, increasing moral economy violations challenged 
the legitimacy of the state-labour expectation relationship and the state itself. When industrial 
workers felt that expected prices were not delivered, they would voice their concerns through 
anti-state protests and strikes that at times became violent. This was the case in both East in West 
Pakistan and escalated at a rapid pace, as compared with the industrial unrest that occurred 
earlier in this civilian-led era. The fact that the state had minimal if no response reinforced the 
legitimacy strain it was experiencing at this point. The terms of the moral economy of 
development policy no longer seemed to be viable for labour or the state in this civilian-led era. 
This also extended to the anti-state unrest over wages in these years. 
While industrial workers clearly created legitimacy strain for the state through their unrest 
over wages and prices, challenges to state legitimacy also came from certain elite groups in 
1957-1958, as illustrated in Chapter Two of this thesis. Key members of the military and 
bureaucracy, as well their links to the United States, posed a considerable threat to state 
legitimacy that contributed to regime breakdown. The civilian regime had made a mockery of 
itself, with chronic political crises and three governments falling during this short two-year 
period. But the military and its key bureaucratic partners still felt a parliamentary façade was no 
longer needed, particularly if a new government in the impending elections actually gained 
legitimate power that could challenge the military in some way. With unofficial support from the 
United States, the military-bureaucratic takeover became more likely. These groups, including 
industrial labour, thus contributed to legitimacy strain in meaningful ways, which culminated in 
the civilian regime’s legitimacy crisis and regime breakdown by the end of 1957-1958. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MORAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT  
POLICY DURING MILITARY RULE: 1958-1971 
 
After ten years of political turmoil and steady economic decline, General Ayub’s coup 
was initially received positively in October 1958. Crowds of Pakistanis in major cities of both 
East and West Pakistan “cheered” for the general684, perhaps feeling that real change was now 
possible with a new regime. In fact, within three days of the coup, the first positive development 
was felt – prices on basic consumer goods fell by more than 25 percent.685 Various ordinances to 
ease the economic situation were announced by the military leader and his bureaucratic team, 
including the new order for the “death for hoarders” of commodities686; the political situation 
was also framed in very specific terms with the new Basic Democracies model. It seemed that 
the general’s “leadership [was going to give] Pakistan relative political stability and a coherent 
public policy”687, unlike the previous civilian-led era. However, the primary focus of the new 
military regime – defence and development – was effectively the same as that of its civilian 
predecessor. 
With the military now at the official helm of government and “mutual distrust and fear of 
aggression”688 from India still very much in force, high defence spending continued to dominate 
the state’s budget; this took up over 46 to 64 percent of total expenditure in each year of this 
military-led era689 and contributed to the rapid growth of the military’s business empire or 
“milibus” 690  in Pakistan. As a result of this heavy defense expenditure, this once again 
“[deflected] the flow of resources away from development needs.”691 This became even more 
apparent in the buildup to the 1965 war with India,692 when General Ayub openly expressed in 
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his monthly broadcast to the public that: “defence [came] first. Everything else [was to take] a 
secondary place.”693 
 Yet again, with what limited funds were left, the state focused on development. The “first 
and principal concern of the new government was to put Pakistan’s economic house in order” 
given the “severe economic crisis” created by the last regime; this was done “expeditiously and 
effectively” as “modernization – a word that Ayub Khan [appeared to understand] only in its 
economic context – provided the coup d’état … with its raison d’etre”694. General Ayub thus 
tried to “channel the energies of the people toward the single goal of economic development and 
attempted to integrate the nation by creating confidence among the people about the destiny of 
Pakistan through maximizing the rate of economic growth.”695 He wanted to make sure all 
groups – especially those who previously felt disadvantaged like labour – felt a part of national 
development and would participate accordingly. 
In this sense, development was once again directly linked to the legitimacy of the state. 
The global community, particularly the United States, had high hopes that the “new regime 
might provide a model for other developing countries”696 – the average growth rate of 5.5% each 
year was considered to be proof of the success of this model, at least initially, thus giving the 
military regime one form of state legitimacy abroad.697 Locally, the expectation of the new 
regime to boost industrial development and so improve general economic conditions was also 
widespread, particularly among classes like labour who had struggled with basic subsistence 
during the previous civilian-led era. This expectation of subsistence, of course, would later prove 
to be the downfall of this military-led era. 
To move development forward as quickly as possible in these early years of the military 
regime, the emphasis was once again on state-led and “rapid” industrial development.698 This 
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was the “centrepiece of Ayub’s economic strategy”699 and was developed by the Planning 
Board700 which had “far greater power and influence in the running of the economy” than in the 
previous civilian-led era.701 General Ayub’s vision, as later articulated in the Second Five Year 
Plan 1960-1965, was for the “removal of administration controls and the maintenance of 
monetary discipline and price stability to provide a macroeconomic environment conducive to 
private investment.”702 703 
 The next step was for the ruling regime to provide “liberal facilities to private 
industry” 704  and so lure them into facilitating the state’s industrial development policy. 
“Investment schedules” were introduced from 1960 onwards so private sector investments were 
not “haphazard” and were “channelled into ... the desired fields”705 – as dictated by the state. In 
particular, the state focused on the development of a substantial steel industry to “serve as a 
nucleus for other heavy engineering”, as well as coal and iron ore.706 This investment of course 
required the participation of certain key industrialists. 
Initial budget speeches of this period repeatedly emphasised how development could not 
be run by the state alone as the private sector had a “responsibility to the nation.”707 General 
Ayub groomed a small entrepreneurial elite – mostly Gujarati-speaking Khojas and Mehmons 
and a few Punjabi Chiniotis.708 The military regime readily provided credits, permits and licenses 
to help empower this small class to facilitate the state’s industrial development policy. This was 
the continuation of the import substitution industrialization regime of the previous civilian era, 
which was still popular in the 1960s in developing countries. 
These industrialists benefited from funding from the Industrial Development Bank of 
Pakistan created in 1961, which aimed to promote “industrial development by providing finance, 
both in local currency and in foreign exchange.” It also contributed to “a broad-based economy, 
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concentrating on medium and small industries, and on the underdeveloped regions” and 
encouraged “new entrants” in “enterprise and innovation.”709 There was also the state’s PICIC, 
which, since 1957, tried to “foster the development of industries in the private sector on sound 
lines”,710 and the PIDC. Such investment licensing and credit opportunities helped this small 
elite711 to boost industrial growth by more than 15 percent in this military-led era.712 The Wazir 
Ali group was the quintessential example of this in that they built their companies in the 1960s 
by “actively accessing state privileges.”713 Elite industrialists thus came to expect preferential 
policies from the military regime to run their business, reinforcing a state-industrialist 
expectation relationship within development policy that was comparable to what existed in the 
previous civilian regime. 
As the industrialization process became more developed in Pakistan’s economy, this elite 
group of industrialists earned huge profits, as was the case for certain industrialists in the 
previous era. One estimate by Dr Mahbubul Haq – General Ayub’s former chief economist of 
General Ayub’s Planning Commission – suggested that by 1968, the general and his family’s 
assets were worth between $10 and 20 million. Another estimate suggested that elite 
industrialists groomed by the ruling regime came to own two thirds of the country’s industrial 
assets and three quarters of insurance company and bank assets.714 In this sense, the “Pakistani 
state explicitly privileged economic growth”715 for this elite, just as was the case in the previous 
civilian-led era. 
About a dozen major business empires in West Pakistan also dominated the All-Pakistan 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries, which was the “most powerful pressure 
group operating from outside formal government institutions.” This “powerful lobby” also had 
an “effective influence” on the economic policy of the government.716 
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For their role in the state’s new development policy, industrialists – largely in West 
Pakistan – clearly became influential in terms of wealth and their power over the government 
policymaking. They “made huge mark-ups for themselves and their families, but the spill overs 
to the rest of the economy were at best marginal.”717 Like in other developing countries and like 
the 1947-1958 civilian regime in Pakistan, General Ayub’s military regime followed an obvious 
“elitist model of growth, where both economic and political power [were] held by a small coterie 
of elites” – it ensured that the “market [was] rigged and the state [was] hijacked in order to 
deliver the most of the benefits of economic growth to this small group.”718 
But what did labour gain from such industrial development? It was clear that while the 
military regime initially expressed its goal of raising the standard of living719 for all, its main 
priority besides defence was growth. Or at least such “elitist growth”720 was all that could be 
achieved, given limited resources available for development. This translated to minimal benefits 
for the majority of Pakistan’s population, including industrial labour.721 Yet the state still 
managed to ensure that workers played a role in this “elitist model of growth”722 throughout this 
military-led era. 
  Just like its predecessor, the military regime state repeatedly insisted it would provide 
certain wages and prices to industrial workers for their labour. This became part of the military 
regime’s strategy to promote a “moral economy” centred on its industrial development policy, so 
workers would play their role in national development for the basic subsistence promised by the 
state. This “subsistence ethic”723 thus became the “norm and standard”724 which labour expected 
the state to maintain, in return for its role in the country’s development project. It became a 
marker for the legitimacy of state-labour relations and the state itself. 
  However, as explained later in this chapter, the state did not always uphold its promise of 
subsistence provision for labour, frequently hindering the state-labour expectation relationship. 
As a result, at certain points in this period, organized industrial workers challenged the state 
through unrest, impacting state legitimacy that even contributed to regime breakdown by the end 
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of this military-led era. The question to consider first though is how the moral economy and 
labour’s expectation relationship with the state were derived during this military-led era. 
 
 
SETTING UP THE EXPECTATION RELATIONSHIP IN THE MORAL ECONOMY 
OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN PAKISTAN: 1958-1961	  
 
To set up the expectation relationship in the moral economy, the new military regime 
took a multi-pronged strategy that effectively mirrored what its civilian counterpart attempted in 
the previous decade of 1947-1958. First, it cashed in on the nationalist and anti-polity sentiment 
after the previous ten years of unstable civilian rule. It egged on labourers to work in the name of 
national duty for Pakistan, economically and otherwise. It also urged workers to be ready to 
sacrifice for their country so Pakistan could finally reach its potential, particularly after years of 
mismanagement by the civilian polity. This introduced the notion that labour should not expect 
more than mere basic subsistence from the state in this period of building and stabilizing 
Pakistan. 
Second, the state announced an ambitious and detailed labour policy within only a few 
months of the coup, rather than after seven years like in the 1947-1958 civilian-led era. The fact 
was that, “up to 1958, the government had basically depended on labour legislation, conciliation 
and adjudication machinery that were inherited from undivided India”725 and so this new policy 
was considered a significant step forward for Pakistan. In this military-led era, the state’s specific 
message for labour to do their duty was relayed through a public campaign to unions to create 
“collectively held goals”726 among workers that reflected the needs of the state to promote 
industrial development at all costs. 
The unions themselves also highlighted their expectations of the state to keep up with 
their promise of subsistence provision. Although the state initially reduced its patronage to 
national trade unions and limited their activity during martial law in 1958-1961, it still called on 
workers to speak up about their needs. It also later rewarded certain members who were “loyal to 
its policies” with appointments to its revamped industrial court.727 
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Third, strategic communication and policies were again introduced by the state to offer 
basic subsistence to industrial workers in terms of a stable level of wages and prices. This was 
key to creating a sense of entitlement of labour and expectation from the state for particular 
patronage. It formed the core of the legitimacy of the state-labour relationship, reinforcing for 
labour that the state would be “responsive” if the expectation of patronage was not met by the 
state.728 
 
LABOUR’S NATIONALISTIC ROLE OF  
SACRIFICE IN MAKING PAKISTAN A VIABLE STATE 
 After its volatile first decade led by politicians, it was still questionable whether Pakistan 
could in fact be a viable state. Parliamentary democracy had “failed”729 miserably but the issue 
remained whether a regime without the civilian polity could in fact work. Overall growth levels 
had “stagnated”730, despite previous efforts at state-led industrialisation in 1947-1958. Would the 
new regime’s approach to industrialisation be more effective? It would with labour’s help, 
according to the state’s recurring message to workers in 1958-1961. The ruling military regime 
tapped into such burning questions and national self-doubt, appealing to Pakistani workers to 
perform on nationalistic grounds. Once again, the state urged workers to see their role in 
industrial development as a significant way to do their duty to Pakistan in its ongoing quest for 
viability; this appeal to nationalist sentiment was one way for the state to achieve “policy 
legitimacy”731 for its industrial development strategy. 
General Ayub was the first to talk of this idea of sacrifice two months after the coup in 
December 1958. He noted that, “every individual must work for the country’s good” to make up 
for the “mistakes” of the politicians of the past regime.732 He appealed to individual Pakistanis to 
sacrifice for the sake of their country and perform their national duty, which was in keeping with 
what he felt were national religious ideals. While previously individual Pakistanis were urged by 
the state to play their role in development to counter the Indian threat, in the early years of this 
military-led era state officials instead emphasized the importance of moving beyond the 
incompetence of the past policies of the civilian governments of 1947-1958 so Pakistan could 
finally reach its full potential. 
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In the first budget speech of the new regime in 1958-1959, the Finance Minister Syed 
Amjad Ali reiterated how Pakistan was “at the economic crossroads” after the previous decade of 
civilian mismanagement. He noted how the military regime’s policy proposals would “mean 
additional burdens on our people” but would also “raise much needed resources to maintain the 
development programme at the very minimum that can be contemplated”, a programme that was 
seen as “vital to the future of our country and our people,” particularly in terms of raising the 
“low standards of living of our people, if freedom is to have any meaning for them.”733 
But again, he noted the people’s need to “sacrifice” and “rise to the occasion and do their 
duty” for the country’s development. He felt “no human achievement [was] possible without 
hard work and without sacrifices” and insisted Pakistanis, particularly labourers, should be 
“ready to make sacrifices … to build a future worthy of ourselves and our children.”734 In this 
sense, the state promoted the idea of sacrifice in the short term for the sake of improvement in 
the long term for the individual Pakistani. A patron-client relationship between the state and 
workers was also hinted at as part of the moral economy of development policy – if they worked 
hard now and sacrificed, they would prosper with the country later, according to the state’s 
vision. 
The April to June 1959 budget speech announced by Finance Minister Mohammad 
Shoaib struck the same tone of sacrifice and duty of the individual for the sake of Pakistan’s 
development. He told the public that he could not “conceal [that the] country will have to 
contend for quite some time with serious economic difficulties. Economic problems of this 
nature do not yield to easy and quick solutions. It is wishful thinking to imagine that the crisis 
will soon be over and that [one] shall be able to sit back and relax.”735 Thus he hinted at the idea 
of sacrifice for the near-term, but implemented development policy required “the active 
cooperation and support of the people.” It necessitated “national self-discipline … hard work and 
a willingness to bear the sacrifices necessary to assure a better future for all of us.” He felt 
“confident” Pakistanis could “sacrifice” with “God’s help.”736 
A few months later the 1959-1960 Budget Speech by the finance minister once again 
noted the regime’s “constant endeavour to promote the long-term welfare of the people” but 
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which required “sacrifice” on the part of the people in the short-term. The “harsh” measures 
taken were necessary but the ruling regime claimed to have made it “as painless as possible” 
before “a sound and healthy economy [could] be built.” He spoke of “the nation” as being a 
“man” who was “given all cooperation and assistance” but “has borne sacrifices ungrudgingly.” 
These efforts of sacrifice would allow the country to make “steady progress towards [its] goal of 
economic prosperity.”737 Such state rhetoric of short-term sacrifice for the nation continued 
through to budget speeches through to 1961. 
This theme of sacrifice was also reinforced at various labour conferences in this period. 
At the 1959 Karachi Labour Conference, for instance, Finance Minister Shoaib told workers 
directly how their “sacrifices” today would “help to lay the foundation for a happier future” for 
them. This required “much higher production than has so far been delivered” and this required 
that everyone be prepared to sacrifice. “How long this period of hardship will last depends on the 
efforts all of us make,” he said. 
This public official also appealed to the Pakistani workers’ sense of nationhood to 
encourage their role in development. He noted, “Pakistan was achieved not because others took 
pity on us, but because the whole nation stood united and determined to attain its freedom. I can 
say with confidence that a nation which possesses the tenacity to free its homeland against heavy 
odds can at much less sacrifice make its country happier and prosperous. So let us set our heart 
to the task under the strong and benevolent guidance of the President, and face with fortitude the 
difficulties we face.”738 Bringing back memories of the struggle for independence was another 
way for the state to gain labour’s support in building Pakistan’s economy and thus achieve policy 
legitimacy. 
At the Tripartite Labour Conference in 1960, the labour minister appealed to workers’ 
sense of nationhood to spur their involvement in development while building the expectation that 
they would have to continue to sacrifice. He explained how “cold statistics” mean nothing until 
“millions and millions of individual citizens begin to sense the possibility, and progressively to 
experience the reality, of a better life for themselves and their children. ... It is you, the people of 
Pakistan, who provide the motive force and the final answer. So it is to each and all of you that I 
make a final appeal to you … to give to your best, individually and collectively, towards 
achievement of the Nation’s vital economic and social purposes.” He emphasized the mutually 
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beneficial relationship between state and labour: “With God’s help, your Government will do its 
part. We count on you to do yours.”739 He thus reinforced the informal patron-client relationship 
between the state and labour as well as the theme of short-term sacrifice for long-term gain. 
 
STATE-TRADE UNION RELATIONS 
Beyond speeches to the public and to workers specifically about the need to sacrifice to 
make Pakistan viable, the state also focused on promoting its 1959 Labour Policy740 to educate 
workers about their important role in national development and to only expect basic subsistence 
from the state. The state emphasized this new policy heavily during this martial law period of 
1958-1961 when trade union activity was limited741 though the unions themselves were not 
banned.742 Unlike in the previous civilian-led era that did not have a labour policy in over seven 
years, the military regime announced its concrete labour policy within a few months, serving as 
its official sound piece to all trade unions about their critical role in national development. 
The state did not choose to continue patronage to strengthen nationwide unions like 
APCOL743, instead relying on its bureaucracy to publicize the merits of its new labour policy to 
unions of all sizes across the country – the purpose was to once again create “collectively held 
goals”744 that reflected the needs of the state to promote industrial development at all costs. But, 
as part of its new policy, it did look to union leaders for input about labour’s needs. It also chose 
to “reward” certain union leaders who were “loyal to its policies” by appointing them to 
industrial courts.745 
General Burki, Minister for Social Welfare and Health, was the first to speak out to 
workers about the 1959 Labour Policy and its relevance to national production. At various union 
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meetings, he offered a recurring message specifically about the policy: “We strongly believe that 
all benefits – to the workers, to the employers, and to the country – can flow from one factor 
only and that is increased production.”746 He explained repeatedly that increased production 
would require “better conditions” for labourers.747 But Burki emphasized that: “the workers 
should also understand they can get their needs and demands satisfied only out of increased 
productivity.”748 In this sense, the ruling regime was making it clear through its labour policy 
and public diplomacy that workers’ “needs” being “satisfied” were contingent upon their role in 
increasing national production, thus echoing the informal patron-client and mutually beneficial 
relationship embedded in the moral economy of development policy. 
Burki also repeatedly pointed out that labour unions were “not very well organised and 
economically a weaker party” and so “the employers should therefore be sympathetic to 
problems of the workers.” He emphasized the need for a “harmonious relationship between the 
workers and employers” for “industrial peace” and “increased productivity.”749 He explicitly said 
the state would now ensure that employers would provide unions with “the basic minimum 
amenities so that the personality of the workers [could] find full expression in terms of his right 
as a citizen of a free country.” This served as a reminder to workers and unions that the ruling 
regime was central to industrial relations and workers should hold the state accountable if 
employers did not deliver certain “amenities.”750 
Various state officials also urged industrialists to take measures to “help [their] workers 
to identify … with the interest of the establishment” so that they could “feel that [they] had a 
stake and a vital stake” in the industry,751 as noted in the labour policy. Industrialists were 
singled out to “pool their resources in a cooperative manner to provide for social welfare 
amenities.”752Again, this mirrored the moral economy rhetoric in which – in return for labour’s 
role in development policy – the state would ensure that employers would provide their industrial 
workers with appropriate conditions. 
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The state also called on unions and labour leaders to use their organizations to educate 
workers about “their rights and privileges but also on their obligations and duties to the 
employers and the country as a whole.” The ruling regime encouraged labour unions to focus on 
“a programme of building up the correct leadership amongst the workers, so that they [could play 
their role as useful citizens of the country in the present phase of development.”753 The policy 
thus reinforced the critical role of workers in the state’s ambitious development policies and the 
need for unions to educate their members about their role in the national development project. 
While the state promoted its subsistence and sacrifice ideology to certain workers and 
employers, certain union leaders in turn spread this rhetoric to workers that created expectation 
of specific patronage from the state. This was despite the limited activity of and decline in state 
patronage to nationwide unions during martial law. In the early years of this military-led era, 
there were about 350,000 to 400,000 workers and 600 to 700 trade unions in organized industry 
of Pakistan, which included groups in electricity production, textiles and sugar.754 This was 
double the number of workers involved at partition (150,000) and the number of unions (300), 
which were small but increasingly active.755 
At various labour conferences, union leaders “praised” the new labour policy as a “wise 
step” that had “raised the prestige” of the new regime.756 These union leaders who were more 
vocal about towing the state’s line on labour and development policy were often rewarded by the 
military regime for their “loyalty” to state policies with prestigious industrial court 
appointments.757 But union leaders also told its members that if they did not find their conditions 
were sufficient, they then could strike – a right that was restored as part of the Martial Law 
Regulation No 29.758 759 
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757 One union leader said he was pursued by the state to accept a position in the industrial court: “One of the bribes 
that the government offers to appoint people active in the labour movement as members of the labour court. They 
offered me such a post, at a fixed salary of Rs 1400. I told them I would gladly accept, but on condition that I forfeit 
the salary. … They insisted that I accept the money, so I refused. Then they issued a gazette notification to the effect 
that I had been appointed a member of the court, at such and such salary. I sent them an official resignation. They 
refused to accept my resignation for six months. Then they agreed to accept my resignation if I agreed to accept four 
months’ salary. What work had I done for them to accept this salary of four months? They try to win you over in all 
ways” (Shaheed 2007: 255.) 
758 Dawn, May 5, 1959 
759 Of course, there were severe restrictions on when a worker could strike, which included giving notice six weeks 
(Section 18, Industrial Disputes Act 1959) before to his employer about a protest and waiting for a “settlement of 
conciliation proceedings” or an application for “adjudication of the dispute to an Industrial Court” (pg 50. M. Ali 
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Leading labour figures like Committee President of the West Pakistan Federation of 
Labour M. A. Khatib spoke to workers about what they should expect from the state. At the first 
labour rally during this military-led era in early 1959, Khatib noted the value of the new labour 
policy, as “ever since the establishment of Pakistan no reasonable amendments [had] been made 
in the labour laws. Provincials and Central Governments came and left after making false and 
empty promises. Most of the reactionary, out-dated and inequitable laws of the British regime are 
in force in the country. In spite of the fact that various conventions and recommendations of ILO 
have been ratified by Government, no legislation based on these conventions and 
recommendations have been introduced.”760 Thus the implication was that labour should expect 
an improvement in working conditions, courtesy of the state. 
Khatib also highlighted that labour should expect an improvement in economic 
conditions, remembering that past civilian governments had failed the “objects for which 
Pakistan was established.” He explained labour’s view that it was the “selfish and destructive 
policy of most of the political leaders … that made the country’s economic condition so 
unbalanced and precarious during the last 11 years that the wealth of the country accumulated in 
the hands of a few persons and the masses were rendered destitute.” He also made it clear that 
price inflation, particularly of food prices, had caused labour significant distress and such high 
prices were due to the actions of “dishonest political leaders” who allowed “industrialists and 
businessmen to “indulge in black-marketing, profiteering, hoarding and smuggling. … The 
economic structure of the country was ruined.”761 Again, labour made another expectation of the 
state clear – a stable set of living conditions.762 
Such recurring rhetoric from labour leaders and state officials thus reminded workers of 
what they should expect from the state within the scope of industrial relations. It also reminded 
the state of its obligation to industrial workers – to provide sufficient working conditions and 
living conditions, which are discussed in terms of wages and prices in this thesis. Through its 
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760 Shafi 1959: 67 
761 Shafi 1959: 66 
762 As a representative for labour, Khatib also expressed “hope” in the new military regime, given its “sincere and 
dynamic character.” He noted labour’s expectation of “positive and planned steps” be taken to raise or at least 
maintain the living standard of the workers, “suitable residential accommodation,” “the dignity of labour be 
recognized and workers’ representatives be given due representation in official and semi-official institutions, fair 
price shops and canteens, healthy trade union movement be encouraged, and out-dated labour laws be amended 
immediately and fresh laws based on the conventions and recommendations of ILO be framed and enforced” (Shafi 
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new policy, the new regime felt it was absolutely “necessary to create goodwill among the 
working class” and so in the initial years “promises [of wages and prices] were made to reduce 
the tension and severe strife between labour, management and employers.”763 
 
WAGES 
In these early years of the military regime, the state once again adopted a multi-pronged 
strategy – strategic speeches, conferences and legislation – to show that wages could be 
sustained for labour. This was the first key component of labour’s expectation of the state in this 
moral economy of development policy. It thus formed one part of the core of the legitimacy of 
the state-labour relationship, reinforcing for labour that the state would be “responsive” if the 
expectation of patronage was not met.764 
First, it was clear that, just like in the previous civilian-led era, state officials wanted to 
project themselves as pro-labour through strategic speeches directed at elite industrialists. Days 
after the October 1958 coup, for instance, East Pakistani Martial Law Administrator General 
Umrao Khan outlined how the new labour policy would encourage industrialists to provide 
“better working conditions” to its workers to benefit production and overall growth.765 
In various meetings with industrialists, General Muhammad Azam Khan specifically 
called on this elite class to work with the state by “fulfilling their obligations to ensure decent 
[wages]” were paid to workers. Only two months after the coup, General Khan addressed 300 
Karachi-based industrialists about this very issue. He highlighted to them that the “existing gap 
between rich and poor must be closed up.” But this could only happen if industrialists helped to 
ensure that “Pakistan’s working class [was] content and happy, so there could be real stability in 
the land.”766 Similarly, seasoned bureaucrat Abul Kasem pointed out in various public meetings 
the state’s expectation of industrialists to “better the lot of labour” in terms of their working 
conditions.767 
Second, the state appeared to push further for labour’s wages through specialized and 
highly publicised conferences involving the ruling regime, industrialists and labour leaders. Just 
like in the previous civilian regime in 1947-1958, documentation from such conferences was 
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then widely distributed to active trade unions at various industrial sites to further influence 
labour about the state’s commitment to their wage needs and the relevant laws in place. Again, 
this was a key way for the state to monitor and shape industrial relations, while reiterating to 
labour about the wages that they should expect from this moral economy of development policy. 
At certain tripartite conferences during this martial law period 1958-1961, two state 
representatives, four industrialists and four labour leaders, who were nominated by the provincial 
governments, would debate industrial relations, including the wage issue. Each conference 
produced reports and recommendations that were then passed on to the ruling regime.768 769 At 
the 1958 tripartite labour conference one month after the coup, General Umrao Khan emphasised 
the need for “a changed outlook under which national interest should get priority over that of the 
consumer, worker and the industrialist.”770 At the same time, he noted the regime’s belief in 
“justice to one and all,” including for labour’s wages. He explained the “need of the hour” was 
more production and fair wages to workers.771 Once again, labour was told that their welfare was 
a primary concern of the ruling regime, alongside the need for increased industrial development. 
At a Labour-Management Cooperation Conference a month later in December 1958772, 
General Ayub himself noted the “difficult problems” that the country faced in “planning a 
balanced national economy” but which urgently required an “imaginative handling” of “labour 
problems.” Key to this was for “labour to give their best for what they [were] paid” and for the 
employer to “realise that what they [were] dealing with is human material and not machines, and 
as such [to] give them all the comfort, conveniences and dignity due to honest, hard-working and 
self-respecting human beings.”773 Thus, this reinforced for labour that a fair wage was due to 
them for their labour and would be overseen by the state, as part of the moral economy of 
development policy. 
The military leader even reminded labourers of their right to “seek redress” through 
appropriate state mechanisms, if they felt they did not earn what they deserved. He called on 
“management” to “conform to the fundamental prerequisites” of labour laws and trade unionism. 
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When a worker had legitimate “demands or grievances” over wage issues, they were to be taken 
by the union secretary to the manager or to the Works Committee774 775 which was an “advisory 
body.” 776  Workers and employers had to follow the “established legal procedures,” i.e. 
mediation, intervention of labour officers, labour courts, Appellate Courts or the National 
Industrial Relations Commission.777 General Ayub thus reminded workers that they could 
challenge the state if their expected wages were not delivered. 
Third, through various laws that had been introduced in independent Pakistan and pre-
partition India, Pakistan’s regime organized industrial-labour relations at the national and 
provincial level, thus explicitly making the state accountable for wages for workers. Certain “old 
laws [continued] in force by virtue of a Presidential order,”778 but new ones were introduced as 
well to specifically deal with wage issues. 
From the previous civilian-led era, the Factories Act 1934 continued to be in effect. It 
specified maximum working hours and “suitable” working conditions for labour, but it also 
specified the need for minimum wages. The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was also still in effect 
to “govern the investigation, settlement and adjudication of industrial disputes.”779 These laws 
were to continue to give labour some legal justification to expect wages as part of the moral 
economy of development policy. 
This military regime also adopted new legislation to deal with various labour issues, 
including wages. The Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959 reshaped the industrial systems so it 
would be more “adjudication oriented.” The legislation acknowledged that “workers had not had 
a fair deal in the past” in terms of the worker’s real income and the ordinance was a step towards 
rectifying that.780 It introduced “conciliation officers” appointed by the state who would mediate 
industrial disputes of any nature. They were encouraged to “make efforts” to promote the 
settlement of all disputes within a “specified period.”781 
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The military regime also created the Minimum Wages Board in the provinces782 to “work 
out minimum wages for unskilled industrial workers in order to remove the differences in wages 
for similar work in different regions.”783 This was legalized in the Minimum Wages Ordinance 
1961, formalizing “the responsibility for fixing wages … with the government.”784 It also 
included a Minimum Wages Council to “advise and guide” the military regime about wage 
issues, with the input of labour.785 Once again, this built up the expectation of labour that the 
military regime would provide sufficient working conditions in the form of wages through 
certain laws. By the same token, if the expectation of labour was not met, workers could hold the 
state responsible for its flawed implementation of such laws. 
While it became questionable as to how effective strategic speeches, conferences and 
laws were in providing wages expected by industrial workers during this military-led era, the 
state clearly made considerable effort in these initial years to show that it was pro-labour. It also 
showed labour that state institutions existed to guarantee wages within this particular moral 
economy. At the same time, as was evident through out this period, industrial workers 
challenged the state through strikes or “entitlement protests”786 when it felt expected wages were 
simply not being offered. 
 
PRICES 
In this initial period of martial law in 1958-1961, the state adopted another multi-pronged 
strategy – speeches, conferences and legislation – to show that prices could be offered to 
industrial labour and so achieve “policy legitimacy.”787 This was the second key component of 
labour’s expectation of the state in this moral economy of development policy in Pakistan. It thus 
formed the second part of the core of the legitimacy of the state-labour relationship, reinforcing 
for labour that the state would be “responsive” if the expectation of prices was not met.788 
 First, it was clear that state officials again wanted to project themselves as pro-labour 
through public speeches specifically about keeping basic prices low, which were then widely 
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publicised to certain unions that supported the regime through media and other state publications 
for labour like the Pakistan Labour Gazette and Labour Journal. 
Finance Minister M. Shoaib emphasized his concern over prices in various speeches 
about the economy, stating his government’s goal of tackling inflation. For instance, at the 
inaugural speech at the second session of the Karachi Economists Conference on Austerity 
Economy in 1959, he presented the military regime’s plan to improve living conditions 
specifically in terms of prices. He highlighted the need to reduce inflation of basic consumer 
goods and ensure price stability that had plagued Pakistan during the previous era of civilian 
rule. 
He noted, “I am sure no one in government labours under the illusion that the task of 
rehabilitating our economy will be easy. … My main concern now is how to get out of the 
present economic difficulties which I frankly admit leave me with no peace of mind.” He 
outlined the “paramount problem” of “creeping inflation” which had surfaced in a significant 
way in recent years. “Basically it is the familiar phenomenon of too much money chasing too-
few goods” and such “spiralling prices have brought great hardship” to Pakistanis, especially 
“lower classes” like labour. Ultimately, he noted that the “inflationary psychology” had become 
too widespread and speculation, black-marketing and hoarding by certain elites had only “added 
fuel to the [existing] inflation” and put more burden on the labour class.789 Such remarks by 
high-level state officials were not mere rhetoric – they were frequent and explicit. Reducing 
prices of basic goods was thus part of the state’s strategy to ensure labour’s participation in 
development policy. It created labour’s expectation of prices for their role in the moral economy. 
 Second, the state appeared to push further for labour’s wages through specialized and 
specialised conferences involving government, industrialist and labour representatives. 
Documentation from such conferences was then widely distributed to active labour unions to 
further influence labour about the state’s commitment to reducing prices. This was another key 
way for the state to monitor and shape industrial relations, while reiterating to labour about 
prices that they should expect form in this particular moral economy of development policy. 
Soon after the coup, at a 1958 labour conference, General Ayub himself offered some 
insight to labour, though recognizing he was “no expert in labour laws and management affairs.” 
He told workers that the “our objects are clear. We want to grow more food. We want our 
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industry to work to its full capacity. We cannot afford any lapse of standards and production in 
either.” At the same time, he recognized the need to “ensure an equal measure of social justice 
for the employer and the employee in every sphere of national activity.” By social justice in this 
case, he specifically referred to the need to offer relief to the industrial worker in terms of prices 
as the labourer had “suffered under the grinding wheel of high prices for much too long.”790 
Similar speeches by the labour minister and finance minister at key conferences reinforced for 
industrial workers that the state’s focus was on prices.  
 Third, through various laws and policies created during this military-led era, Pakistan’s 
regime organized industrial-labour relations at the national and provincial level and also made 
the state accountable for wages for workers. There were several short-term and long-term 
strategies attempted by the state in these early years of the military regime.791 
The state “rigorously pursued”792 certain anti-inflation policies, to ensure that prices 
would not increase. This included an anti-hoarding ordinance that was “enforced with vigour” 
and price controls to “arrest the rising trend in prices to provide some relief to the common 
man.”793 In fact, the prices of 15 commodities were “fixed” by the Controller-General of Prices 
and Supplies and 73 others were “fixed by trade and industry” so it would “provide relief to the 
consumers.”794 These were “temporary controls”, which the military recognized were not a 
“permanent remedy for rising prices.” It then focused on “gradual decontrol to allow the free 
play of the market mechanism as far as practicable.” In 1960, the state created a Price 
Commission to investigate price instability and introduce price stabilization measures.795 It was 
acknowledged, however, that “some increase in the price level [was] inevitable in the process of 
economic growth.”796 
 General Ayub also tackled price inflation by publicly targeting black-marketers and 
hoarders from the previous era who had artificially driven up prices on certain commodities. The 
military regime seemed genuine in its efforts to hold guilty parties accountable for their 
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behaviour in previous civilian governments of 1947-1958, particularly certain members of the 
“capitalist elite.”797 
Several former ministers were charged and arrested for their involvement in black-
marketing that had artificially driven prices up. In December 1958, former Sind and Defense 
Minister M. A. Khuhro was also implicated in a rice permit scandal from the previous regime.798; 
he allegedly issued permits worth several thousands of rupees to persons of his choice in 
contravention of rules and regulations799 and so contributed to the soaring prices of rice in 
Karachi in particular.800 
Certain industrialists were also targeted for their role in price manipulation of basic 
commodities. For instance, M. A. Rangoonwala and J. S. Lobo, President and Secretary of the 
Federation of the Chamber of Commerce, as well as “prominent” businessman Ahmed A. 
Karim,801 were charged with “conspiracy” in “sabotaging” local prices, currency and income 
regulations under Martial Law Regulations.802 
The state felt that import licenses were also linked to price instability in Pakistan and so 
took action to deter this. Governor of West Pakistan Akhter Husain noted how “one of the main 
causes for inflation of prices and black-marketing was the illicit sale of import licences which 
passed through quite a few hands before they reached the actual industrial or commercial 
consumer.”803  In October 1958, weeks after the coup, several businessmen even destroyed 
licenses they previously bought from license holders, before the military regime caught up with 
them. But, as a Dawn editorial noted, the government was trying to counter these license-related 
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city businessman (Pakistan Times, October 11, 1958). He was also later accused of tax evasion, only paying tax for 
one car though reportedly owning ten. He was sentenced to five years in prison and fined Rs 1.5 lakhs under Martial 
Law Regulation (Pakistan Times, January 18, 1959). 
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issues: “the one-year period should furnish more “elbow-room” to all concerned and enable 
demands to be assessed and allocations made on a more satisfying basis.”804 
While it was questionable as to how effective these strategies were in providing prices to 
Pakistan’s industrial workers, these institutions and mechanisms did exist for prices to be 
achieved for labour within this moral economy. Of course, as was evident at certain points of this 
military-led era, industrial workers would stage “entitlement protests”805 against the state when it 
felt prices were not being delivered. 
 
 
MORAL ECONOMY VIOLATIONS AND  
LEGITIMACY STRAIN OF THE STATE: 1962-1969 
 
During this initial period of martial law in 1958-1961, the state thus did work to both 
build the expectation of what labour should receive for its role in national development through 
public communication and specific measures to follow through on this identified goal – it 
effectively tried to achieve the normative and cognitive component of “policy legitimacy”806 
involving industrial development. At the same time, workers also showed their expectation of the 
state in terms of their subsistence needs. In this sense, the moral economy of development policy 
was established during this initial era of military rule in Pakistan, with specific expectations built 
into the state-labour and informal patron-client relationship. The state clearly used this 
“ideology” of subsistence and nationalistic sacrifice to “build legitimacy” among unions and 
industrial workers. It aimed to create “unity of national purpose”807 to reduce the risk of strikes 
and so maximize industrial productivity that would in one sense legitimize the military-run state. 
But after 1962, the state spent relatively less time on building up expectation of 
subsistence provision and more of its focus simply reacting to labour unrest over specific moral 
economy violations. They would offer certain labour concessions (i.e. 1965 Labour Advisory 
Board; East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act 1965, East Pakistan Employment of Labour Standing 
Orders Act 1965, and East Pakistan Trade Unions Act 1965; 1968 Industrial Disputes Ordinance 
and Trade Union Ordinance) when strikes increased, but this was also in the backdrop of 
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legislation to “control” and “weaken” the trade union movement (e.g. Defence Pakistan Rules) in 
1965.808 
Effectively, the significant build-up of expectation in 1958-1961 later led to recurrent 
legitimacy strain for the state when it appeared it was not fulfilling labour’s expectation for 
specific subsistence goods. Previously, the state’s moral economy “ideology [had repeatedly 
promised] a bright new future as the principal means for establishing legitimacy” but such 
performance-based legitimacy became “hazardous”809 with increasing moral economy violations 
involving wages; this was particularly the case in terms of wages in 1962-1969 as strikes steadily 
increased810 against the state. When labour’s expectation of wages was not met and thus 
“promised were not realized,” the authority of Pakistan’s leadership quickly “eroded”811 in their 
eyes, which led to industrial unrest directed at the state; this was similar to the pattern of events 
in 1947-1958. 
Since military leaders in the Pakistani state did “not yet have an easy command of 
power” as institutions were not firmly entrenched given martial law in 1958-1961, industrial 
workers appeared to be evaluating the state “within a very narrow range of acceptability, 
requiring only a minor [issue like a drop in wages] to spark a crisis.”812 Such moral economy 
violations represented workers’ temporary “loss of public confidence” in the state and increased 
“the potential for disorder.”813 The disruption in production created legitimacy strain for the new 
regime struggling to firmly establish its industrial economy. This reflects the hypothesis of this 
thesis: when there is a decline in subsistence conditions in terms of wages, labour stops 
production through unrest and thus creates legitimacy strain for the Pakistani state. 
  
 Two types of wage-focused strikes against the state can be inferred from available data, 
just like in the previous civilian-led era. First, workers would strike against the state when it 
appeared the state was not taking necessary action against industrial elites who were unfairly 
firing workers or limiting their wages in some way. It was thus rooted in “workers’ sense of 
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injustice, a feeling that they were being denied something to which they were entitled”814 as part 
of the moral economy of development policy. Second, industrial workers would strike against 
the state when they felt state-run institutions and policies did not follow through on delivering 
expected wages. This could be termed “entitlement protests” rooted in “unmet promises” 
embedded in state institutions and policies – “anger over unmet expectations [was] the impetus 
to workers’ actions.”815 
After both types of wage-focused labour unrest, the state immediately responded with 
specific speeches or policies to limit any further legitimacy strain. This typically saw the end of 
industrial unrest and the resumption of labour’s role in production. During this period, this 
pattern of events occurred repeatedly in various industries. The wage data below reinforces that 
subtle changes in industrial wages overall had no significant impact on labour unrest. Whether 
general wage levels increased or decreased, it was specific moral economy violations at the level 
of individual or a group of industrial outlets that labour perceived as broken promises by the state 
to maintain wages and which prompted workers to engage in unrest. 
 
Real Wages of Industrial Workers816 in Rupees per year per worker 
(Deflated by the 1961-based Consumer Price Index)  
 
Year Real Wages Index 
1962-63 1,261 100 
1963-64 1,484 117 
1964-65 1,267 100.4 
1965-66 1,277 101 
1966-67 1,197 95 
1967-68 1,467 111 
1968-69 1567 119 
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Pak Publishers, Karachi, Pakistan, 1973 
	   151 
 
 
There was, however, a noticeable drop in industrial unrest over wages in 1965 after a 
significant labour concession in the form of the Labour Advisory Board and an obvious moment 
of national unity during the war over Kashmir with India. For workers, the labour board 
represented state progress towards meeting workers’ expectation of wages after a steady increase 
in industrial unrest due to moral economy violations since 1962. However, after 1965, it 
appeared labour’s expectations of this policy were not met as incidents of industrial unrest began 
to gradually increase again, from 152 incidents in 1965 to 170 and 203 in 1966 and 1967, 
respectively. 
But, after two years of rising unrest, the state offered another set of concessions to labour 
in 1968, leading to a reduction in industrial strikes and protests from 203 in 1967 to 153 in 1968. 
These concessions included the announcement of an ambitious new labour policy that was being 
planned for 1969 and certain labour policies being legalized in East Pakistan (e.g. Industrial 
Disputes Ordinance 1968 and Trade Union Ordinance of 1968). While some perceived these 
ordinances as “token appeasements,”817 for other workers they represented state progress towards 
delivering labour with expected wages, hence the decline in industrial strikes and protests against 
the state. 
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However, within a year, in 1969, it was clear the new labour policy and earlier 
concessions were not what was expected by workers – industrial unrest over wages almost 
doubled to 285 incidents that year, which was the highest of the 1962-1969 period and the entire 
military-led era. In this sense, labour concessions could not appease workers who at this point 
did not expect the civilian regime would be able to deliver wages. The resultant increase in anti-
state unrest consequently added to the legitimacy strain of the state. 
 
Year Number of 
Unions818 
Membership Labour Unrest 
Over Wages 
Production Days 
Lost 
1958 621 106,417 93 283,994 
1959 358 98,692 29 516,971 
1960 410 101,138 42 50,990 
1961 466 175,313 54 78,765 
1962 492 138,356 121 79,191 
1963 521 95,022 215 387,847 
1964 555 226,789 228 1,823,196 
1965 592 218,665 152 4,195,524 
1966 621 217,096 170 471,338 
1967 639 219,438 203 494,575 
1968 654 230,809 153 2,344,164 
1969 638 259,723 285 3,500,600 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
818 Pg 6. Abul Majeed, The Vital Industrial and Labour Statistics, complied for the National Administration 
Training, 1972 
283,994	  516,971	   50,990	  78,765	  
79,191	  
387,847	  
1,823,196	  
4,195,524	  
471,338	   494,575	  
2,344,164	  
3,500,600	  
93	  
29	   42	  
54	   121	  
215	   228	  
152	   170	  
203	   153	  
285	  
0	  50	  
100	  150	  
200	  250	  
300	  
0	  500,000	  
1,000,000	  1,500,000	  
2,000,000	  2,500,000	  
3,000,000	  3,500,000	  
4,000,000	  
58	   59	   60	   61	   62	   63	   64	   65	   66	   67	   68	   69	  
Industrial	  Unrest	  	  and	  Production	  	  
Days	  Lost:	  1958-­‐1969	  Production	  Days	  Lost	   Industrial	  Unrest	  Over	  Subsistence	  Wages	  
	   153 
 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST OVER FIRST WAGE ISSUE: 1962-1964 
 The first type of industrial unrest focused on industrialists’ treatment of workers with 
respect to expected wages, just like in the previous civilian-led era. Workers held strikes against 
the state because it appeared the state was not taking necessary action against industrial elites 
who they felt were unfairly limiting their labour’s wages and so threatening their subsistence. 
Such a moral economy violation was thus rooted in “workers’ sense of injustice, a feeling that 
they were being denied something to which they were entitled.”819 This was clear evidence of 
industrial labour independently attacking the state in a period not necessarily preceding the 
decline of the ruling regime – unlike what is suggested in the existing literature. After this type 
of wage-focused labour unrest, the state responded strongly with specific speeches to 
industrialists and labour to limit any further legitimacy strain. This saw the end of industrial 
unrest and the resumption of labour’s role in production. 
This pattern of events was once again most obvious in the burgeoning textiles industry, 
particularly in certain cotton and jute mills in West and East Pakistan, respectively. Soon after 
General Ayub took over the country, there was a proliferation of mills, with “spinning, weaving, 
dyeing and finishing sections in a single plant.”820 There were significant and recurring bouts of 
unrest (and even violence) at these sites in the 1960s during this military-led era. This was partly 
because mill owners821 were widely criticised for allegedly “mismanaging mills” and “swindling 
consumers for rapid profits”822 Some industrialists “resorted to all kinds of strong-arm tactics” to 
influence workers, including hiring “gangsters” to intimidate workers from staging protests and 
strikes.823 And so it seemed that they were often unable or unwilling to offer subsistence 
patronage that was expected by labour. This generated significant unrest at times as workers felt 
the state should be punishing industrialists for their mistreatment of workers. It was thus crucial 
for the state to attend to textile workers’ welfare in the interest of maintaining this key 
component of industrial production and which provided one form of legitimacy of the state. 
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From 1961 to 1962, martial law was lifted and this led to the first in a series of increases 
in bouts of unrest involving textile workers. Incidents of labour unrest over wage issues more 
than doubled, from 54 to 121, and steadily increased till 1965. The most widely documented 
industrial disputes were at various mills in 1962-1964. At Asiatic Cotton Mills in Chittagong, for 
instance, in February 1962, more than 150 workers “did not attend to their duties” due to the 
dismissal of one worker who was also the secretary of their union. While the union prepared to 
file a strike note and remind the state of this moral economy violation, the swift intervention of 
the state-appointed directorate led to a resolution and the workers resumed their role in 
production within two days.824 Similarly, at the Chittagong Textile Mills, a month earlier, 
workers complained that their employers had failed to pay them the minimum wage it had 
promised. The Labour Directorate intervened and management paid labour what was due within 
a few weeks.825 In such cases, labour resumed their work in production and the state’s legitimacy 
strain was resolved with respect to this group of textile workers. 
In late 1962 and early 1963, several strikes took place at textile mills in and near 
Karachi.826 A protest over the sudden suspension of four workers at Ghafoor Textile Mills led to 
sympathy strikes by labourers at Lakhani, Zebtan and Hafiz Textile Mills.827 This wage dispute 
was resolved in a matter of days as the state-appointed Labour Commissioner mediated between 
management and workers. However, when employers did not meet the terms of the settlement, 
this led to a resurgence of unrest involving more than 10,000 industrial workers and a general 
strike on March 1, 1963.828 This generated considerable protests, processions and clashes with 
police that reportedly culminated in the deaths of 42 workers and the arrests of several others. 
Yet this general strike was still seen as a success – it informed the state of its moral 
economy violation with regards to wages and allowed them to “extract promises for the labour to 
be given strike-pay, an unprecedented concession for those times.”829 In this sense, industrial 
unrest subsided, production resumed and the state regained one form of legitimacy in the eyes of 
this particular set of workers. 
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A similar sequence of events took place at the Platinum Jubilee Jute Mills, Nishat Jute 
Mills and the Pak Jute Mills Ltd in late 1963.830 Labour unions spoke out about it not receiving 
what management had promised and so it publicised its plans to strike. The state reacted by 
having its Labour Directorate intervene so production would not be hindered any longer. In these 
mills, within a day or two, workers would call off the strike and resume their role in production. 
In 1964, 70,000 workers in Dacca, East Pakistan, went on strike to “press” for an increase 
in wage rates” as well as other demands like fixed hours, free medical facilities and free 
housing.”831 Yet again, the workers showed respect for state mechanisms, taking the time to file 
a strike notice to limit hindrances to production. Within nine days, the state-appointed Director 
of Labour negotiated a tri-partite agreement between representatives of workers and the 
employers over due wages,832 which temporarily appeased labour who were reminded that the 
state would fight for them. 
Later in 1964, the pace of industrial disputes in the textiles industry continued to escalate. 
In September, a significant dispute arose between management and labour at the Ashraf Textile 
Mills in Dacca over the “suspension of certain workers ... for disobeying orders” on July 13. 
Almost 500 workers staged a strike the next day. But the state’s Labour Directorate resolved the 
issue within a few days and the workers resumed their work.833 A few days later at the 
Luxminarayan Cotton Mills at Narayanganj, workers also announced they would strike over 
unpaid wages. But the quick involvement of the Labour Directorate led to the workers calling off 
their strike and management agreeing to pay what was due. 
In the event that management did not deliver the terms set by the Labour Directorate, he 
then recommended the use of the Industrial Court. For instance, this occurred with the case of the 
Dacca Cotton Mills in 1964. The Dacca Cotton Mills Workers’ Union filed Industrial Disputes 
cases with the Industrial Court but “in the meantime, there was a tripartite agreement between 
the parties.” The Chairman of the Industrial Court A. H. Khan noted that the “parties came to an 
amicable settlement.”834 However, it was only with a few cases that the labour dispute was 
resolved without further disruption in production through a tripartite agreement.835 As explained 
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in the next section, workers often protested against the inefficiencies of the Industrial Court itself 
as rulings would take several months and were difficult to enforce. 
In these examples, the workers and industrial elite reached an impasse in their 
negotiations and the break in production clearly created legitimacy strain for a state that was so 
focused on national development. It was at this point when it became abundantly clear how the 
state was the key arbitrator in Pakistan’s industrial relations. After weeks of labour strikes and 
employer speeches against such unrest, the state often offered a strong response in favour of 
labour in the interest of resuming production. 
There were other industrial disputes that also had the possibility of strikes that could 
create disruption but were nipped in the bud quickly by the state-appointed Labour Directorate or 
Conciliation Officer. This occurred with wage-related disputes where workers felt their employer 
was not paying what they were entitled to. Labour refused to work and threatened to strike unless 
employers paid their wages. A swift intervention of the Labour Directorate or Conciliation 
Officer quashed the threat of strike or at least resolved the issue without production being 
disrupted for too many days or weeks.836 
In this sense, the state appeared to be committed in 1962-1964 to responding to what 
labour felt were moral economy violations involving their wages. This type of unrest was rooted 
in “workers’ sense of injustice, a feeling that they were being denied something to which they 
were entitled.”837 The fact that workers often went through state mechanisms reinforced that they 
still believed in state policies and institutions concerning labour at this point. It also showed their 
commitment to development in that they would go through these state mechanisms before 
striking so production disruptions would be minimal. This of course would not be the case after 
1965, when it appeared the state recurrently lost legitimacy in terms of its informal patron role in 
the moral economy of development policy. 
  
INDUSTRIAL UNREST OVER SECOND WAGE ISSUE: 1962-1964 
 Second, industrial workers would sometimes strike against the state when they felt state-
run institutions had failed in some way. At times, workers felt that official mechanisms simply 
did not deliver the expected wages that had been promised repeatedly by the state. The perceived 
gaps in the 1959 labour policy838 and related state mechanisms only ensured that such labour 
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unrest would recur during this period. 
 Most often, it was clear that the Industrial Court839 itself was a source of conflict. Workers 
specifically protested to highlight the “inadequacies of the Industrial Courts and the conciliation 
machinery”840 that impacted their wages. One “inadequacy” 841 with this state institution was that 
it had limited binding power to hold employers accountable to an “award declared.”842 This court 
had more power than its predecessor – the Industrial Tribunal – in that it could “try and punish 
persons accused of certain offences”843 but this was rarely “enforced.”844 So, although the 
Industrial Court suggested that workers’ demands about moral economy violations about wages 
were being taken seriously by the state, the court ultimately was incapable or unwilling to ensure 
industrialists followed through, leading to recurring unrest. 
 The other “inadequacy”845 was that it often took several months for the Industrial Court to 
hear the case and make a ruling, which contributed to recurring unrest. In fact, industrial labour 
unions frequently took issue with the fact there were only three Industrial Courts for all of West 
Pakistan and two for East Pakistan, which could not “deal quickly and effectively with all 
disputes.” These proceedings were also criticized by labour for being “lengthy.” For instance, in 
1963 and 1964, in 90% of these cases, the Industrial Courts took between 7 and 25 months to 
reach a decision and give out related wage awards.846 This contributed to the escalation in 
strikes. 
 Such unrest could be termed “entitlement protests” rooted in “unmet promises” of state 
institutions and policies – it was “anger over unmet expectations [that was] the impetus to 
workers’ actions.” 847  Once again, this was clear evidence of Pakistan’s industrial labour 
independently attacking state legitimacy in a period not necessarily preceding the decline of the 
ruling regime – unlike what is suggested in the existing literature. After this particular type of 
wage-focused labour unrest, the state immediately responded with specific speeches about how 
to resolve such industrial disputes or announce an appointment with the Industrial Court to limit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
839 Industrial Courts were created out of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959 and were used to “adjudicate and 
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any further legitimacy strain. This typically saw the end of industrial unrest and the resumption 
of labour’s role in production, at least in the near term. 
  
 This pattern of events was particularly evident at certain flour mills in 1962-1964. In 
1962 for instance, there was significant unrest at the Government Flour Mills over workers’ 
recurring demands for the expected wage increase from Rs 75 to Rs 115.848 The Labour 
Directorate initially intervened for mediation, but when no resolution could be reached, the case 
was forwarded to the Industrial Court. In the six months in which it took for the court to hear the 
case and make a ruling, however, workers at the flour mills staged three lock-outs and one 
strike.849 
 This occurred at a number of flour mills in Karachi in the same year. There was a 
significant dispute involving certain flour mills of Karachi. The Karachi Factories Workers’ 
Union fought with the Karachi Steam Roller Flour Mills, Sind Flour Mills and India Flour Mills 
Ltd. When the union and employers could not reach an agreement and workers announced a 
strike, the Labour Directorate intervened in the dispute. The state representative interviewed 
more than twenty witnesses regarding the issue of wages and expected bonus payments. When 
no resolution could be reached, the case was forwarded to the Industrial Court. Ultimately, the 
tribunal decided in favour of labour but it took another year of sporadic protests and strikes for 
the mill owners to actually pay their workers the wages as specified in the court-appointed 
award.850 
The sugar industry faced bouts of anti-state unrest in 1963 when a series of Industrial 
Court rulings were delayed in East Pakistan. The workers of Jaipurhat Sugar Mills Ltd in Bogra 
fought for wages and protested the “unfair” dismissal of workers. Unrest recurred for months 
until the Industrial Court made a ruling.851 This also occurred at the North Bengal Sugar Mills in 
Rajshahi. Workers announced strikes over an expected wage increase. The internal discussion 
failed and was taken over by the Labour Directorate.852 The Industrial Court’s ruling three 
months later meant the threat of strike was diminished. 
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849 Pakistan Year Book 1962: 176 
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851 Pg 164-165. East Pakistan Labour Journal, Vol. XXIII: 2, Dacca, Pakistan, 1963 
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Some workers in the textile industry in East Pakistan also challenged the state for its 
insufficient state mechanisms. The workers of Satrang Textile Mills in Tongi “abruptly” went on 
strike in 1964. They had 19 issues that they said they needed resolved to stop their strikes. Much 
of their demands had to do with wages that had not been paid and sudden dismissals of workers 
with no real cause. After a “protracted negotiation” led by the Labour Welfare Officer, that 
spanned a month, production resumed. However, when expected wages were still not delivered, 
unrest resumed. The public announcement of an Industrial Court hearing within a few days saw 
the end of the strike.853 
This occurred in Dacca as well, with the dispute between the Ahmed Bawani Textile 
Mills and its labour union. Five workers were dismissed without cause and this led to significant 
numbers of workers filing a strike notice and actually holding their strike. But with 
“conciliation” by the Labour Directorate, an agreement was reached to rehire those dismissed 
workers and reinstate their wages.854 However, this mediation by the directorate was not 
enforced to the satisfaction of these labourers. They announced another strike would be held but 
called it off when the state representative announced a date for an Industrial Court hearing. 
 
In response to such recurring attacks on such labour-focused state mechanisms, the ruling 
regime did try to show labour it was working to strengthen its institutions. Beyond its 
involvement in the Industrial Court and public speeches in support of labour, it also carried state-
sponsored studies to highlight where policies had worked and where they needed improvement. 
Such studies were then publicized through distribution to the state media and various labour 
unions themselves. 
One such study was titled “Improvements in Working Conditions of Labour.”855 The data 
from the study revealed “healthy trends in the condition of labour” as “Government policy had 
helped in improving material and non-material conditions of work in factories.”856 The report 
reinforced the many measures taken to deal with the “vital issue” of “labour contentment,”857 
particularly with legislation like the Revised Labour Policy of 1959 and various programs 
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initiated by the state’s Directorate of Labour Welfare. Through specific wage and price-related 
indicators, the study showed improvement in nine centres – Lahore, Lyallpur, Gujranwala, 
Sialkot, Multan, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Hyderabad, Quetta – between 1959 and 1964.858 At the 
same time, the report admitted that there was till work to be done to improve housing, medical 
and education facilities for labourers and their families. 
Another relevant state publication was the evaluation of labour policies in 1964. Planning 
Commission Deputy Chair Said Hasan said that led to seven labour welfare centres being 
established in East Pakistan for “providing education, recreational, cultural and medical facilities 
to industrial workers” and eleven more were expected. He also noted other patronage offered to 
labour: “The Factories Directorate and the conciliation machinery were strengthened, making it 
possible to inspect factories more frequently; provide guidance to employers on safety, 
protection and welfare in work-places; and to take effective measures to reduce considerable loss 
of man-hours” from accidents. An industrial relations institute was also established “to provide 
training to trade union workers and labour officers in labour laws and practices” in both East and 
West Pakistan.859 
 
In 1962-1964, workers still abided by state mechanisms in keeping with the terms of the 
moral economy – i.e. they only protested after these mechanisms failed to provide them with the 
wages they had been promised. The state also appeared to be committed to responding to what 
labour felt were wage-related moral economy violations, using different strategies. This in one 
sense reflected the legitimacy of the state-labour relationship during this period. But the steady 
build up of labour unrest from 1962-1964 also meant that increasing numbers of workers were 
challenging the state about expected wages that were not provided by the state. This contributed 
to the state’s decision to announce certain labour concessions in 1965 and so reduce further 
labour unrest that would hinder industrial production and the state’s critical development policy. 
 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST POST-1965 WAR  
AND LABOUR POLICIES: 1965-1969 
After significant unrest in 1962-1964, the state announced certain labour concessions, 
including the Labour Advisory Board and the country’s first social security law. This was an 
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859 Pg 91. Preliminary Evaluation of Progress, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1965 
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effort for the state to regain “policy legitimacy”860 for industrial development and to strengthen 
its position in its ongoing “legitimation project”861 with labour. The state wanted to show labour 
that it had noted its frustration with certain wage-focused moral economy violations in recent 
years and was now taking big-picture, long-term actions to tackle them. For workers, such steps 
represented state progress towards meeting workers’ expectation of wages after a steady increase 
in moral economy violations since 1962. This contributed to a noticeable drop in industrial 
unrest over wages in 1965. 
The war over Kashmir with India also provided an obvious moment of national unity, 
such that the need to strike against the state appeared to be put aside while the country focused 
on a shared hatred for its South Asian neighbour and the United States. However, after 1965 with 
Pakistan’s loss in the war, labour appeared to shift its focus back to unmet expectations of the 
state, as incidents of industrial unrest began to gradually increase again, from 152 incidents in 
1965 to 170 and 203 in 1966 and 1967, respectively. 
After two years of rising unrest in 1966-1967, the state offered another set of concessions 
to labour in 1968, leading to a notable reduction in industrial strikes and protests from 203 in 
1967 to 153 in 1968. These concessions included the announcement of an ambitious new labour 
policy that was being planned for 1969 and certain labour policies in East Pakistan. While some 
perceived these ordinances as “token appeasements,”862 for other workers they once again 
represented state progress towards delivering labour with expected wages, hence the decline in 
industrial strikes and protests against the state. 
However, within a year, in 1969, it was clear the new labour policy and earlier 
concessions were not what was expected by workers – industrial unrest over wages almost 
doubled to 285 incidents that year, which was the highest of the 1962-1969 period and the entire 
military-led era. It also seemed that the behaviour of these industrial strikers had changed 
towards state mechanisms for resolving industrial disputes in that they began bypassing such 
mechanisms completely and went straight to unrest. In this sense, labour concessions could no 
longer appease workers who at this point did not appear to expect the civilian regime would be 
able to deliver wages. The resultant increase in anti-state unrest consequently added to the 
legitimacy strain of the state in 1969, partly contributing to General Ayub’s resignation and 
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handover of power to General Yahya.863 The informal state-labour relationship in the moral 
economy of development policy thus appeared to be in decline by 1969. 
 
The first reason for the drop in anti-state strikes and protests in 1965 was the introduction 
of certain labour concessions by the military regime to “appease trade unions.”864 The creation of 
the Labour Advisory Board was seen as a significant move in industrial relations. It was made up 
of “equal numbers of representatives from the provincial government, employers and workers.” 
Its various committees were supposed to examine “general problems and grievances of workers 
in specific industries.865 The military regime’s goal was to show labour that the state was 
committed to addressing their concerns, particularly with their input. 
The ruling regime also announced it would ensure “stable wages” and “more favourable 
decisions in the Industrial Court”866 which had created much conflict in 1962-1964. In East 
Pakistan, this was legalised through the Labour Disputes Act 1965, Trade Unions Act 1965 and 
Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act 1965, all of which served as “indispensable 
elements in shaping industrial relations”867 in Pakistan.  
General Ayub then introduced the country’s first social security law868 to help those 
workers who were abruptly dismissed and had no income to survive during unemployment.869 
The law ordered employers to increase their contribution to workers’ welfare fund by two 
percent. 870  Another development came in the form of the Wage Board of 1965, which 
specifically recommended increases in wage rates for industrial workers in several industrial 
sectors including sugar, cotton and silk.871 All these steps together represented state progress 
towards meeting workers’ expectation of wages as part of the moral economy of development 
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policy. It showed efforts by the state to regain whatever legitimacy may have been lost during 
rising anti-state unrest by workers in 1962-1964. 
The second reason for the drop in industrial unrest in 1965 was the surge in nationalism 
over the war with India over Kashmir.872 This nationalist sentiment was also a result of the 
United States’ decision to postpone its food aid program873 as well as its economic and military 
aid874 to Pakistan at this critical time of war with India. This nationalist sentiment appeared to 
take priority over the need for labour to protest over its working conditions. It provided a 
moment of unity for all groups in Pakistan. Like the early years of this military regime, ruling 
elites called for every Pakistani to sacrifice and work hard for their country at war. 
General Ayub called on Pakistanis to be “thoroughly prepared to meet any aggression”; 
he noted how “the flame of national fervour and dedication … [burned] in every home in 
Pakistan, lighting the path along which people of Pakistan [were] prepared to march as one man 
when duty [called].”875 876 877 878 He asserted that “defence [came] first. Everything else [was to 
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873 The US first indicated in December 1965 that in the future it would likely forego its PL480 programme or ask for 
dollars in exchange for foodgrains to Pakistan. This was because the US administration felt it already had too many 
local currencies. Additionally, given the depleting world’s food shortage, many US officials reportedly felt they 
could compete in the global market. The PL480 program was originally created as US foodgrains could not find 
cash markets globally – this subsidized “give away” programme was introduced to tackle food shortages in certain 
developing countries and also to “squeeze out some political gains from the recipients” (Dawn, December 3, 1965). 
The US also hinted at the possibility of higher shipping charges when it delayed the release of 300,000 tons of 
PL480 foodgrains to Pakistan. But final decisions were to be taken after General Ayub’s meeting with US President 
Johnson (Dawn, December 12, 1965). 
874 The United States had announced it would suspend military and economic aid to Pakistan in 1965 as the war with 
India loomed. But Pakistan’s relations with the United States had started to “cool” as early as 1962. “Ever since the 
Chinese attack on India in 1962, Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has grown increasingly cool. Pakistan 
has been bitter that India has been receiving military aid from the United States, even though Pakistan has protested 
very strongly that such military assistance will eventually be used against Pakistan. The United States, on the other 
hand, has expressed grave concern over Pakistan’s increasing cordiality towards the Chinese” (Sayeed 1966: 84). 
875  The national unity over fighting India also coincided with the state’s confidence over its progress in 
industrialisation and its overall economy. “The first signs of this success became clear in 1965 when Pakistan 
completed the Second Five Year Plan on schedule, over-fulfilling targets in many areas” (Pg 8. Arthur MacEwan, 
Contradictions of Capitalist Development in Pakistan, Pakistan Forum, Vol 1: 1, pg 8-9, October - November 1970). 
876 Planning Commission Deputy Chair Said Hasan said of the results of the Second Five Year Plan: “the country 
had demonstrated its capacity to achieve growth rates higher than 5% per annum in both East and West Pakistan. ... 
The pace of development in the five years 1960-65 has been remarkable. Adequate infrastructure has been built up 
and a now confidence created in our ability to attain rapid economic growth in future. The stage is now set to strive 
for better standards of living for the people for the people and ultimately to reach the goal of a welfare state in 
Pakistan” (Preliminary Evaluation of Progress During Second Five Year Plan 1965: ii and 48). 
877 The finance minister also reiterated the significant achievements of the state’s growth policies in his 1964-1965 
budget speech: “We are witnessing achievements, of which all possible humanity we can still be proud, in 
agriculture, in industry, in exports, in rate of growth; in fact, in practically all sectors.”877 Of course, he 
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take] a secondary place.”879  As a result, “this [entailed] hardship and sacrifice.” He called on all 
citizens to “cheerfully accept a life of austerity rather than allow their freedom to be trifled 
with.” He reassured the people that the “basic necessities of life” would be “within the reach of 
every citizen” and “faith” would provide each individual with all that he needed to “sustain 
[himself] in the struggle.” For labour this meant they could continue to expect subsistence 
provision form the state.880 881  
In one of his national broadcasts, General Ayub also talked about how the Pakistani 
people were even willing to counter the depletion in US aid882 through taxation: “The willingness 
with which people in all walks of life have welcomed the additional taxation announced by the 
Finance Minister is one more piece of evidence of the determination of our people to make every 
sacrifice for the defence of their homeland.”883 884 885 Similarly, Bhutto noted that, despite the 
drop in US aid, development of the eastern wing would not suffer.886 In East Pakistan, Governor 
Abdul Monem Khan called for “unity” in the eastern and western wings of the country and for 
the “need for supreme sacrifice on the part of the people.”887 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
acknowledged, “We have still, however, a long way to go. ... Let us ... unite as never before and work together, each 
to the best of his ability, to the limit of our resources, for the greater progress and prosperity of Pakistan, the land of 
our dreams” (Budget Speeches 1947-48 to 1984-85 1984: 116-117). 
878 The state’s confidence about its growth was reiterated in the Third Five Year Plan 1965-70. The Deputy 
Chairman of the Planning Commission said the major objective of the Third Plan (1965-70) was to continue to 
“make substantial progress towards achieving certain specific social objectives such as diminishing inequalities in 
distribution of income, wealth and economic power, providing a measure of social security and promoting social and 
cultural change conducive to accelerated economic expansion” (Third Year Plan, Government of Pakistan, 1965). 
879 President’s Monthly Broadcast to the Nation, Pakistan High Commission, Information Division, Press Release, 
November 2, 1965  
880 The 1965-1966 budget speech also reinforced the national drive for development and surge in nationalism which 
hindered strikes. The finance minister remarked: “We dare not relax and we must, each and all of us, commit 
ourselves to the cause of national reconstruction. ... With faith in God, with faith in ourselves, with faith in our 
destiny, let us get on with the job and leave results to the Almighty” (Budget Speeches 1947-48 to 1984-85 1984: 
148). 
881 According to Food and Agriculture Minister A. H. M. S. Doha, Pakistan would soon be able to attain self-
sufficiency in food in spite of such foreign aid difficulties (Dawn, December 12, 1965). 
882 Only a year earlier, the United States Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy praised Pakistan for its economic 
progress: “Developing nations throughout the world, struggling to improve the standard of living of their peoples, 
can learn much from the way in which Pakistan has evolved ambitious development plans and then proved by 
remarkable accomplishment that the plans were practical and visionary. ... The 100 million people of Pakistan can 
take pride in the economic development of their country” (The Pakistan Example 1966: 3-4). 
883 Dawn, December 2, 1965 
884 West Pakistan Governor Malik Amir Mohammad Khan noted the toughness factor of Pakistanis and, even 
without US aid, they could and would survive; he suggested one way to guarantee their survival was for the rich to 
forgo their luxuries for the sake of the national interest (Dawn, August 7, 1965). 
885 Khan A. Sabur, Central Minister for Communications, also reassured the people that development plans would 
continue as the “US [aid] move was no cause for worry” (Pakistan Times, August 8, 1965.) 
886 Pakistan Times, August 8, 1965 
887 Dawn, December 2, 1965 
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Many labour groups spoke up to pledge their allegiance to General Ayub. This was 
especially the case after the United States decided to postpone the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium 
meeting in July 1965888, proving to be another indicator of a US-Pakistan alliance that was no 
longer in “full bloom.”889 In August 1965, as the war in Kashmir between India and Pakistan 
unravelled, President of the All-Pakistan Federation of Labour Amir Husain assured the general 
of the full support of labour to “counter the situation created by the United States’ move.”890 
Workers were also urged to condemn American policy on Pakistani aid, as stated by West 
Pakistan Federation of Labour President Rahmatullah Khan Durrani.891 
The Federation’s Peshawar Zonal Committee called on workers to raise production to 
counter the “sinister imperialist move” of the United States, which would “equally” affect the 
labour class unless action was taken.892 The business and industrial community also expressed 
their “whole-hearted support” to General Ayub during this “difficult” time in terms of continuing 
their “duty” in industry, according to Kasam Usman Kandawala, Acting President of the 
Chambers of Commerce and Industries.893 894 895 In this sense, all groups seemed united and with 
the state. 
And yet, after 1965 and the loss in the war, industrial strikes regained momentum, 
increasing from 152 in 1965 to 170 and 203 incidents in 1966 and 1967, respectively. It seemed 
the 1965 advances in labour legislation and policies no longer had any impact on workers. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
888 Sayeed 1966: 84 
889 Pg 19. Feroz Ahmed, Aiding Underdevelopment in Pakistan, MERIP Reports, No 42, pg 19-22, November 1975 
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892 Pakistan Times, August 17, 1965 
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894 This nationalist sentiment was reflected in the media as well. In an August 8, 1965 editorial in Dawn, it read: “the 
nation’s resolve to resist the political pressure which the US seeks to exert on this country continues to find 
expression on speeches and statements from different quarters. … National sovereignty cannot be surrendered for 
the sake of economic aid.” Ten days later, the newspaper’s editorial talked about how the US administration, led by 
President Johnson, had introduced a “new twist to US economic assistance” which stipulated that aid-receiving 
countries must “fit in their foreign policies within the framework of the US global strategy as conceived by some 
short-sighted and frustrated people in the Pentagon and in the White House. This is an outlook to which Pakistan, or 
for that matter any self-respecting country, cannot yield.” 
895 Even US media critiqued Johnson’s decision to suspense aid because it caused the “virtual collapse of our once 
good relations with Pakistan,” according to the Washington Post. The editorial further noted: “We have dealt with a 
country of nearly 160 million as though it were a mendicant dependency devoid of power or pride and without the 
means or spirit of exhibiting its irritation or annoyance” (Washington Post, December 15, 1965). The New York 
Times expressed that: “There is little doubt that President Johnson had decided it was time to review the whole 
relationship with Pakistan. The angry demonstrations in Pakistan, however, only confirmed his judgement and in 
private aroused his wrath. … [US] officials here now say they want to know quite bluntly what benefits the US will 
get from further aid to Pakistan” (New York Times, Aug 15, 1965.) 
	   166 
documented cases of industrial disputes in 1966-1967 were yet again primarily focused in the 
textiles and sugar industry and on unpaid wages and ineffective state institutions. 
But there was more turbulence in electricity companies, which were key to all industries 
in Pakistan. Most notable were the disputes at the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation896 in 
West Pakistan and the Dacca Electric Supply897 in East Pakistan. By now familiar with the ins 
and outs of industrial relations of the military-led regime, union workers at both companies filed 
written statements for the Labour Directorate and also the Industrial Court to move for a 
resolution as quickly as possible regarding wage discrepancies. While these documents were 
submitted, workers also staged a strike demanding “immediate fulfilment of their [wage] 
demands.” They even announced their plans to “switch off the electric connections” to “stop 
work.”898 The Labour Directorate intervened and mediated the wage dispute immediately. 
Clearly, by 1966-1967 during this military-led era, industrial workers had become more adept at 
using the state mechanisms and their own tactics to their full advantage to get the state’s quickest 
response. 
 
By 1968, protests over working conditions declined temporarily again, due to General 
Ayub’s new Industrial Disputes Ordinance899 and Trade Union Ordinance. The government also 
introduced the Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workmen Ordinance fixed monthly wages for 
unskilled workers (Rs 140) in Karachi and other industrial areas (Rs 110).900 For workers, these 
new laws represented state progress towards meeting their expectation of wages, especially after 
a steady increase in moral economy violations in 1966-1967. The military regime introduced 
such labour policies to cope with the “increasing number of strikes” after the 1965 war so that a 
more effective “machinery” could handle disputes.901 Protest declined from 203 instances with 
344,679 workers involved in 1967 to 153 instances in 1968 with 120,927 workers involved.902 
However, by 1969, this strategy no longer worked as labourers often bypassed state 
mechanisms regarding their wage issues. Legislation like the new 1969 labour policy and 1968 
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ordinances were no longer viewed as capable at delivering wages to labour. This represented 
industrial workers’ “loss of … confidence” in state mechanisms and the state itself, increasing 
the “potential for disorder”903 through industrial unrest. The terms of the informal patron-client, 
state-labour relationship in the moral economy of development policy no longer seemed to be 
accepted for labour.    
The 1969 labour policy came out of a six-month dialogue and state-organized labour 
conference. This led to a new minimum wage specifically for the industrial labour force904 and 
other non-wage features to appease labour. But this did nothing to stop the increasingly violent 
momentum of labour unrest. This was glaringly obvious in East Pakistan’s jute industry in 1969. 
At Adamjee Jute Mills in Dacca, without filing any strike notice or attempting an internal 
mediation via a Labour Directorate, industrial workers went on strike over their lack of increase 
in wages that was promised.905 Similar events took place at Alijan Jute Mills in Narsingdi, Bawa 
Jute Mills in Narayanganj, Delta Jute Mills in Noakhali, Victory Jute Products Ltd in Chittagong 
and Platinum Jubilee Jute Mills in Khulna, Quami Jute Mills in Pabna. 906 In many of these mills, 
workers took their strikes a step further by organizing a “gherao” in which they took “complete 
control” of the industrial site.907 It was clear the workers “no longer relied upon the legal 
procedures which had been laid down by the Government to solve industrial disputes.” Instead, 
industrial workers at jute mills and other sites directly confronted employers, sometimes 
engaging in “violence.”908 
 At this point, the state had limited response to workers’ issues, nor did any ruling elites 
take action to tackle rising militancy among labour in any notable away. In this sense, it seemed 
the state-labour relationship was in serious decline within the scope of the moral economy of 
development policy. Workers increasingly saw the state as a weak authority that did not try to 
stop them as they took over factories with “force,”909 thus contributing to legitimacy strain of the 
state. 
This was further reinforced by a “wave of strikes” led by labour leaders (Bashir Ahmed 
Bakhtiar, M. A. Khatib, Usman Baloch and Mubarak Haider) in Karachi, Lahore and other 
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cities910 for a “Demands Week.”911 At this point, the ruling regime did attempt to “negotiate” 
with labour leaders but the momentum of unrest was far too strong and workers’ demands were 
not being sufficiently addressed.912 It seemed the informal patron-client relationship between 
state and labour was irreparable at this point, as the state experienced much legitimacy strain. 
“Industrial strikes, the closing of all schools in the country, increasing social disorder and strife 
and the defection of key allies within the government led President Ayub Khan to search for a 
graceful way to exit the political scene.”913 His government had “collapsed like a house of 
cards”914 as “the people and the areas by-passed by economic growth grew progressively 
resentful,915 but the military regime continued under General Yahya for a short while longer. 
 
Undoubtedly, in the 1962-1969 period, increasing moral economy violations over expected 
wages challenged the legitimacy of the state-labour expectation relationship and the state itself. 
When industrial workers perceived that expected wages were not delivered, they would voice 
their concerns through certain state mechanisms. But, when it seemed such mechanisms were not 
delivering, they would often stop production through anti-state unrest, thus creating one form of 
legitimacy strain for the Pakistani state. The ruling regime would then intervene directly through 
specific speeches and at times offer relevant policies to limit any further strain such that 
production would resume as quickly as possible. In fact, specific state policies for labour led to a 
temporary decline in industrial unrest over wages in 1965 and 1968. 
This pattern of events, however, ended in 1969. Despite a new labour policy in 1969 and 
various legislations introduced in 1968, incidences of industrial unrest doubled in one year 
reaching the highest level of this period. At this point, labour created the most significant strain 
for the state, who had no response that would appease frustrated industrial workers. The 
legitimacy of the state-labour relationship within the moral economy and the state itself appeared 
to be in significant decline. 
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While industrial workers created legitimacy strain for the state through their unrest, 
challenges to state legitimacy also came from other groups in 1962-1969, as illustrated in 
Chapter Two in this thesis. Certain Islamist groups and ethnic groups posed a considerable threat 
to state legitimacy in terms of their disagreement with certain state policies. After the 1965 war, 
such legitimacy strains were further reinforced as the United States’ financial support wavered. 
All these groups contributed to legitimacy strain in 1958-1969 that later led to a full-blown 
legitimacy crisis in 1970-1971. 
 
 
MORAL ECONOMY VIOLATIONS AND  
LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF THE STATE: 1970-1971  
 
 Industrial workers continued to challenge the legitimacy of the state-labour relationship 
over wages in 1970-1971. The state’s attempts to reinstate the terms of the moral economy and 
regain development “policy legitimacy” through the 1969 labour policy clearly had limited 
impact on organized workers at this point. There were over 445 incidents of industrial unrest in 
this short period. The 1970 marker was the highest level of industrial unrest of the 1958-1971 
period. In fact, “about 40% of the workers employed in factories including 20 or more workers 
were involved in strikes.”916 
Significant numbers of workers felt “those in power [were not] acting in the best interests 
of the governed”917 in that they could not provide the expected wages, hence the rapid rise in 
anti-state protests”918 in 1970-1971. 
 
Year919 
 
Number of  
Unions 
Members Industrial Unrest 
Over  
Wages 
Production 
Days Lost 
1970 4952  525,062 307 1,220,377 
1971 5345 570,202  141 1,747,959 
 
What is also apparent is that, just like at the end of the previous civilian-led era, there was 
another type unrest in 1970-1971 that was not documented in the state literature920 but is obvious 
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in certain media archives. There was a noticeable shift in the focus of these bouts of unrest – 
labour protests and strikes no longer only focused on wages, but at this point considered the 
state’s failure to deliver prices as well. General price increases in consumer goods may not have 
been dramatic in 1970-1971, but at this point even minor fluctuations were perceived by labour 
as major moral economy violations. Since the military elites of this tumultuous era still did not 
have “an easy command of power”, never having truly recovered their prestige after the loss in 
the 1965 war, and the Basic Democracies system was not firmly entrenched even a decade later, 
industrial workers continued to evaluate the state “within a very narrow range of acceptability, 
requiring only a minor [issue] to spark a crisis.”921 
As indicated in the table and graph below, in both East and West Pakistan, the consumer 
price index922 for industrial workers steadily increased during this military-led era, but reached 
its highest points in 1970-1971. In fact, in East and West Pakistan, the price index for industrial 
workers reached highs of 147.77 and 150.22 by 1970-1971, up from an index level of 135.55 and 
150.22 in 1969-1970, respectively.923 Just like in the end of the previous civilian-led era, this 
again coincided with sudden and numerous protests and strikes by industrial workers against the 
state, specifically over price-related issues involving basic commodities across the country. 
 
General Consumer Price Index Numbers  
for Industrial Workers 1958-1971924  
(Base: 1959-60 = 100) 
Year West Pakistan East Pakistan 
1959-60 100.00 100.00 
1960-61 101.82 100.66 
1961-62 104.56 105.60 
1962-63 103.19 107.21 
1963-64 106.45 109.12 
1964-65 112.92 113.83 
1965-66 123.44 116.70 
1966-67 130.99 126.96 
1967-68 120.55 120.88 
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1968-69 121.44 122.70 
1969-70 135.55 135.21 
1970-71 147.77 150.22 
 
 
 
Thus the military regime’s moral economy “ideology that [had initially guaranteed] a 
bright new future as the principal means for establishing legitimacy”925 – a future that was 
supposed to include prices for labour – evidently backfired for the state by 1970-1971. From the 
perspective of labour, the state committed more and more moral economy violations over prices 
during these final two years of the military regime. In effect, when labour’s expectation of prices 
was not being met and thus “promises [were] not realized,” the authority of Pakistan’s military 
leaders increasingly “eroded”926 in their eyes – this was on top of the broken promises that 
workers felt the state had already made concerning wages recurrently in 1962-1969 and had 
continued to make in 1970-1971. Industrial workers thus became a source of two separate 
legitimacy strains through their anti-state unrest over wages and prices, adding to the growing 
legitimacy crisis of the state and military regime in 1970-1971. 
 
 Two types of price-focused strikes against the state can be inferred from available data, just 
like in the previous civilian-led era. First, workers would strike against the state when it appeared 
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the state was not taking necessary action to reduce prices they promised they would maintain 
(e.g. bringing elite manipulators of the market to book). It was thus rooted in “workers’ sense of 
injustice, a feeling that they were being denied something to which they were entitled”927 as part 
of the moral economy of development policy. Second, industrial workers would strike against 
the state when they felt state-run institutions and policies were not effective at delivering 
expected prices. This could be termed “entitlement protests” rooted in “unmet promises” 
embedded in state institutions and policies – “anger over unmet expectations [was] the impetus 
to workers’ actions.”928 
After both types of price-focused labour unrest, the military regime would sometimes 
offer a public response to reduce unrest and so limit further legitimacy strain. However, these 
minor remarks appeared to have no real impact as protests and strikes against rising prices 
continued and at times even escalated, hindering industrial production. This was unlike in 1962-
1968 period when state responses to moral economy violations over wages usually appeased 
workers to stop their anti-state unrest and resume their role in production. But by 1970-1971, it 
seemed workers from various industries no longer saw the military regime as a viable authority 
that could respond to moral economy violations, as the state experienced increasing legitimacy 
strain and crisis. 
These findings thus support the hypothesis of this thesis: when there is a decline in 
subsistence conditions in terms of prices, labour stops production through unrest and thus 
creates legitimacy strain for the Pakistani state that can contribute to legitimacy crisis and 
regime breakdown. Along with other groups identified as causing legitimacy strain, industrial 
workers thus contributed to the legitimacy crisis that preceded the regime breakdown of this 
military-led era in 1971. 
 
ECONOMIC DECLINE 
With rising industrial unrest that was one factor that hindered production, there was 
undoubtedly a significant impact on Pakistan’s overall growth at the end of this military-led era. 
This created further legitimacy strain for the state that had partially defined itself in terms of 
increasing production and high growth since 1947 and especially since 1958. As the table and 
graph indicate, industrial production dropped by dramatically, from 13.9 in 1969-70 to -6.8 in 
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1970-1971, reducing the level of overall growth from 9.8 to 1.2 in one year. Of course, it should 
be noted this also had to with the effects of the 1971 war. 
 
Annual Industrial Production 
and Growth 1958-1971 
Year929 Production Growth 
1958-59 5.6 5.5 
1959-60 2.7 0.9 
1960-61 20.3 4.9 
1961-62 19.9 6.0 
1962-63 15.7 7.2 
1963-64 15.5 6.5 
1964-65 13.0 9.4 
1965-66 10.8 7.6 
1966-67 6.7 3.1 
1967-68 7.6 6.8 
1968-69 10.6 6.5 
1969-70 13.9 9.8 
1970-71 -6.8 1.2 
 
 
 
But production and growth also suffered because of the general decline in economic 
conditions that caused further strain for the military regime, quite a contrast from earlier years 
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when Pakistan was seen as a “model” for developing countries.930 There was a genuine “fear” 
about a “serious economic crisis” in the entire country that appeared to have no quick or easy 
solution.931 Even General Yahya admitted, at one of his first press conferences, that “the 
distribution of income had not equally favoured all groups in the country [which had] fuelled the 
agitation of almost all economic groups.”932 
The country’s growing food crisis was worsened by the water crisis,933 which hit crop 
production in Sind and Punjab provinces in West Pakistan. The suspension of foreign aid in 1971 
because of the civil war further exacerbated economic conditions, given Pakistan’s dependence 
on such funding.934 The overall conditions only served to “alienate the masses from the elite”, 
“exacerbate regional inequalities and reinforce tendencies towards secession” among East 
Pakistanis.935 
 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST OVER FIRST PRICE ISSUE: 1970-1971 
Amid this backdrop of declining economic conditions, industrial workers continued their 
anti-state unrest over wages.936 But they also engaged in unrest focused on prices during this 
turbulent two-year period in 1970-1971. In most cases, these strikes against the state were 
focused on the elite manipulation of the market (through hoarding, black-marketing) that had 
driven up prices and that the state had repeatedly promised it would curtail. Such industrial 
unrest was thus rooted in “workers’ sense of injustice, a feeling that they were being denied 
something to which they were entitled”937 and had been promised as part of the moral economy 
of development policy. This was similar to the pattern of events at the end the previous civilian-
led era in 1957-1958. 
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In 1970-1971, industrial workers took issue with the elite hoarding that had created an 
artificial food shortage and sudden price increases in all provinces in Pakistan. In East Pakistan, 
workers spoke out about the rise in sugar – from Rs 1.57 one day to Rs 2.50 the next – and flour 
– from Rs 65 to 75 in just 24 hours. There were also complaints of a “short supply of kerosene 
oil.”938 In March 1971, a group of labour leaders publicly warned against the “machination of a 
business section to play foul with foodgrains in East Pakistan” that was hitting workers, even 
leading to famine conditions in some parts of the province. 
Through a series of public speeches and protests, these labour leaders cautioned the 
military regime to not allow hoarders and black-marketers “to play with the life of the people” 
and criticized the inaction of the West Pakistan-focused government in taking steps to counter 
the “miseries of people” resulting from soaring prices of foodgrains.939 They urged the central 
government to take action against anyone engaged in hoarding, black-marketing or smuggling of 
food items. Labour leader Hamid Khan warned that, without central government support, there 
was a risk of more than 500,000 people dying, including workers, in the upcoming harvesting 
seasons – this was the “grim reality in East Pakistan.”940 This was also the case in some parts of 
West Pakistan, where essential commodities had gone up 20-30 percent, again largely due to the 
actions of black-marketers, profiteers and opportunists. Wheat had risen from Rs 18 to Rs 26, 
prompting some industry workers in Karachi and Lahore to hold protests, along with workers 
from non-industrial sectors.941 
Labour’s response to hoarding did generate some response from General Yahya and his 
military regime during this period of martial law. The approach was effectively for the ruling 
regime to “deal with anti-social traders and businessmen with an iron hand on the one hand and 
throwing fresh stocks of needed commodities into the market on the other.”942 
In Karachi, “profiteers and hoarders” were hit “hard” when ten squads raided certain city 
markets at night and arrested over thirty people – including two wealthy mill owners943 and ten 
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943 The two arrested mill owners were Mohammad Siddique, proprietor of Tabani Trading Company in Landhi 
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leading wholesale merchants and retailers.944 They were charged with “creating an artificial 
price-hike, hoarding of essential commodities and black-marketing” of sugar, flour and wheat. 
These raids were “part of hard-hitting measures undertaken by local administration against anti-
social traders, businessmen and industrialists who capitalized on the state of emergency declared 
due to threat of Indian aggression.”945 
The state also ordered provincial governments to release fresh stocks of “scarce” 
commodities like wheat and sugar for distribution through ration depots so mill-owners and other 
market manipulators could not hoard such goods. State-appointed food inspectors were also 
posted at mills and ration-depots to ensure that “fair amounts” of wheat and other goods were 
sold at the “fair” prices set by the military regime.946 
 Such “hard-hitting steps against hoarders and black-marketers” did lead to a “slight” and 
short-lived reduction in prices but “artificial scarcity of consumer goods and essential 
commodities” continued through out 1971.947 In November 1971, a month before the breakdown 
of this military regime, unrest by industrial workers (and other subordinate classes) continued to 
escalate over price levels of basic goods. The state’s attempts to control prices through provincial 
food departments’ ration shops and other measures could not combat “large-scale hoarding” that 
widely persisted.948  
 Increasing numbers of people, including industrial workers, led the charge against the 
state for the state’s failure to contain hoarding activities. Members of the Merchants Association 
in Hyderabad, which included some workers, expressed their concern about “sky-rocketing 
prices of commodities of daily use.” Through a series of protests and speeches, the labour-related 
association appealed to Governor of Sind Lt Gen Rahman Gul and Divisional Commissioner, 
Hyderabad, to take steps now to check upward trend in prices and “save poor people from being 
fleeced by profiteers and black-marketers who [were] … working against interests of nation.”949 
 Various consumer groups, which had some industrial workers as members, called for the 
state to “stop hoarding and profiteering” which had caused “panic buying”, further pushing up 
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prices.950 Nayab Naqvi, Chairman of the Mazdoor Rabia Council, and Nabia Ahmad, General 
Secretary of Pakistan’s Workers Federation, “deplored” the ongoing “trend of profiteering and 
hoarding” that they expected the military regime to stop. They added that poor consumers were 
“finding it hard to meet the growing expenses in view of hoarding, profiteering and black-
marketing.”951 
The United Hawkers Federation of Pakistan noted this “ugly trend” that the state had 
failed to stop. The workers linked to the Vegetable Hawker Welfare Association in Liaquatabad 
protested about the rapid rise in wheat, fro Rs 52 to Rs 72, a 25% increase in kerosene oil and 25 
paisa increase in a seer of sugar. Daud Patel, Chairman of Karachi Retail Grocers, and Rana 
Azhar Ali, President of the Chamber of Consumers, also appealed to the state to control hoarding 
before the situation spun “out of control.” Soon after, a leading labour figure, Abdul Rehman, 
also appealed to the state to stop hoarding “at this critical juncture”, before his fellow workers 
would have to strike. He said it was the state’s “patriotic duty” to stop such “anti-Islamic, anti-
social” behaviour, especially when the country was facing “external aggression.”952 
General Yahya’s measures to tackle hoarding and black-marketing thus did little to 
reduce prices significantly or appease workers or other groups at this late stage of the military 
regime’s tenure. The fact that unrest continued, despite state efforts to combat hoarding, was 
another indicator of labour’s “loss of confidence”953 in the state and its declining legitimacy in 
the state-labour expectation relationship; it reinforced how it saw the state was less viable as a 
legitimate partner in the moral economy. 
 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST OVER SECOND PRICE ISSUE: 1970-1971 
 Some industrial workers also held strikes against the state when they felt state-run 
institutions and policies did not follow through on lowering rising prices. Specific state 
mechanisms like national ordinances and food drives did not deliver the expected prices, 
contributing to further industrial unrest. This could be termed “entitlement protests” rooted in 
“unmet promises” embedded in state institutions and policies – “anger over unmet expectations 
[was] the impetus to workers’ actions.”954 Such labour unrest was in the backdrop of waves of 
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“disturbances and atrocities”955 by various other groups over political issues as civil war brewed 
in East Pakistan, as mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
One state mechanism which workers felt increasingly frustrated with were the “ration 
depots” which were supposed to help regulate prices. Workers from a number of textile mills 
insisted that these depots were “still” not supplying them with fairly priced flour which they 
needed for their basic subsistence. The state did attempt to take “stern official action” against 
ration shops and instructed certain mills they should not interfere in these depots. But this had 
little benefit to workers who found the flour from these state depots were of “poor quality”956 and 
thus not useable. 
In response to increasing appeals from workers about faulty state mechanisms to help 
with prices, officials often spoke out to Pakistanis to remind them that the “price hike came as a 
complete surprise” to the government but it was still committed to “a policy of promotion of 
social justice,”957 including helping lower income classes cope with price increases. The ruling 
regime also held a “top-level meeting” with local administration and provincial governments to 
determine the optimal way to reduce price levels.958 One idea was for the introduction of 200 
“fair price shops” to deal with a “much larger variety of goods in general demands” like tea and 
vegetable ghee and so stabilise prices. 
But the most concrete policy to tackle price levels was in the form of the Essential 
Commodities Control Order 1971. This was the state’s way to overtly “fix” maximum prices of 
essential commodities and “impose restrictions on possession” as well as the “movement of 
commodities.”959  It also empowered the provincial or central government to call for the 
“declaration of stocks of essential commodities and to direct their supply to specified user in line 
with what was required.”960 The military regime also repeatedly called on farmers to “grow more 
food” as way to “lend their support to the war efforts on the home front.” State officials like 
Governor of Punjab Lt General M. Attiqur Rahman reiterated how Pakistan was an “agricultural 
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economy” and so “Farmers were custodians of the economy” who needed to fulfil their “national 
responsibility.”961 
 But there was limited time to see the effects of such state measures, if any, on workers’ 
subsistence conditions. Only days later, “law and order had broken down completely” due to the 
activities of Bengali secessionists in East Pakistan. Apart from widespread incidents of arson and 
loot, such ethnic violence had taken a critical turn with attacks on non-conformists at Chittagong 
and Khulna, resulting in hundreds of casualties.”962 Alongside the freedom agenda led by the 
Awami League party, there were cases of “looting, arson and other acts of vandalism” spreading 
in Dacca and Narayanganj.963  
This pattern of violence continued for days and involved significant numbers of East 
Pakistani industrial workers. “On the streets, mobs roamed with guns, iron rods and staves in 
their hands, raising anti-Pakistan slogans” that had failed to give them what they felt they were 
entitled, including basic subsistence. Several businesses and a jute mill at Ghawasi were set on 
fire.964 The state found itself “incapable of coping with the large-scale disturbances which 
gripped the city, and at their request, troops which has so far remained in the barracks, were 
called out and curfew was imposed during the night.”965 
This cycle of violence, with businesses being burned down, indiscriminate firing, acid 
bottles being thrown, and anti-state slogans being shouted continued for weeks in East Pakistan. 
It was at this point that labour’s role became more prominent in reacting to what they felt was the 
failed role of the state to deliver not only political right but also mere basic subsistence.966 
Various labour-led groups “began circulating handwritten and cyclostyled posters in various 
parts of the province, inciting people to violence.” One poster read: “Please keep in mind that the 
national liberation of East Bengal is only possible through armed struggle which will be of long 
duration. Hence, without a guerrilla war tactics, we shall not be able to resist the enemy. Be 
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ready to protect the freed areas at any price. The long struggle of liberation of East Bengal is not 
at its end. It is just the beginning. To weaken us, the enemy may impose economic blockage. The 
victory of East Bengal is inevitable. We have torn off the shackles of Pakistani colonialism. 
Independent East Bengal − Zindabad.” 967  
Various industrial centres were also being burned down. At the jute mill owned by the 
“influential” Ispahani family, there were reports of “mass graves of 152 non-Bengali women and 
children reportedly executed … by secessionist rebels in the mills’ recreation club.”968 
At this point, the efforts by the state could do little to stop rising prices or the related 
unrest that included labour’s participation. Industrial unrest was also visible in West Pakistan. A 
day before it was reported that General Yahya was quitting his post on December 19, 1971, 
thousands of labourers, along with intellectuals, businessmen, lawyers, women and children, 
protested in Lahore and Rawalpindi about the policies of the regime, including criticizing the 
state over escalating prices.969 The day of General Yahya’s resignation, various groups, including 
members of labour, called for a “complete strike in cities to protest against the “wrong policies” 
of the military regime.970 
 
It seems that in the 1970-1971 period increasing moral economy violations challenged the 
legitimacy of the state-labour expectation relationship and the state itself. When industrial 
workers perceived that expected prices were not delivered, they would voice their concerns both 
through anti-state protests and strikes that at times became violent. This was the case in East 
Pakistan in particular, as compared with the industrial unrest that occurred earlier in this 
military-led era. The fact that the state’s efforts to tackle prices had limited impact on industrial 
unrest even before the war reinforced the legitimacy strain it was experiencing at this point. The 
terms of the moral economy of development policy no longer seemed viable for labour or the 
state in this military regime. This also extended to the anti-state unrest over wages in these years.  
While industrial workers created legitimacy strain for the state through their unrest over 
wages and prices, challenges to state legitimacy also came from certain elite groups and political 
factors in 1970-1971, as illustrated in Chapter Two of this thesis. Politically-rooted ethnic unrest 
in East Pakistan, as well as the Islamist conflict this represented, clearly posed a serious threat to 
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state legitimacy that contributed to regime breakdown. Squabbling at the elite level in West 
Pakistani politics and declining support from the United States also challenged state legitimacy. 
The loss in the 1971 secessionist war was of course also a precursor for regime breakdown. 
These groups, including industrial labour, thus contributed to legitimacy strain in meaningful 
ways, culminating in the military regime’s legitimacy crisis and regime breakdown by the end of 
1970-1971. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
RECAP OF PHD THESIS 
 
This PhD research has made a significant contribution to the literature on Pakistan, regime 
breakdown and moral economy within the disciplines of history, political science and sociology. 
It has highlighted a notable gap in this particular body of literature in terms of the role that 
industrial labour in fact plays in challenging state legitimacy and contributing to Pakistan’s 
recurring regime breakdown. By using a specific moral economy centred around industrial 
development policy and underlining the political rhetoric embedded in it, this thesis has 
illuminated Pakistan’s politics and industrial labour in fresh way. Ultimately, labour’s unmet 
expectations from the state’s development policy have explained one type of legitimacy strain 
and crisis of the Pakistani state that contributed to recurring regime breakdown. 
First, there is no question that this PhD study has unearthed the significance of industrial 
labour vis-à-vis notions of state legitimacy in Pakistan. The existing literature on Pakistani 
history and politics suggests that only elite or elite-linked groups challenged state legitimacy and 
contributed to regime breakdown. Preceding authors have typically focused on the role of certain 
military, bureaucratic and civilian elites or Islamist and ethnic groups in orchestrating key 
changes in political stability and state policy. Yet through an examination of government, 
institutional and media archives, it is clear that Pakistan’s industrial labour acted independent of 
outside influence to challenge state legitimacy in 1947-1971. These workers were relevant actors 
in the political process – through their unrest, they managed to impact state policy on labour-
specific issues, even if only in a small way. This is contrary to the existing literature that 
generally portrays the labour class as a mere tool of certain political parties and elites who 
manipulate workers into unrest when strategic interests arise. 
Furthermore, it is clear that industrial labour challenged state legitimacy in both civilian 
and military-led eras of Pakistan. This is contrary to the existing literature that generally appears 
to emphasize labour protests and strikes during military-led eras, rather than civilian-led eras. 
Also, this thesis highlights how industrial labour created legitimacy strain via their unrest against 
the state through out a regime’s tenure. This is divergent from the existing literature that suggests 
workers only felt compelled to protest against the state at the end of a regime’s tenure when an 
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elite-driven legitimacy crisis was already in full swing. But in fact, this thesis has pinpointed 
how industrial workers are a significant player in creating legitimacy strain at various points in a 
regime’s tenure in Pakistan. Industrial labour was also another factor that created legitimacy 
crisis of the Pakistani state preceding regime breakdown, which is not investigated sufficiently 
by other authors. 
Second, this thesis also reinforced that an elite-centric lens is not sufficient for a complete 
picture of regime breakdown in Pakistan. It is clear that elite-driven groups such as certain 
military, political and bureaucratic elites have of course played a key role in regime breakdown 
in Pakistan. But it is also apparent that other groups such as industrial labour have had a notable 
impact on regime breakdown that can simply not be ignored. In this sense, I have challenged 
certain basic ideas about the process of regime breakdown as illustrated in political science 
literature.  
For instance, this PhD thesis has countered the thinking of Bermeo about the “ordinary” 
person’s role in regime breakdown. She herself is challenging what she suggests is an 
increasingly common view – that people will bring down their governments through protest, 
especially when there is significant political and economic crisis in a country. Her findings in 
several modern democracies disprove this theory, instead emphasizing the role of political elites 
But again, this thesis shows without doubt that there is a notable role for industrial labour to 
challenge state legitimacy which contributes to regime breakdown. This is alongside elite-driven 
factors that hinder regime stability in Pakistan. 
This PhD thesis also fills the gap pointed out by Przeworski, Alvarez, Limongi and 
Cheibub about their failure to observe “something like [popular] pressures toward transition” 
related to “economic dynamics.” Their study suggests that only “manifestations of political 
mobilization: strikes, anti-government demonstrations, or riots” are visible.971 But this thesis 
reveals that in Pakistan there have been notable anti-state protests and strikes that are in fact 
rooted in “economic dynamics”972 – even if such anti-state unrest was often based on perceived 
rather than actual economic factors. Perhaps this research is most compatible with Bellin’s ideas 
on labour’s support for government being dependent on what workers receive in return. She 
alludes to a patron-client relationship between the state and labour which is further outlined in 
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this thesis. Like Bellin, this research emphasized how labour’s support for the state is 
“contingent”973 on state patronage but I connect it more explicitly to regime breakdown. 
Third, this PhD thesis framed such labour-focused bottom-up mobilization in the context of 
a very particular moral economy that others haven not sufficiently addressed. The earlier moral 
economy theorists like Scott and Thompson typically suggest that the moral economy can only 
be centred around a specific market mechanism. Peasant protests, whether in Vietnam or the 
English countryside, were focused on preventing “market manipulation” of commodity prices 
and “securing a subsistence” at affordable prices. 974  When it appeared that prices were 
suspiciously high and officials were not taking action to stop this, anti-state protests would 
follow. These theorists thus allude to a patron-client relationship with the state within this 
market-focused moral economy. 
In this PhD thesis, however, there is a different moral economy, one that in fact is centred 
around the state’s industrial development policy. A similar patron-client relationship with the 
state is brought to the forefront of the analysis that preceding theorists do not sufficiently 
address. Underlying this interpretation of the moral economy is labour’s explicit sense of 
expectation of the state that is not appropriately explored in the theoretical literature. When the 
state’s development policy and related political rhetoric did not deliver what was expected – i.e. 
labour’s subsistence conditions, then anti-state unrest would ensue. 
Contemporary theorists like Posusney do mention such moral economy violations rooted in 
unmet expectations – she even talks about how this relates to development policy with the case 
of Egypt. But the explicit state-labour expectation relationship is not adequately fleshed out to 
relate to political changes. Posusney does suggest that recurring moral economy violations and 
subsequent labour unrest were a “constraint”975 that made it harder for ruling elites to govern. 
She thus alludes to the effect of labour’s expectation relationship on state legitimacy but does not 
follow through in any notable way. This PhD thesis fills this gap, walking the reader through the 
moral economy of development policy that in fact pits labour against the state and specifically 
illustrates labour’s role in attacking state legitimacy that eventually leads to regime breakdown. 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF STATE-LABOUR RELATIONS IN 1971-2007 
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While this thesis convincingly reveals that industrial labour impacted state legitimacy 
during civilian and military-led eras in Pakistan in 1947-1971 through a moral economy lens, 
what about subsequent regimes in 1971-2007? A cursory look at government and media archives 
hints that a similar trend in state-labour relations continued; it is also important to note that 
industrial unrest was much more frequent in the 1960s and 1970s, compared to the 1980s, 1990s 
or 2000s.976 
First, one can witness some cases of labour unrest over wages – this was of course after a 
short period of stability when a new regime emphatically promises through public rhetoric that 
the subsistence needs of labour would be delivered and maintained. Effectively, such recurring 
anti-state unrest was attacking the validity of such rhetoric and related state legitimacy. Second, 
one can note the rapid rise in labour unrest rooted in prices towards the end of a regime’s tenure.  
This was true of Bhutto’s civilian government in 1971-1977. His regime was initially 
“regarded by most workers as a victory in their struggle”977 against moral economy violations of 
the previous military-led era of General Ayub and the civilian-led era after partition. Under 
Bhutto, the state promised stable subsistence conditions epitomized by the widely publicized 
slogan of “roti, kapra, aur makaan” (bread, cloth and shelter). Workers, particularly from 
industry, came to expect such subsistence given the state’s rhetoric and Bhutto’s 1972 labour 
policy. The 1973 Employee Cost of Living (Relief) Ordinance specifically required employees, 
including industrialists, to “award cost-of-living adjustments at a rate fixed by” the state.978 But a 
similar pattern of events occurred during this civilian-led era when labour’s expectations of the 
state were simply not met. 
First, industrial workers reignited their protests and strikes over wages to challenge state 
legitimacy, despite “the entire force of the state machinery, the police as well as the militia” that 
appeared to be vying against them.979 The state continued its strategy, as in past regimes, to 
manipulate trade union leaders through patronage to limit unrest.980 But with increased firings at 
certain factories and industrial outlets as well as increasingly independent trade unions shunning 
the state’s ethos, unrest ensued over wages. Second, towards the end of this regime when 
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Bhutto’s nationalization policies only appeared to worsen economic conditions, there were 
increasing anti-state protests against rising prices; the regime’s steps981 to counter price inflation 
seemed ineffective at this point during the state’s apparent legitimacy crisis. 
The military-led era of General Zia in 1977-1988 followed a similar pattern in terms of its 
state-labour relations. Zia promised his regime would improve on what he felt were his 
predecessor’s failures and growth at all costs was once again the state’s priority policy to achieve 
legitimacy. In 1978, he appointed a Labour Commission to formulate a new policy that would 
improve industrial relations. The 1979 report noted the “fundamental problem of Pakistani 
industrial development.” 982  It also detailed specifically how labour’s conditions could be 
improved. While the report itself was not publicly available, public officials echoed the rhetoric 
of a new and improved labour policy, yet no recommendations were actually implemented. This 
contributed to labour unrest over unmet expectations of the state. 
First, there were cases of significant unrest (especially at textile mills983) over wages, 
despite General Zia having “outlawed strikes and demonstrations under martial law.”984 The 
“connivance of the police and political appointees” only served to increase tensions between the 
state and labour that only added to the state’s legitimacy strain.985 Second, there were increasing 
cases of anti-state unrest focused on price levels in the final years of General Zia’s tenure. In 
fact, two weeks before the general’s death in a mysterious airplane crash, significant numbers of 
workers had protested about the price increase of certain consumer goods.986 Such anti-state 
unrest reflected a legitimacy crisis of the state – though the state had tried several measures (e.g. 
state price lists and rationing schemes) to stop the price hike, it appeared to mean nothing to 
labour given their sense of a moral economy violation being committed by an increasingly 
illegitimate state.987 
The turbulent civilian-led era of Benazir and Sharif once again promised huge 
improvements for labour. Benazir in particular promised that the country’s labour laws would be 
“amended” in accordance with ILO conventions. Soon after, it was expected that a new labour 
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policy would be announced which would “enhance workers’ benefits”988, but her government 
was dismissed in 1990 before anything could be done. The same was true of the Sharif 
governments and Benazir’s second government during this period – the state made promises, 
created labour expectation of specific subsistence provision for their role in development policy, 
but failed to deliver sufficient results. 
The 1992 Pakistan Tripartite Labour Standing Committee – the first meeting since 1988 – 
was seen as a significant positive step during this civilian-led era; the state-sponsored committee 
even agreed to create the Tripartite Wage Council that would ensure fair wages to labour.989 But 
ultimately these measures led nowhere and industrial workers once again challenged the 
legitimacy of their expectation relationship with the state. For instance, in 1995, workers and 
supporters of the Shafi Tanneries Labour Union staged a protest over unfair firings by 
management; they carried banners and placards, chanting anti-state slogans.990 State intervention 
typically ended such unrest over wages. But by the end of this politically unstable era, anti-state 
unrest over prices could not be thwarted, despite the state’s measures to reduce inflation. This 
legitimacy crisis made it straightforward for General Musharraf to stage his coup and introduce 
another decade of military-led rule. 
General Musharraf’s tenure was also not very different from that of his predecessors in 
terms of the state-labour relationship within this specific moral economy lens. The initial years 
of this regime spent considerable time on public rhetoric in favour of labour, while it pushed for 
high growth at all costs. It also “significantly amended”991 the Industrial Relations Ordinance to 
ensure fair conditions, including wages, for industrial workers, and pushed for working 
conditions that were of course in line with international norms. Minister of Labour Omar Asghar 
Khan had “approved a new set of policies” before his death, but these were considered “broad” 
and “vague.” In fact, these policies were largely “unimplemented” and ultimately the same 
pattern of events resurfaced. 992 
Given the significant political rhetoric of the Ministry of Labour and other state officials, 
industrial workers likely felt their expectation of the state had yet again not been met. Part of this 
had to do with the effect of privatisation on labour which unexpectedly altered the terms of their 
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relationship with the state; in certain cases it led to bouts of protest activity (e.g. Pakistan 
Telecommunication Company Ltd, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation) 993 , though state 
intervention usually resolved such industrial disputes relatively quickly. But the subsequent anti-
state unrest over prices994 995 only added to the legitimacy strain of the Musharraf regime towards 
the end of its tenure – when the lawyer’s movement was already in full swing. Technically, 
moral economy violations did not contribute to the breakdown and a full-blown legitimacy crisis 
of this military-led regime – the reality is the regime did complete its term and at least appears to 
have led to a legitimate democratic transition to the democratically elected rule of President 
Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani that continues today. 
 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
What can one infer from this historical research on the moral economy of development 
policy in Pakistan? First, there are certain basic policy implications that can be deduced about 
development policy in a weak state with severely limited resources. Perhaps a slight change in 
the expectation embedded in development policy could reduce challenges to state legitimacy by 
vulnerable groups like industrial labour. Second, it may be worthwhile to explore the role of 
other groups – i.e. agricultural labour – who have impacted state legitimacy in Pakistan but have 
not been documented sufficiently in the existing literature. Third, there may be value in 
exploring the patron-client dynamic of foreign donors like the US or IMF and Pakistan as a client 
state. The moral economy of foreign aid may enhance our understanding of the donor-state 
patron-client state and perhaps even improve the foreign aid apparatus. 
First, in rather simplistic terms, this PhD research has reinforced the idea that political 
rhetoric can significantly impact state legitimacy. In Pakistan, policymakers clearly placed 
considerable importance on a moral economy to safeguard the participation of certain groups in 
implementing development policy. This moral economy focused on a political rhetoric of 
sacrifice, nationalism and anti-India sentiment to motivate even the most vulnerable groups like 
industrial labour to play their role in development policy and thus gave the state a sense of policy 
legitimacy996; increasing growth through industrial development was also the quickest way for 
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the state to achieve economic legitimacy. But at the same time, the state created the expectation 
of certain subsistence provision to labour that it never managed to deliver. When labour did not 
receive expected wages and prices, they engaged in anti-state unrest that impacted state 
legitimacy. 
It is thus clear that unrealistic expectation embedded by the state in development policy 
paradoxically contributed to its own legitimacy strain and crisis in Pakistan. Top down rhetoric 
of state officials on subsistence conditions for labour never seemed to translate into concrete 
patronage for workers, given the other clients that were deemed more important to the state with 
its limited resources. In this specific sense, a change in how state officials present development 
policy to labour could help. 
The state’s recurring strategy of linking development with anti-India sentiment or a larger 
sense of nationalism isn’t sustainable when certain groups – in this case, industrial workers – 
perceive that their subsistence conditions are consistently not being delivered. Perhaps reducing 
the expectation of a steady stream of subsistence patronage through a slight adjustment in policy 
rhetoric might help the state manage its relations with labour; it could reduce the bouts of anti-
state unrest that repeatedly challenge state legitimacy, even if only in a minimal way. 
Second, it would be worthwhile to explore challenges to state legitimacy by other groups to 
fill the notable gap in what is largely elite-driven literature on Pakistani politics. During my 
initial research, I did discover in the media archives how significant unrest was taking place not 
only among industrial labour, but also among peasants and Haris997 during different points in 
1947-1971. These agricultural labourers were specifically speaking out against the limitations of 
state policies on land reform and refugee rehabilitation – something that other authors have not 
emphasized sufficiently. While these workers were less organized in their protest than their 
industrial counterparts, the state’s emphasis on agriculture (especially in terms of “urgently” 
increasing the food supply998) meant it could not completely disregard the needs of landless 
farmers. One could possibly formulate a moral economy centred on the agricultural sector, 
honing in on the expectation relationship between the state and peasant farmers. This could 
complement existing explanations for legitimacy strain and possibly even legitimacy crisis and 
regime breakdown in Pakistan. 
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At the very least, a cursory look at the archives definitively reveals anti-state unrest by 
agricultural labourers that is linked to unmet expectations of certain state policies; such anti-state 
unrest to a certain extent contributed to legitimacy strain of    the ruling regime. In the early years 
of the 1947-1958 era, for instance, ruling political elites emphasized the importance of 
harmonious relations between landlords and Haris, partly to avoid any impediments to 
agricultural production, while industrialization was in its early stages. State officials publicly 
stressed norms of equality and justice alongside concrete legislation – this could be framed in 
terms of a “moral economy” centred on the agricultural sector. Often, when the Haris felt let 
down by these norms and laws, they challenged the legitimacy of their relationship with the 
ruling regime through their anti-state unrest. 
This was certainly the case in Pakistan’s Sind province where state officials regularly 
talked about taking “necessary reforms” so there would be “social justice between landlords and 
the tenants in accordance with Islamic Principles”999 and hence uninterrupted agricultural 
production. Home Minister Kazi Fazlullah repeatedly called for the need for “brotherly relations 
between Haris and Zamindars” to maintain agricultural production that was driving the economy 
and also combatting the economic “threat” next door.1000 State officials regularly publicized 
specific policies and legislation like the Sind Tenancy Act that they claimed would give Haris –
 who made up about 80% of Sindh’s population – basic rights and provisions. In this sense, to 
achieve policy legitimacy1001 within the agricultural sector, state officials appealed to the 
individual’s sense of patriotism and social justice, while also giving specific information as to 
how this policy could be achieved; it served to create a sense of shared norms about state-labour 
relations within the agricultural realm. 
But this strategy increasingly faltered as early as 1952 – peasant farmers began challenging 
the ruling regime specifically because of its failure to keep up with expected state provision in 
terms of landlord-peasant relations. One approach was for the political representatives of the 
Hari population to hold one-on-one meetings with public officials, like Sind Governor Din 
Mohammad1002, demanding the state provision they had repeatedly been promised. The President 
of Sind Hari Committee Abdul Kader M. Khan explained to the governor on one such occasion: 
“Today in every village in Sind, the zamindars and jagirdars are terrorising, harassing the Haris. 
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Corrupt officials and police are supporting the zamindars. In these conditions, the Sind Hari 
Committee is organising the 30 lakh Haris of Sind [to fight for] their just rights. The result is that 
the Hari Committee is the target of the landlords.”1003 1004 He emphatically questioned the Sind 
Governor about what he would do to fix this “unjust” situation.1005 
Another approach was for peasants, tenants and refugees to appeal to certain government 
officials at state-sponsored labour conferences, even proposing their own policy solutions for the 
state to pursue. At one such conference, G. M. Leghari, an executive member of the Sind Hari 
Committee, appealed to the state to be more vigilant about how poorly Haris were being 
treated.1006 He offered government representatives a solution in which land plots could be given 
to the Haris – for instance in the areas irrigated by G. M. Barrage. But he noted that so far, these 
were usually given to the “relatives of high-ups and the most influential people in the Central and 
Provincial Ministries”1007 of the ruling regime. At this point, Sind Minister Pir Ali Mohammad 
Rashdi openly said that the plight of Haris was “unenviable” and criticism of the state’s approach 
to this issue was “substantially true.”1008 
But these efforts to communicate with the state about workers’ unmet expectations often 
failed to generate much response beyond the state’s admission of mistakes made and a obligatory 
promise to do better. A more effective approach was for Haris to engage in protests and hunger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1003 Pakistan Times, September 27, 1952 – At this conference, the General Secretary of the Committee, Ghulam 
Mohammad Leghari, also spoke up about how certain zamindars were still evicting Haris from their lands and were 
using any means necessary to deprive cultivators of their share of produce, despite the particulars of the Sind 
Tenancy Act of 1950 
1004 Significant reports of illegal ejectment of tenants and peasants from feudal land also surfaced in February 1953. 
Hari leaders of Sind alleged that they were being thrown off their land without any legitimate reason. As a Dawn 
editorial noted, “The Sind Tenancy Act of 1950 enacted by an Assembly of feudal zamindars had placed in the 
hands of landlords unlimited powers to eject their tenants with complete impunity.” (Dawn, February 23, 1953) In 
anticipation of changes to the Act that would limit their ability to freely throw tenants off their land, landowners 
reportedly began a fierce campaign to eject tenants and peasants from their land. Even after the amendment was 
passed, the arbitrary terrorising of tenants continued. 
1005 Pakistan Times, September 27, 1952 – At this conference, General Secretary of the Committee Ghulam 
Mohammad Leghari also spoke up about how certain zamindars were still evicting Haris from their lands and were 
using any means necessary to deprive cultivators of their share of produce, despite the particulars of the Sind 
Tenancy Act of 1950. 
1006 Dawn, February 19, 1956 – Leghari revealed to government representatives at this time: “big landlords and their 
hirelings in small towns and villages have made it practically impossible for Hari workers to move about and 
function. Local police and revenue officials in spite of the full knowledge of these facts keep their eyes closed. 
Instead, Haris are harassed, victimized and thrown behind bars on flimsy grounds. Hari workers are publicly insulted 
by the hirelings of the landlords and jailed by the authorities. … Hari workers are pressed by officials not to work in 
Hari Committees. They are intimidated and warned of the dire consequences if they dare to flout the orders of the 
authorities.” 
1007 Pakistan Times, February 19, 1956 
1008 Dawn, June 1, 1955 
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strikes about the failures of the Sind Tenancy Act and other land-related policies. In 1956, the 
first reported hunger strike against ejectment by landlords took place. Seven members of the 
family of Ghulam Mustafa staged a hunger strike for several days before the state provided them 
with new housing in Anarkali. That same month, more than 200 tenants protested in Peshawar 
for being forced off their land by feudal elites. They shouted anti-landlord and anti-state slogans, 
while carrying black flags for several days. 
The most serious protesting, however, took place in July 1956 in Lahore. More than 1,000 
ejected tenants marched through the city, criticising the state and particularly the ministry 
responsible for implementing land reforms. More than two dozen tenants also staged a hunger 
strike. Eighty-nine year old Baba Hasan Din, who staged a hunger strike for more than 72 hours, 
was exhausted but said with a faint smile: “I will not give up my fast till authorities agreed to our 
reasonable demands.”1009 A few days later, another 7,000 ejected tenants reached Lahore, from 
Gujranwala, Montgomery and Lyallpur. After ten days of tenant-led strikes in Lahore, a three-
man committee of tenants met with West Pakistan Chief Minister Dr Khan Sahib, who agreed to 
“properly consider” their demands. 1010  For the moment, this appeased these agricultural 
labourers who stopped protesting, perhaps suggesting the state had regained some legitimacy. 
A preliminary look at the evidence would suggest that this pattern of events was also true 
during the military-led era of General Ayub and General Yahya. Particularly during the early 
years of the 1958-1971 period, state officials spoke out to landowners to treat their workers 
better and promised tenants and peasants that their situation would improve.1011 For instance, in 
Nasirabad sub-division in Sibi district, the Commissioner of Quetta Mohammad Husain Sufi 
offered landowners a “stern warning against” ejecting tillers of the soil or face trial in a military 
courts for contravening Martial Law Regulations.1012 
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1011 Dawn, February 19, 1959 – Peasants, tenants and refugees, who had previously been mistreated by their feudal 
lords, received a lot of attention from the military regime. Governor of West Pakistan and Chairman of the Land 
Commission Akhtar Husain insisted that refugee allotted would be treated on par with any other landlords. More 
than one lakh tenants were to become peasant proprietors. In Lahore, for example, one thousand tillers of the soil 
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During a visit to villages near Lahore in February 1959, many peasants reportedly “cheered for their hero” General 
Ayub who they said had given them life through land. As one peasant put it, “he gave in four months time what we 
have been craving for 11 years without success.” 
1012 Dawn, February 20, 1959 
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The 1959 land reforms 1013  were a direct response to the increasing unrest among 
agricultural labourers in 1947-1958. The reforms were based on recommendations from the Land 
Reform Commission to “put every inch of land to best use”1014; violators of this scheme were to 
receive seven years “rigorous imprisonment.”1015 It was seen as a historic moment for Pakistan in 
that feudalism had reportedly ended and “conflicting interests [were] justly compromised.”1016 
1017 
But once again, the ruling regime had introduced very specific expectations of state 
provision which were often not met, leading to significant challenges to the state, sometimes in 
the form of violence1018, in the middle and later years of the 1958-1971 period. In future 
research, it would thus be worthwhile to look in more detail into how changes in agricultural 
unrest related to political rhetoric and policies through out Pakistan’s history, which may have 
impacted state legitimacy. This could lead to another “moral economy” but which is centred 
around agricultural policy.1019 
Third, in future research, it may be valuable to consider the moral economy patron-client 
lens for the donor-state relationship, particularly given the aid-dependent nature of Pakistan’s 
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be given full ownership. More than 6,000 landlords were reportedly affected, even ruling ministers like Minister for 
Social Welfare and Health Lt Gen W. A. Burki and Commerce Minister Zulfikar Bhutto who were reportedly “some 
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1018 As in the 1947-1958 era, in 1958-1971 significant numbers of tenants formed political bodies to more effectively 
challenge the state. For instance, in 1965, a delegation of Anjuman Tahaffuz-i-Haqooq-i-Zamindaran-o-Kashtkaran 
from Peshawar met a number of Provincial Ministers and members of Parliament to present them with a memo 
detailing their difficulties as tenants. This delegation, led by Khan Ghulam Mohamad Khan Lundkhour, had been 
asked by the provincial governor to call on the province’s revenue minister, Khan Habibullah, who would look into 
their grievance. 
1019 It might also be worthwhile to view the expectation relationship between other non-Punjabi provinces like 
Baluchistan and the state over time. Vernon Hewitt has explored this in terms of identity in his piece, Ethnic 
Construction, Provincial Identity, and Nationalism in Pakistan:  The Case of Baluchistan” (pg 42-67) in Subnational 
Movements in South Asia (Subrata K. Mitra and R. Alison Lewis, eds., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, United 
States, 1966). 
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economy. In no uncertain terms, Pakistan has been a client state to patron donors like the US for 
decades. The US has had certain security interests in Pakistan since the Cold War with the Soviet 
War in Afghanistan and more recently with the War on Terror. Pakistan provided its American 
patron with assistance in fighting its enemies in the region; in return Pakistan, as the client state, 
received huge aid packages, particularly during the General Zia and General Musharraf regimes. 
In effect, this resembled a moral economy of foreign aid, with the patron-client expectation 
relationship firmly rooted in US-Pakistan relations. 
However, this expectation relationship lost legitimacy when the US no longer had strategic 
interests in the region, for instance during the Benazir and Sharif-led civilian eras of the 1990s. 
The Pakistani state expected aid to continue to keep its economy afloat but when its American 
ally reduced or stopped its aid assistance, anti-US sentiment surged. The US-Pakistan 
relationship lost legitimacy. 
Today’s scenario is slightly more complicated. It is clear the US still has strategic interests 
in Pakistan, given the obvious terrorist networks which exist and the situation in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan clearly needs financial assistance: its GDP growth is a meagre 2.4% for 2010-2011, 
partly due to high food prices, an energy crisis and the ongoing effect of the 2010 floods. The 
declining security conditions have likely only hindered foreign investment. But the donor-state 
relationship has also taken a blow since Osama bin Laden’s death on Pakistani soil in May 2011. 
The September 2011 announcement by US Admiral Mike Mullen that Pakistan’s spy agency 
(ISI) is linked to militant groups who carried out the September 13 US Embassy in Afghanistan 
has not helped bilateral relations either.1020 The United States has made military aid to Pakistan 
conditional upon certain security objectives and even financial aid is said to be at risk, with 
several senior US aid officials (e.g. US Congresswoman Kay Granger (R-TX), chairwoman of 
the House Appropriations subcommittee that allocates foreign aid1021) questioning the sincerity 
of Pakistan’s government.  
At the same time, increasing numbers of Pakistani political elites (e.g. Imran Khan) and 
analysts have called for the state to finally cut off US ties and make its own way to self-
sufficiency. Can the moral economy of foreign aid continue, with a patron-client relationship that 
is laced with such distrust? The mutual benefits may exist but the mutual perception of distrust 
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may permanently complicate this expectation relationship. Achieving policy legitimacy1022 in the 
eyes of political opposition and even citizens may be difficult for the current government, given 
increasing anti-American sentiment. 
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